7 occurrences of treason in this volume.
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The Works of Niccolò Machiavelli
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The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. 3: Diplomatic Missions 1498-1505
MISSIONS.
Memorandum of the Troops of the Duke Valentino.
LETTER XXI.

Niccolo Machiavelli
Machiavelli, Niccolo

8 November, 1502
Imola

LETTER XXI.

Magnificent Signori: —

Apart from what I have written in the enclosed, I must communicate to your Lordships a conversation I had with that friend of mine, who, as I have mentioned to you, told me within the past few days that it was not well for you to remain on general good terms with the Duke; and that it would be an easy matter for you to form a close alliance with him, each desiring it and having both the same enemies. That individual, having appointed an interview with me yesterday evening, said to me: “Secretary, I have on a former occasion intimated to you that for your Signoria to remain on mere general good terms with the Duke was of little advantage to him, and still less to you; for this reason, that the Duke, seeing that all remains in uncertainty with regard to your Signoria, will form an alliance with others. I wish to talk this over with you at length this evening, and although I speak only for myself, yet I have good grounds for what I am about to say to you. The Duke knows very well that the Pope may die any day, and that, if he desires to preserve the states which he has, it behooves him to think of basing his power upon some other foundation before the death of the Pope. His first reliance will be upon the king of France, the next upon his own armed forces; and we see that he has already brought together nearly five hundred men-at-arms, and as many light cavalry, which will be in effective condition within a few days. But as he foresees that in time these

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two reliances might not suffice him, he thinks of making his neighbors his allies and friends; and those who of necessity must defend him, if they wish to defend themselves, are the Florentines, the Bolognese, and Mantua and Ferrara. To begin with the last, you see what an alliance he has formed with Ferrara; for besides the marriage of his sister with so large a dowry, he has already bestowed and continues to shower favors upon the Ferrarese Cardinal.* With Mantua the Duke is negotiating two matters; the one is a cardinal’s hat for the brother of the Marquis, and the other a marriage between the Duke’s daughter and the son of the Marquis. As compensation for the hat, the Marquis and his brother are to deposit forty thousand ducats, which sum is afterwards to constitute the dowry of the Duke’s daughter. These things are to be carried into effect anyhow, and are obligations calculated to preserve friendships. With Bologna he is also negotiating some arrangement separate from the other confederates; and so far as I see, it is in a fair way of accomplishment, for the Duke of Ferrara desires it very much. His Excellency Duke Valentino is well disposed for it and the terms are favorable for the Bentivogli. And in fact the Duke was never as anxious for the possession of Bologna as he has been to assure himself of Romagna, and whenever he succeeds in that he will be satisfied. Thus, if those four states which adjoin each other become united and well armed, they are not to be disregarded. And the king of France, knowing that he can rely upon them, is disposed even to increase their power. As to your Florentine Signoria, it is less than three days since that I heard the Duke argue that he wished they would make free use of his territory, as he would of theirs, they being both friends of the
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king of France and himself; and that he had no intention of acting adversely to them in any way, even if no definite treaty were concluded between them; but should it really come to such a treaty, then they would find out the difference between his friendship and that of others. But to come back to the main point, I tell you that to remain on mere general good terms would be a greater disadvantage for your Signoria than for the Duke; for his Excellency having the good will of the king and of the aforementioned princes, whilst your Signoria have no other support than that of the king, they will find that they have more need of the Duke than the Duke of them. However, I do not by any means wish to say that the Duke is not disposed to render them any service; but should it happen that they really have need of him, and he being under no obligations to them, he would be free to aid them or not, as might seem good to him. Now were you to ask me what they ought to do, and that I should specify some particulars, I would reply, that you for your part have two sores, which, if you do not heal them, will enfeeble you and perhaps cause your death. The one is Pisa, and the other is Vitellozzo. If now you were to recover the former, and if the latter were crushed, would not that be a great advantage for your republic? And so far as the Duke is concerned, I tell you that his Excellency would be satisfied with the honor of having his former engagement renewed by your Signoria, which he would value more than money or anything else; so that if you were to find means for bringing this about, everything would be satisfactorily settled. And if you were to tell me with regard to Vitellozzo, that the Duke has made a compact with him and the Orsini, I should reply that the ratification of it has not yet been received, and that the Duke would give the best town he possesses that that ratification should not come; or that such a compact had never been talked about. Still, if the ratification should come, I would say, ‘Where there are men there are means’; and it is better to come to an understanding, and that orally rather than by writing. You must understand, furthermore, that it is necessary for the Duke to save a portion of the Orsini; for in case of the Pope’s death it is important for the Duke to have some friends in Rome. But he cannot bear to hear the name of Vitellozzo as much as mentioned; for he regards him as a
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venomous serpent, and as a firebrand for Tuscany and for all Italy, who has done and continues to do all he can to prevent the Orsini from ratifying the treaty, as they ought to do. I desire, therefore, that you should write to the Gonfalonier, or to the Ten, what I have said to you, although it comes altogether from me. Remind them also of another thing, namely, that it might easily happen that the king of France should direct your Signoria to maintain the engagement of the Duke, and to place their troops at his service, which they would in that case be obliged to do without receiving any credit for it. And therefore you should remind your Signoria that, when a service has to be rendered, it is better to perform it of one’s own free will, and so as to have it appreciated rather than otherwise.”

