B.

    § 69. But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical Ethics, is not that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon the question involved in practical Ethics ‘What effects will my action produce?’, but that it has such a bearing upon the fundamental ethical question, ‘What is good in itself?’ This theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy; it only remains to discuss certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility. …
    § 70. One such source of confusion seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between the proposition ‘This is good’, when it means ‘This existing thing is good’, and the same proposition, when it means ‘The existence of this kind of thing would be good’; …
    § 71. and another seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between that which suggests a truth, or is a cause of our knowing it, and that upon which it logically depends, or which is a reason for believing it: in the former sense fiction has a more important bearing on Ethics than Metaphysics can have. …