BEASTS(Souls of).

Gomez Pereira was a Spanish physician of the sixteenth century, who affected to combat received opinions and support paradoxes. Among other strange notions, he maintained that brutes were mere machines. Although fiercely attacked, he formed no sect, and his opinions soon fell into oblivion; so that there is little probability that Descartes, who read little, and supported precisely the same position, ever heard of him. Some writers indeed, assert that this notion was entertained anterior to the time of St. Augustin, and even to that

of the Cæsars, 300 years before; as also that it was maintained by the Stoics, and by the Cynic Diogenes: but these allegations are not capable of demonstration. Vossius observes, that there have been philosophers who made no distinction between thought and sensation, whence they should have concluded, either that beasts possess reason, or that they are destitute of sensation. He adds, that the last proposition pleased nobody among the ancients, but that it was maintained in the seventeenth century by Gomez Pereira The present article is selected from a mass of argument and erudition, on this subject, in the articles Pereira and Rorarius in the original. The investigation of the opinions of the ancients, upon the mental faculties of brutes, being chiefly for the purpose of proving a negation; viz. that none before Pereira and Descartes regarded them as automata, or mere machines, is omitted. The various conjectures of the moderns, previously to Descartes, are equally unimportant, centred, as they all very nearly were, in the greatly modified Aristotelian notion of a sensitive and mortal soul in brutes; the most orthodox opinion, it is presumed, of the present day. The difficulties attendant upon both theories are smartly canvassed in these extracts, which exhibit the boundaries of purely intellectual discovery on this subject, pretty clearly. Whether the existing predilection for physiological research will carry conclusions further, it is not the province of a note to determine.—Ed. ⁵⁶.

According to Vossius, Pereira explained not the motions of beasts by mechanical principles, but by the occult qualities of antipathy and sympathy. He rejected the sensitive souls, because he believed not that a material, divisible, and mortal substance was capable of feeling; whence he concluded, that if beasts had a sensitive soul, it was not corporal. When he was put in mind of the actions of beasts; for example, of a dog, he answered, that it was not necessary they should proceed from a sensitive faculty; for if it were so, the peripatetics would be in the wrong not to ascribe to a rational soul so

many actions of a dog which are like those of a man. He had wit enough to take advantage of the weak side of the cause of his adversaries, which is the common shift of those who undertake to maintain absurdities.

The doctrine which so soon was forgotten from Pereira, was destined to produce a wide and ex-tensive controversy as modified and delivered by Descartes. The ill consequences of the opinion» which gives beasts a sensitive soul, was thoroughly exposed in this disputation. Whatever the weight of rational objection to theautomata of the Cartesians, there is, in fact, nothing more diverting than to see with what authority the schoolmen take upon them to set bounds to the knowledge of beasts. They will have it, that they know only particular and material objects, and that they only love what is profitable and agreeable; that they cannot reflect upon their sensations and their desires, nor infer one thing from another. One would think that they have searched more exactly into the faculties and acts of the souls of beasts, than the most expert anatomists into the entrails of dogs. Their temerity is so great, that though they had found out the truth by chance, they would yet have rendered themselves unworthy of praise, and even of excuse. But let us give them quarter; let us grant them all that they suppose: what do they hope for from it? Do they fancy that by this means they shall obtain from anybody that can reason, that it ought to be granted that the soul of man is not of the same species with that of beasts? This is a chimerical pretension. It is evident to any one that can judge of things, that every being that has sense, knows that it has it; and it would not be more absurd to maintain, that the soul of man knows actually an object without knowing that it knows it; than it is absurd to say, that the soul of

a dog sees a bird, without perceiving that she sees it. This shows that all the acts of the sensitive faculty are of their own nature, and by their own essence, reflective upon themselves.

