To Mr. Norton.

[Feb. 18, 1867.]

Being this morning inspired with certain reflections, which were suggested by our talk on your paper about religion, I have written out a “brief” of them; and as I am impatient to submit it to you, and cannot come this evening, as I should prefer, I enclose it in this note.

Religion (subjective) means a man’s devotion — the complete assent and concentration of his will — to any object which he acknowledges to have a right to his entire service, and supreme control over his life. Religion (objective) means the object or objects whose claims to this supremacy are

acknowledged. An irreligious man is, then, first, one who acknowledges no supreme ends or objects; or, secondly, one who, though he acknowledges, does not habitually submit his will to such a power.

Morality, as contradistinguished from religion, is, subjectively, the habit of observing certain rules of conduct, deemed worthy or conducive to generally desirable ends, whether with or without an acknowledgment of the supremacy of these rules as injunctions, or the supremacy of the ends which they are believed to subserve. Morality (objective), as contradistinguished from supreme ends, means the rules of conduct deemed worthy or subservient to any generally desirable ends, whether these are acknowledged as supreme or not. An immoral man is, then, one who does not observe habitually and consistently any principles of conduct: either, first, from infirmity of purpose or want of discipline; or, secondly, from pure selfishness or a disregard of generally desirable ends.

Religion and morality are both realized in the practical nature of man, in character, in the fashioning of his volitions and desires. Both are concerned with “duty” in the broadest sense of that word; and religious and moral duties are often indistinguishable. But religious duties, or acts which are believed to be religious duties, come to be distinguished from others by the predominance of two marks: first, their absolute or unconditional character; second, their inutility, or the immediacy of the relation of act to object or end.

Besides such immediate and unconditional or religious duties, civilization creates a host of others, and many other motives to their observance. Partial, relative, conditional duties, with which morality in the narrower sense of the word, or casuistry, has to deal, may be enforced by meaner motives than the acknowledgment of unconditional obligations as the grounds of all right conduct. Hence, the possibility of an irreligious morality.

The above discriminations are independent of any theory, utilitarian or other, of the source of moral and religious convictions and truths, and are designed to show that religion and morality are definable and distinguishable independently of creeds and codes. This is the same as Mill’s position.