And finally he begged me to treat with the utmost discretion what he had said against Vitellozzo, as well as other important matters. The argument of this friend of mine was quite lengthy, and of a character that will be appreciated by your Lordships. I replied briefly, and only to those points that seemed specially to require it. In the first instance, I told him that his Excellency the Duke had acted wisely in arming himself and in securing allies; and secondly, I confessed to him that it was our earnest desire to recover Pisa, and to secure ourselves against Vitellozzo, although we did not regard him as of much account. Thirdly, with regard to the engagement of the Duke I told him, speaking all the while, however, only for myself, that the power of his Excellency the Duke was not to be measured in the same way as that of the other lords, who so far as their states were concerned had nothing to show but simply their carriages, whilst the Duke must be looked upon as a new power in Italy, with which it was better to conclude a friendship and alliance rather than a military engagement. And I added, that, as alliances between princes are maintained only by arms, inasmuch as the power of arms alone could enforce their observance, your Lordships would not be able to see what security they could have for their part when three fourths or three fifths of their troops were under the control of the Duke. But I wanted him to know that I did not say this because I doubted the good faith of the Duke, but because I knew your Lordships to be prudent men; that it was the duty of governments to be circumspect,

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and never to expose themselves by their acts to be deceived. As to what he had said with regard to the possibility of the king of France’s commanding your Lordships to do certain things, I said that there was not a doubt but what his Majesty might dispose of the Florentine republic as of his own property; but neither the king nor any one else could make your Lordships do what was not possible. My friend replied only to that part of my remarks which related to the Duke’s engagement, saying that I had spoken frankly and loyally, which was very gratifying to him; suggesting at the same time that the three hundred men might really be reduced to two hundred, whilst nominally the number of three hundred might be maintained; and to facilitate this, one tenth of the difference might be conceded to your Lordships, or two thirds to the priests. As my friend could not continue the conversation any longer, owing to his other important occupations, he left me, urging me, however, to make the substance of his argument known in the proper place; but with an injunction of secrecy. This I have done herewith, as your Lordships will observe.

I cannot say whether these suggestions were inspired by the Duke, or whether they originate with my friend; all I can tell you is, that the latter is one of the Duke’s chief ministers; and if all this is merely the result of his own imagination, it is quite possible that he deceives himself, for he is a man of the best and most benevolent disposition. I beg your Lordships will examine the whole subject, and let me have your reply.


Niccolo Machiavelli.
Imola,
8 November, 1502.