It is conceded that the memory of beasts is an act that makes them remember what is past, and which tells them that they remember it. How, then can it be said that they have not the power of reflecting upon their thoughts, nor of drawing consequences? But, once more, let us not dispute upon that: let us give these philosophers leave to build their suppositions very ill; let us only make use of what they teach. They say, that the soul of beasts perceives all the objects of the five external senses; that among those objects it judges that some are suitable to it, and others hurtful; and that in consequence of this judgment, it desires those that are suitable, and abhors the others; and that in order to enjoy the object it desires, it transports its organs to the place where that object is; and that in order to fly from the object which it hates, it withdraws its organs from the place where the object is. I conclude from all this, that if it do not produce acts so noble as those of our soul, it is not its fault, or because it is of a nature less perfect than of the soul of man; it is only because the organs it animates do not resemble ours. I ask of these gentlemen, if they would allow that one should say, that the soul of a man is of another species at the age of thirty-five years, than at the age of one month? Or, that the soul of a madman, of an idiot, or of an old man become childish through age, is not substantially as perfect as the soul of a man of excellent parts? They would, without doubt, reject this opinion as a gross error, and with good reason; for it is certain that the same soul, which in children is only sensitive, meditates and reasons solidly in a grown man; and

that the same soul which makes its reason and wit to be admired in a perfect man, would only dote in an old man, talk idly in a natural, and exert sensation in a child.

We should be guilty of a gross error did we believe that the soul of man is only capable of thoughts which are known to us. There are infinite sensations, passions, and ideas, of which this soul is very capable, though it be never affected with them during this life. If it were united to organs different from ours, it would think otherwise than it does at present, and its modifications might be far more noble than those we now experience. If there were substances which in organized bodies had a train of sensations, and other thoughts far more sublime than ours, could it be said that they are of a more perfect nature than our soul? No, without doubt; for if our soul were removed into those bodies, it would have the same train of sensations, and other thoughts, far more sublime than ours. This may be easily applied to the soul of beasts. It will be granted us that it has a sensation of bodies; that it discerns them; that it desires some, and abhors others. This is enough: it is therefore a substance that thinks; it is therefore capable of thought in general; it can therefore entertain all sorts of thoughts; it can therefore reason; it can therefore know what is honest: the universals; the axioms of metaphysics; the rules of morality, &c. For as wax can receive the impression of one seal, it manifestly follows, that it may receive the figure of any seal; it must likewise be granted, that since a soul is capable of one thought, it is capable of any thought. It would be absurd to reason thus: “ This piece of wax has only received the impression of three or four seals; therefore it cannot receive the impression of a thousand. This piece of pewter has never been a

plate; therefore it can never be made one, and it is of another nature than the pewter plate I see there.” They reason no better who say: “The soul of a dog has never had any thing but sensations, &c.; therefore it is not capable of the ideas of morality, or metaphysical notions.” Whence comes it that a piece of wax bears the impression of a prince, and that another does not? It is because the seal has been applied to the one and not to the other. The piece of pewter that never was a plate, will be one if you cast it into the mould of a plate. Cast in like manner the soul of this beast into the mould of universal ideas, and of the notions of arts and sciences; I mean, unite it to a well-chosen human body; it will become the soul of a man of parts, and be no more that of a beast.

You may see therefore, that it is impossible for the school-philosophers to prove that the souls of men and those of beasts are of a different nature: let them say, and repeat it a thousand and a thousand times—“ That man’s soul reasons and knows universals and virtue, and that of beasts knows nothing of all this.” We answer them, “ these differences are only accidental, and are no marks of a specific difference. Aristotle and Cicero at the age of one year, never had more sublime thoughts than those of a dog; and if they had lived in the state of infancy thirty or forty years, the thoughts of their souls had never been any thing but sensations and little passions for play and eating; it is therefore by accident that they have surpassed beasts; it is because their organs on which their thoughts depended, have acquired such and such modifications, to which the organs of beasts arrive not. The soul of a dog in the organs of Aristotle or Cicero, would not have failed to acquire all the knowledge of those two great men.”

