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cover
Works of G. E. Moore
Principia Ethica
Frontmatter
Table of Contents
Chapter III: Hedonism
B.

B.

    § 45. We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism as an ‘Intuition’, as which it has been clearly recognised by Prof. Sidgwick alone. That it should be thus incapable of proof is not, in itself, any reason for dissatisfaction. …
    § 46. In thus beginning to consider what things are good in themselves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind, and enter on the second division of ethical questions. …
    § 47. Mill's doctrine that some pleasures are superior ‘in quality’ to others implies both (1) that judgments of ends must be ‘intuitions’; …
    § 48. and (2) that pleasure is not the sole good. …
    § 49. Prof. Sidgwick has avoided those confusions made by Mill: in considering his arguments we shall, therefore, merely consider the question ‘Is pleasure the sole good?’
    § 50. Prof. Sidgwick first tries to show that nothing outside of Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for doubting this. …
    § 51. He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. …
    § 52. But pleasure must be distinguished from consciousness of pleasure, and (1) it is plain that, when so distinguished, pleasure is not the sole good; …
    § 53. and (2) it may be made equally plain that consciousness of pleasure is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to distinguish it from its usual accompaniments. …
    § 54. Of Prof. Sidgwick's two arguments for the contrary view, the second is equally compatible with the supposition that pleasure is a mere criterion of what is right; …
    § 55. and in his first, the appeal to reflective intuition, he fails to put the question clearly (1) in that he does not recognize the principle of organic unities; …
    § 56. and (2) in that he fails to emphasize that the agreement, which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and those of Common Sense, only holds of judgments of means: hedonistic judgments of ends are flagrantly paradoxical. …
    § 57. I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, if proper precautions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as the sole good. …