ARMINIANISM.

It was a great pity that Arminius did not govern himself by St Paul’s rules. That great apostle, inspired by God and immediately directed by the Holy Ghost, in all his writings raised to himself the objections which natural light forms against the doctrine of absolute predestination. He apprehends all the force of the objection; he proposes it without weakening it in the least. “ God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.” This is St Paul’s doctrine, and behold the difficulty which he starts upon it. “ Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?” This objection cannot be pushed farther: twenty pages by the subtilest Polinis could add nothing to it. What could they infer from it more than that in Calvin’s hypothesis, God will have men to commit sin? Now this is what St Paul knew could be objected against him. But what does he answer? Does he seek for distinctions and mollifications? Does he deny the fact? Does he allow it in part only? Does he enter into any particulars? Does he remove any equivocation in the words? Nothing of all this; he only alleges the sovereign power of God, and the supreme right which the Creator has to dispose of his creatures as it seems good to him. “ Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?” He

acknowledges an incomprehensibility in the thing which ought to put a stop to all disputes, and impose a profound silence on our reason. He cries out, “ O the depth and the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out !” All Christians ought to find a definitive sentence here, a judgment final and without appeal, in the dispute about grace; or rather they ought to learn by this conduct of St Paul, never to dispute about predestination, and at the first motion to oppose it in bar to all the subtilties of human wit, whether they offer of themselves while they are meditating on that great subject, or whether another suggests them. The best and shortest way is, to oppose this strong bank betimes, against inundations of argument, and to consider the definitive sentence of St Paul, as one of those immoveable rocks whose foundation is in the midst of the sea, against which the proudest billows cannot prevail, but turn to froth, dash and break themselves upon them in vain. All the arrows shot against such a shield, will have the same fate as that of Priam. Thus ought men to behave themselves, when the dispute happens between Christian and Christian. And if ever it be safe to give the mind some exercise on points of this kind, at least we ought to sound a retreat betimes and retire behind the bank I have spoken of. Had Arminius acted thus as often as his reason suggested to him difficulties against the hypothesis of the Calvinists, or at all times when he found himself called to answer any disputants, he would have taken a perfectly wise and apostolic course, and made use of the lights of his understanding just as he ought to have done. If he conceived that there was any thing too harsh in the ordinary doctrine, or if he found himself relieved by adopting a lest rigid method, he should have gone what lengths he thought fit for his own particular; but then he should have been content to have enjoyed that conveniency in silence: I mean without disturbing the rights of possession, since he could not do this without raising a dangerous storm in the church. His silence would have saved himself a great deal of trouble; he would have done well to have remembered an old fable,minus invidiœque. Horat. Epist. 17. lib. 1.

But, say they, would not he have been a prevaricator, and unworthy of the ministry, if he had neglected the instruction of his auditors, whom he believed to be engaged in a false doctrine? I answer, that two capital reasons excused his speaking out: one was, that he did not believe the hypothesis which he disapproved prejudicial to salvation; the other, that his new method was useless towards removing the chief difficulties that are to be met with in the matter of predestination. We must confess, absolutely speaking, that the least truth is worthy to be proposed, and that there is no falsity so inconsiderable, but it is better we should be healed, than tinctured with it. When, however, the circumstances of time and place will not permit any novelties to be proposed, be they never so true, without causing a thousand disorders in the universities, in families, and in the state at large; it is infinitely better to leave things as they are, than undertake to reform them: the remedy is worse than the disease. Our conduct in this case ought to resemble that towards certain sick persons, who can take no physic without stirring several ill humours, the agitation of which is more pernicious than the coagulation. I except one case where the saving of souls is the point, and the snatching them out of the jaws of the devil; for in this case charity will not suffer us to stand still, how great soever the commotions may be which are accidentally

occasioned; we must then submit all consequences to the care of Providence. In this respect Arminius was no way pressed to oppose the common doctrine, he did not believe that any one ran the hazard of salvation, by following the hypothesis of Calvin. Let us see another circumstance by which he rendered himself inexcusable. To a system full of great difficulties, he substituted another system, which to speak truly, draws after it no fewer difficulties than the former. One may say of his doctrine, what I have said of the innovations of Saumur. It is more earnest and less constrained than some opinions on the subject, but after all, it is no better than a palliative remedy; for the Arminians have scarcely answered some objections, which, as they pretend, cannot be refuted on Calvin's system, when they find themselves exposed to other difficulties which they cannot get clear of but by a sincere acknowledgment of the infirmity of the human mind, and by a consideration of the incomprehensible infinity of God. And was it worth while to contradict Calvin for this? Ought he to have been so very delicate in the beginning, seeing in the end he must have recourse to such an asylum? Why might not he as well begin with it, since he was doomed to come to it soon or late? He is mistaken who imagines, that after having entered the lists with a great disputant, he will be allowed to triumph only because he had some small advantage in the beginning. A runner who should outstrip his adversary three parts or more of the race, does not win the crown, unless he preserve his advantage to the end of the course. It is the same in controversies; it is not sufficient to parry the first thrusts. The replies and rejoinders must all be satisfied, till every doubt is perfectly cleared. Now this is what neither the hypothesis of Arminius, nor that of the Molinists, nor that of the Socinians, is able to do. The system of the Arminians is only fit to obtain some advantages in those preludes of the combat in which the forlorn hope is detached to skirmish; but when it comes to a general and decisive battle, it is forced to retire as well as the rest behind the intrenchments of an incomprehensible mystery This is a smart exposition of the difficulties attendant on the subject, which in fact involves the great question of the origin of evil, and the doctrine of philosophical necessity, a ground which cannot be taken from under the Calvinistic predestination, in itself so startling.—Ed. ⁴⁵.—Art,Arminius.