The following consequence is very false—viz.,

“such a soul does not reason, knows not universals, therefore it is of a different nature from that of a great philosopher.” If this consequence were good, it would follow that the soul of little children is different from that of men. What then do you dream of, you Peripatetic Divines, when you pretend that if the souls of beasts do not reason, they are essentially less perfect than souls that reason? You ought first to have proved that the want of reasoning in beasts proceeds from a real and intrinsic imperfection of the soul, and not from the organic dispositions on which it depends; but this is what you can never be able to prove, for it is clear, that a subject which is capable of the thoughts which you allow in the soul of beasts, is capable of reasoning, and of any other thought; from whence it results, that if it do not actually reason, it is because of certain accidental and external obstacles; I mean, because the Creator of all things has fixed every soul to a certain train of thoughts, by making it depend on the motions of certain bodies. This is the reason why sucking-children, naturals, and madmen do not reason.

One cannot calmly think of the consequences of this doctrine— “ That the soul of men and the soul of beasts do not differ substantially, they are of the same species, the one acquires more knowledge than the other, but these are only accidental advantages, and depending on an arbitrary institution.” Yet this doctrine necessarily and inevitably flows from what the schools teach about the knowledge of beasts. It follows from thence, that if their souls arc material and mortal, the souls of men are so likewise; and that if the soul of man be a substance spiritual and immortal, the soul of beasts is so too. Sad consequences ! turn which way we will. For if to avoid the immortality of the soul of beasts, we suppose that the soul of man dies with the body;

we overthrow the doctrine of another life, and sap the foundations of religion. If to preserve to our souls the privilege of immortality, we extend it to those of beasts, into what an abyss do we fall? What shall we do with so many immortal souls? Will there be for them also a heaven and a hell? Will they go from one body to another? Will they be annihilated as the beasts die? Will God create continually an infinite number of spirits, to plunge them again so soon into nothing? How many insects are there which live only a few days? Let us not imagine that it is sufficient to create souls for the beasts which we do know; those that we do not know are far the greater number. The microscopes discover them to us by thousands in a single drop of liquor. Many more would be discovered if we had more perfect microscopes. And let no man say that insects are only machines; for one might better explain by this hypothesis the actions of dogs, than the actions of pismires and bees. There is, perhaps, more wit and reason in the invisible creatures, than in those which are large. They also say, “ there is specific difference between the souls of men and those of beasts — that the soul of beasts is a material form, but that the soul of man is a spirit which God creates immediately. But how do they prove it? I suppose they only argue upon the principles of natural reason, without having recourse to scripture or the doctrines of religion; and I ask of them one good proof to show that the souls of beasts are corporeal, and that ours is not? They will allege the beauty and extent of human knowledge; and the smallness, grossness, and obscurity of the knowledge of beasts; and they will conclude, that a corporeal principle is capable of producing the knowledge of beasts, but not the reflections, the reasonings, the universal ideas, the ideas of honour and honesty, which are found in the soul of man; and that, by consequence, this soul ought to be of an order superior to matter, and ought to be a spirit. I will not say now that they assert rashly, that the soul of beasts does not argue, and that it has no idea of what is honest. Let us lay aside this objection, and only say, that it is a thousand times more difficult to see a tree, than to know the act by which we see it; so that if a material principle be capable of knowing an infinite number of outward things, it will be far more capable of knowing its own thoughts, and of comparing them together, and multiplying them; therefore, the reflections, and conclusions, and abstractions of man, require not a principle nobler than matter. A very learned peripatetic is of our side; let us hear him speak; his confession will be more persuasive than my objections. “ If you once admit,” says he, “ that all that is most wonderful in the actions of beasts, may be done by means of a material soul; will you not soon grant what follows, and say, that all that passes in man may be also done by a material soul?—If you once grant that beasts, without any spiritual soul, are capable of thinking, of acting for an end, of foreseeing things to come, of remembering what is past, of acquiring experience by the particular reflection they make upon it; why will you not grant that men are capable of exercising their functions without any spiritual soul? After all, the operations of men are no other than those which you ascribe to beasts; if there be any difference, it is only as to more or less; and so, all that you can say will only be, that the souls of men are more perfect than those of beasts, because men remember better than they, think with more reflection, and foresee things with more certainty; but in fine you cannot say, but that their souls are still material. You will say, perhaps, that in men there are some operations that cannot suit with beasts, nor proceed from any other principle than a spiritual soul; and those operations are universal knowledge; that ratiocination, whereby we infer one thing from another: and the ideas we have of infinity, and of things spiritual which do not fall under the senses; but those, who deny that there is any knowledge in beasts, do not deny for all that, that those thoughts and reasonings are in us, since we ourselves are conscious of them; so that they have always the same right which you have to prove the existence of the rational souk But besides, they add, that all those operations which you look upon to be so extraordinary, differ only in degrees from the operations which you attribute to beasts. And certainly, it seems that to act 'with a design, to improve by experience, to foresee things to come, (which you grant to beasts) ought to proceed no less from a spiritual principle than what is found in man. For, after all, what is an universal knowledge, but a knowledge which suits with many things that are like, as the picture of a man would suit with all the faces that should resemble it? What is reasoning, but a knowledge produced by another knowledge, as we see that a motion is produced by another motion? Certainly, if it be once granted, that thought, intention, and reflection, may proceed from a body animated with a material form; it will be very difficult to prove, that the reasonings and ideas of man cannot proceed from a body animated likewise with a material form.”

