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Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia
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Volume 25. Disputationes Metaphysicae
DISPUTATIO I. DE NATURA PRIMAE PHILOSOPHIAE SEU METAPHYSICAE
Notes

Notes

†* Letzte Aktualisierung: 17. Juli 2015. Michael.Renemann@ruhr-uni-bochum.de. – Dank an Prof. Salvador Castellote und besonders an Dr. Shane Duarte, der die gesamte Disputation im Rahmen einer Übersetzung in Englische sehr genau gelesen und im Zweifelsfall auch andere Editionen (z.B. die von 1597) hinzugezogen hat. Durch seine Hinweise ist die vorliegende Digitalisierung jetzt zuverlässiger als die Vivès-Ausgabe. Details sind in den Fußnoten vermerkt.

†1 Vivès: "56" (Thanks to Dr. Shane Duarte.)

†2 The Vivès edition has immortali , which seems to be a mistake. In line with the Rábade edition, we are following the 1597 edition which has immateriali . Cf. editionem Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofía, Madrid 1960, vol. I, p. 219, footnote.

†3 We want to thank Dr. Shane Duarte (Stanford) for pointing out to us that the 1597 edition (as well as the 1605 edition Apud Io. Baptistam Colosinum ) has a “non” before “expectatur”, which the Vivès edition does not have. After some investigation, we added this “non” to our text. The question in this paragraph seems to be whether there is some genuinely “philosophical” evidence, situated between evidence from the senses and metaphysical evidence. And Suárez argues that within philosophy, there are two kinds of evidence - a posteriori evidence, which is based upon sensory cognition, and some deeper, a priori kind of evidence. Since “a higher evidence ... is not expected [to come] from metaphysics” ( non expectatur ... a metaphysica ), the deeper kind of evidence must be based upon philosophy's own principles. Here is my preliminary translation of this paragraph: “But philosophy, even though it does not have as much evidence as mathematics, has some evidence which is proper and adapted to it, because it is not founded per se on human authority. Because as far as it does proceed in such a way, it is not a science, but only belief and opinion, and it does not change its ratio or become more evident due to some connection with metaphysics. Therefore, it is founded per se in the evidence of its [own] principles, which [evidence] it also does not have primarily from metaphysics, but from the habitus of its principles. Because if somebody says that this evidence in philosophy is only a posteriori and from the effects cognized through the senses, I will reply by acknowledging that this is the case with us ( in nobis ) mainly because of our imperfection. But this has no consequences for our topic. Because those physical things which are understood so imperfectly by us through philosophy, are not understood more perfectly or more evidently through metaphysics. Because if it is possible that some natural things be understood in a more perfect way by the human intellect joined with body, which is in fact possible, then a higher evidence concerning these things ( in his ) is not expected [to come] from metaphysics, but in philosophy per se it ( sc. the higher evidence) can be had. Because even though it ( sc. philosophy) starts through the senses, it is not always founded in them. Rather, the senses are used by the intellect as an instrument to perceive the natures of things, and with these natures cognized, the intellect produces an a priori demonstration through principles which are per se and from the terms evident ( per se et ex terminis evidentia ) to the intellect. And no other mode can be thought up in which a more perfect or more evident knowledge of natural things be had through metaphysics. Therefore, thinking up such a mode of saying is for nothing.”

†4 The following portion of the text is omitted in Vivès and 1614 (Cologne), but is included in 1597 and 1605: "... quia nulla est sufficiens ratio ad fingendum illum. Secundo, ..." (Discovered by Dr. Shane Duarte.)

†5 Mistake in Vivès: “ 2 Contra Gentes”. The 1597 edition has it right. (Discovered by Dr. Shane Duarte.)

†6 http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg3001.html#25767

†7 Vivès has “ea ut demonstret”. We are following Shane Duarte's suggestion to stick to the 1597 edition, which – like the 1605 edition Apud Io. Baptistam Colosinum – has “eave demonstret”.

†8 Shane Duarte suggested to use “dicebam” (as in the 1597 edition) instead of “dicebant” (as in the Vivès edition). We follow his suggestion, because obviously, Suárez refers here to his answer to the first difficulty, given in the previous paragraph (n. 16).

†9 Probably refers to Nicomachean Ethics VI.3 - cf. DM 1,3,1 and DM 1,4,15. (Thanks to Shane Duarte.)

†10 We are following the Rábade edition, which has “finalem” (as in the 1597 edition) instead of “formalem” (as in the Vivès edition). Cf. editionem Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofía, Madrid 1960, vol. I, p. 280, footnote. (Thanks to Shane Duarte.)

†11 Vivès: “artificio in re effecta”. (Thanks to Shane Duarte.)

†12 The 1597 edition and Vivès have “geometriam”, while the 1600 edition has “geometram” which seems to correspond better to “primum philosophum” (at the end of the sentence). Nevertheless, we decided to stick to “geometriam”.

†13 Vivès has “ad alteram partem ex divisione”, but Shane Duarte pointed out to us that “de divisione” (as the 1597 edition has it) would be preferable. We share his assessment, since Suárez is refuting here the argument that the aim of metaphysics is to treat the “instrumenta sciendi”, i.e. definitio, divisio , and argumentatio (1.4.28). The second part ( altera pars ) of the argument is “about division” ( de divisione ). Cf. Bartolomeo Mastri de Meldola, In Logicam, d. 1 (De modis, seu instrumentis sciendi), q. 1 (Quid, et quotuplex sit modus, seu instrumentum sciendi) ( Google Books , digitized version on this homepage ).

†14 IV Tusc., et II Officior. (Footnote from the Vivès edition.)

†15 The Vivès edition has charitas , which seems to be a mistake. In line with the Rábade edition, we are following the 1597 edition which has claritas . Cf. editionem Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofía, Madrid 1960, vol. I, p. 298, footnote.

†16 For grammatical reasons, we are following the 1597 edition which has “demonstrantur”, while Vivès has “demonstratur”. (Thanks to Shane Duarte.)

†17 The 1597, 1614, and Vives edition all read: “IaIIae, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.” The 1605 edition reads: “Ia, q. 2, a. 2, ad. 2.” But Suárez seems to be quoting from ST Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2 . (Shane Duarte)

†18 Lege Aristotelem, de sensu et sensibili. (Footnote from the Vivès edition.)

†19 See Problems, XXXI, c. 17, 259a18-19. (Shane Duarte)

†20 Reading '5' with the editions of 1597 and 1605. The 1614 and Vivès editions have '6.' (Shane Duarte)

†21 Fonseca, lib. I, c. 1, q. 4. (Footnote from the Vivès edition.)