C.

    § 58. It remains to consider Egoism and Utilitarianism. It is important to distinguish the former, as the doctrine that ‘my own pleasure is sole good,’ from the doctrine, opposed to Altruism, that to pursue my own pleasure exclusively is right as a means. …
    § 59. Egoism proper is utterly untenable, being self-contradictory; it fails to perceive that when I declare a thing to be my own good, I must be declaring it to be good absolutely or else not good at all. …
    § 60. This confusion is further brought out by an examination of Prof. Sidgwick's contrary view; …
    § 61. and it is shewn that, in consequence of this confusion, his representation of ‘the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence’ as ‘the profoundest problem of Ethics’, and his view that a certain hypothesis is required to ‘make Ethics rational’, are grossly erroneous. …
    § 62. The same confusion is involved in the attempt to infer Utilitarianism from Psychological Hedonism, as commonly held, e.g. by Mill. …
    § 63. Egoism proper seems also to owe its plausibility to its confusion with Egoism, as a doctrine of means. …
    § 64. Certain ambiguities in the conception of Utilitarianism are noticed; and it is pointed out (1) that, as a doctrine of the end to be pursued, it is finally refuted by the refutation of Hedonism, and (2) that, while the arguments most commonly urged in its favour could, at most, only shew it to offer a correct criterion of right action, they are quite insufficient even for this purpose. …
    § 65. Summary of chapter.