I desire all my readers to take notice of the unlucky condition the school-men are in, as to the doctrine of the sensitive soul. They allege against Descartes the most surprising actions of beasts; they choose them on purpose, the better to confound him; but afterwards they find that they have gone too far, and have supplied their adversary

with weapons to destroy the specific difference which they endeavour to prove between our souls and those of beasts. They could wish that one should forget all the examples of cunning, precaution, docility, and knowledge of things to come, which they have set forth with so much pomp, in order to show that beasts are not mere machines; they could wish that one should mind only the gross actions of an ox whose sole business is feeding; but it is too late to require such a thing; those very examples are made use of to confound them, and to prove against them, that if a material soul be capable of all those things, it will be able to do whatever is performed by the soul of man. Only a greater degree of refinement will be wanting to the souls of beasts. Must we not suppose that the soul of a dog, or of an ape, is not of so coarse a nature as that of an ox? In one word, if nothing but a spiritual soul can produce the actions of a dull-witted clown, I will maintain against you, that nothing but a spiritual soul can produce the actions of an ape; and if you say that a corporeal principle is able to produce whatever is performed by apes, I will maintain against you, that a material principle may be the cause of whatever is performed by stupid men; and that provided matter be subtilized, and disentangled from all gross particles, phlegms,&c., it may be the cause of whatever the most understanding man can do.

Some authors insinuate, that since the soul of man is endowed with free-will, and that of beasts is deprived of it, there must needs be a specific difference between them, and one must be spiritual and the other material. The Jesuit Theophilus Raynaud, published in 1630, a little book intituled “ Calvinismus Bestiarum Religio.” His chief design was to prove that “ Calvinism was to be accounted the religion of beasts; because, according to their

principles, man was degraded into the rank of beasts, and deprived of the degree and dignity of man. In order to the proof of which, two propositions were by him to be established. One is, that to man, considered as such, liberty of acting is essential. The other, that by Calvinism, liberty is destroyed.” He supposes that the liberty of indifference is the character whereby men are distinguished from beasts; for as to the liberty, which consists only in being free from constraint, or in spontaneity, no school-men can say that beasts are deprived of it. I will make it appear that it is most false, that a soul endowed with free-will is of another kind than a soul that is not endowed with it. The souls of children and madmen are destitute of free-will, and yet they are of the same species with the souls that are most free. To which may be added, that those who maintain the liberty of indifference, say, that it will cease after this life; and yet they acknowledge that a human soul is the same substance upon earth as in heaven or in hell. It is, therefore, manifest, that the liberty of indifference is not an essential attribute of creatures, but a gift, or an accidental favour bestowed upon them by the Creator; and, consequently, the souls that are not gratified with it, are not of a different species from those that receive it. This argument is therefore very wrong. The souls of beasts are deprived of free-will, but the souls of men are not deprived of it; therefore, the souls of beasts are material, and the souls of men are spiritual. I will go further and say, that those who admit of a sensitive soul, have no good reason to assert that beasts are not free creatures. Do not they say, that they do a thousand things with great pleasure, being directed by the judgment they make of the usefulness of objects, whereby they are prompted to unite themselves to those objects? If liberty consist only in being free from constraint, and in a spontaneity preceded by the discerning of the objects, is it not an absurd thing to deny the liberty of beasts? Has not a hungry dog the power of abstaining from a piece of meat, when he is afraid of being beaten if he do not abstain from it? Is not this to have the power of acting or not acting? Doubtless his abstinence proceeds from his comparing his hunger with the blows of a stick, which ho judges to be more intolerable than hunger. If you observe all the human actions that are ascribed to a liberty of indifference, you will find that a man does never suspend them, or never chooses one of the two contraries, but because, like the dog, having compared the reasonspro and con, he sees more inducements to suspend his action than to act, or has more motives for one action than for another.

One of the strongest arguments alleged for the liberty of man, is taken from the punishment of malefactors. All societies are agreed to punish them exemplarily, and even to extend, in some cases, the punishment to their dead bodies. They are deprived of burial, and exposed to the public view upon wheels and gibbets. If man did not act freely; if he were determined by a fatal and unavoidable necessity to have a certain train of thoughts; robberies and murders should not be punished, and no advantage could be expected from the punishment of criminals; for those who should see the dead body of a malefactor upon a wheel, would not be less subject than before to that prevailing power, which makes them act, and does not allow them the use of their liberty. This argument for a free-will is not so strong as it seems to be; for though men are persuaded that machines have no feeling, they will nevertheless give them a hundred blows with a hammer, when they are out of order, if they think that they may be set right by flatting

a wheel, or another piece of iron. They would, therefore, cause a pickpocket to be whipped, though they knew that he has no free-will, if experience had taught them that the whipping of people keeps them from committing certain actions. However, if this argument for a free-will have any force, it will manifestly show that beasts are not deprived of liberty. Men punish them every day, and mend their faults by that means. Ochinus, in the beginning of his Labyrinths, examines all the reasons which make us believe that we act freely; and says among other things against that which is taken from the punishments inflicted upon malefactors, that if the judges were sure that the hanging of a horse which had killed a man, and the leaving him a long time upon the gallows in the highway, would hinder other horses from doing mischief, they would use that punishment whenever a horse maims or kills anybody by kicking or biting. It is likely he did not know that in some countries they make use of such sights, to keep beasts in awe. Rorarius was an eye-witness of it; he saw two wolves hanging upon a gibbet in the duchy of Juliers, and he observes, that it made a greater impression upon the other wolves, than the mark of a red-hot iron, the loss of one’s ears,&c., does upon thieves The doctrine of philosophical necessity combined with that of preponderating motive, makes all these odds even, and applies equally to man and beast. The argument in relation to malefactors remains a favourite one with the advocates of free-will, to this day; but even in this short passage, Bayle proves the futility of the reference. There is more philosophy in this reported reply of the judge to the horse-stealers than is generally imagined.—“You are not hanged for stealing a horse, but that horses may not be stolen.” In other words, a stronger motive to leave horses unstolen, is furnished to men of your habits and character, one that has a greater chance of being more weighty than the temptation; and which, if so, willnecessarily prevail. Hawks and Kites are nailed to barn doors, on exactly the same principle, and what is more to the purpose, the mental, if not the moral operations are the same.—Ed. ⁵⁷.

In short, the facts which concern the capacity of beasts, put under great difficulties both the followers of Descartes, and of Aristotle. This needs no proof with respect to the Cartesians; there is nobody but knows that it is difficult to explain how mere machines can do what animals do. Let us only prove that the Peripatetics will find it very hard to give good reason for what they assert. Every Peripatetic, when he hears it affirmed, that beasts are onlyautomata, or machines, presently objects, that a dog that hath been beaten for falling foul upon a dish of meat, touches it no more when he sees his master threatening him with a stick. But to show that this phenomenon cannot be explained by him that proposes it; it is enough to say, that if the action of this dog be attended with knowledge, the dog must necessarily reason—he must compare the time present with that which is past, and from thence draw a conclusion—he must needs remember both the blows that were given him, and why he has received them—he must needs know, that if he should fall foul upon the dish of meat, which affects his senses, he should do the same action for which he was beaten; and conclude, that to avoid a new beating, he must abstain from that meat. Is not this true reasoning? Can you explain this act by the simple supposition of a soul that has sense, without reflecting upon its acts—without remembrance—without comparing two ideas— without drawing any conclusion? Examine well the examples which are collected, and which are objected to the Cartesians; you will find they prove too much, for they prove that beasts compare the end with the means, and that on some occasions

they prefer what is honest before what is profitable; in short, that they are guided by the rules of equity and gratitude. What some authors relate of the eagerness of dogs to assist their master, and to revenge his death,&c., are things absolutely inexplicable according to the hypothesis of the Aristotelians; so that all their dispute against the disciples of Descartes, is labour in vain. There is no need of anything, but of he dexterous management which Pereira made use of. “ You grant,” said he to his adversaries, “ that animals do many things which much resembles what the rational soul does, and yet that their soul is not rational.” Why then did you forbid me to maintain that they do several things, which much resemble what a sensitive soul does, though their soul be not sensitive? I do not wonder in the least, that neither Descartes, nor any of his disciples ever made use of a passage in the “ Code of Justinian,” where it is said that beasts are incapable of doing any injury, because they want sense; it is clear that the wordsensits in that law is taken for design and understanding.

What induces the Cartesians to say that beasts areautomata, is, that according to them, all matter is incapable of thinking. They do not content themselves to say, that only spiritual substances are capable of reasonings, and to join a long train of consequences, but they maintain that every thought, whether you call it reflection, meditation, inferring from principles; or whether it be called sensation, imagination, instinct, is of such a nature, that the most subtile and perfect matter is incapable of it; and that it is to be found only in incorporeal substances. By this principle, there is no man but may be convinced of the immortality of his own soul. Every one knows that he thinks, and consequently, if he reason after the Cartesian manner, he must own that what in him is the subject of his thoughts

is distinct from his body; whence it follows, that in this respect he is immortal; for the mortality of creatures consists only in this, that they are composed of several parts of matter, which are separated one from another. This is a great advantage to religion; but it will be almost impossible to preserve it by philosophical reasons, if it be granted that beasts have a material soul which perishes with the body; a soul, I say, whose sensations and desires are the cause of the actions which we see them do.

The Theological advantages of Descartes’s opi-nion concerning beasts being mereautomata, do not stop there. They diffuse themselves over many important principles, which cannot be sufficiently maintained, if beasts be allowed to have a sensitive soul. Mr Locke has declared himself to be against those who will not allow reason to brutes. The following words will show you wherein he places the difference between men and beasts. “This I think I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them, and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes; and is an excellency, which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident, we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs, for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs. And, therefore, I think we may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men; and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which, at last, widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines, (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some

reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that they have sense; but it is only on particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses; they are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not, as I think, the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction It is pleasant in reference to the “Treatise on the Human Understanding,” then a new book, to read the following marginal testimony of Bayle: “ It is an excellent work, which deserved to be translated into French by M. Coste.”—Ed. ⁵⁸.”

There is in the “ Nouvelles de la République des Lettres,” an abstract of a book intituled, “ Essais nouveaux de Morale,” which was printed at Paris, in 1686. The author, who denies, on the one side, that beasts are endowed with the faculty of reasoning, confessés on the other side, that their actions are directed by an “ external reason,” and that “ the reason and wisdom which governs them, is a reason and wisdom more excellent and sure than that of men.” . ... “ The reason,” says he, “ which operates in beasts, is not in them .... it is, as St Thomas says, after all the ancient fathers, the sovereign and eternal reason of the supreme architect, who preserves his works, and directs them to the ends for which he created them, with the secret springs he has put in them, which are variously determined according to occurrences, to produce a thousand sorts of different motions, according to their several wants.” Add to this the following words of Mr Bernard:—“ The philosophers, who are most inclined to believe that beasts are mere machines, must ingenuously confess that they perform several actions, the mechanism of which it is impossible to explain. It would be much better to say in general, that God, who was willing that their machines should subsist from some time, has, through his infinite wisdom, disposed their

parts agreeably to such an intention. I think I have read somewhere this position, “ Deus est anima bru-torum: this expression is somewhat harsh; but it is susceptible of a reasonable sense.” Grotius says that some actions of beasts, wherein they give over their private interest in favour of others, proceed from an external intelligence. “Cæterarum animantium quædam utilitatum suarum studium, partim fœtuum suorum partim aliorum sibi congenerum respectu, aliquatenus temperant: quod in illis quidem procedere credimus ex principio aliquo intelligente extrinseco, quia circa actus alios, istis neutiquam difficiliores, par intelligentia in illis non apparet Grot. de Jure Belli et Pacis, Proleg. Num. 7. ⁵⁹.” “ Some of the other animals, do in some measure, abstain from what is profitable to themselves, in regard partly of their own young, and partly of those of others of the same species; which we believe to proceed from some outward intelligent principle, because about other actions not more difficult, the like understanding does not appear.” Gaspar Zieglerus, in his note upon this passage, complains of Grotius for not explaining more clearly his thoughts about the nature of that external principle; “ If it be the divine providence,” says he, “ Grotius lies open to the severe strokes of Dr. Juan Huarte, who shows that a philosopher ought not to explain phenomena by the immediate operation of God.” M de Vigneul Marville tells us that there was a certain philosopher, who in order to explain in M. Rohault’s conferences, how beasts, being mere machines, “acted nevertheless as if they had a soul,” made use of the hypothesis of the Comte de Gabalis, and by way of accommodation, made it serve his purpose; that is, he supposed that certain elementary spirits make it their business “ to put in motion all the machines of beasts, according to the rules of mechanics.” He gave so ingenious a turn to his discourse, that M. Pequet told him, that “ if his agreeable system were not true, it was however bene trovato” (well contrived Mélanges d’Histoire et d'Litterature, Tom. i. ⁶⁰). I make no doubt that some people will be pleased with it: but if I were to dispute about it, I could easily shew that it is insufficient to explain the phenomena, and that in some respects it is more intricate than that of Des Cartes.

You will find in the Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, that M. Vallade, author of a philosophical discourse, concerning the creation and ordering of the world, has explained the most surprising actions of brutes by mechanical laws. The same journal informs us, that M. de la Bruyère was censured for asserting, that beasts are nothing but matter. There is in the fine book of Don Francis Lami, about the knowledge of one's self, an explanation, wherein the author shows that there is no solid reason to ascribe either knowledge or immortality to the souls of beasts; whereas it cannot be reasonably denied that human souls have both the one and the other. That explanation is worth reading, especially because it contains a solution of the most perplexing difficulty of the Cartesian system; for Don Lami shows that anybody may be convinced by very strong arguments, that other men are not mere machines: and yet the Anti-Cartesians draw such an inference from this position, viz., that brutes are made up of organs so well contrived, that they may do without knowledge whatever they do. If God, say they, were able to form such a machine, he might also

make others that would perform all the actions of man, and consequently we could not be sure that any other man thinks besides ourselves. To conclude, the combat of sects is like that of the Greeks and Trojans the night that Troy was taken: they overcome one another by turns, as they happen to change their way of fighting. A Cartesian has no sooner run down a school-man’s opinion about the souls of beasts, than he finds that he may be beaten with his own weapons, and that his adversary may show him that he proves too much, and that if he will argue, consequently he must give Over some opinions; which he cannot do without making himself ridiculous, and admitting manifest absurdities. A sect, though put to its last shifts, will always recover, if it cease to stand upon the defensive, in order to act offensively by way of diversion and retort, and it seems that God, acting like the common father of all sects, is not willing that any of them should entirely triumph over another, and sink it beyond recovery.—Arts.PereiraandRorarius.