VII. To the First Question

376. To the first question [n.191] I say that the unity of essence and plurality of persons do stand together, as appears from the solution of the preceding question [nn.353-370], because this plurality exists there at the same time along with this unity.

A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

377. Now to make this in some way clear one must note that, just as repugnant things are repugnant by their own proper reasons, so non-repugnant things, or compossibility, are so by the proper reasons of the compossible things.

378. But to see this compossibility one must look at the reasons of the extremes, namely of nature and of the supposit.

Here one should note that nature is not related to the supposit as a universal to a singular, because in accidents too singularity is found without the idea of supposit, and an individual nature was assumed in our substance by the Word, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith III ch.3, but not a supposit of our nature. Nor is the nature related to the supposit as the ‘in which’ to the ‘what’, for to the ‘in which’ of anything there corresponds a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’, and so, as nature is the ‘in what’, so it has a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’ which it does not contract to the supposit, and as the supposit is the ‘what’ or the ‘who’, so it has a proper ‘in what’ in which it subsists, and yet the supposit concomitantly is of necessity a singular, - and also, the nature cannot be an ‘in what’ with respect to something else, because it is subsistent, incapable of being the act of another subsistent thing; these two indicate a twofold incommunicability.Text cancelled by Scotus: “Second thus: plurality should never be posited without necessity; there is no necessity, whether in relation to itself or outwardly, for the contingency that there are several unborns; therefore there is only one. - Third, because one essence actually existing does not seem of itself to have very immediately several modes of existing. The opposite would follow if there were several ungenerated supposits. But it does not follow now, because the divine essence does not have very immediately several modes of existing without production, but only one of existing without production and another two by intermediates that are also productions.” ²¹³

379. Here one needs to know that something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that what it is communicated to is ‘it’, or by informing, such that what it is communicated to is ‘in it’, not ‘it’.

380. In the first way a universal is communicated to a singular, and in the second way a form to matter.Text cancelled by Scotus: “because the relations of the produced can be distinguished by the distinct ideas of producing in the producer, although there is the same supposit producing.” ²¹⁴ Any nature, therefore, insofar as concerns itself and the idea of nature, is communicable in both ways, namely to several supposits, each of which is ‘it’, - and also as ‘in which’, by way of form, in which the singular or the supposit is a quidditative being, or in possession of a nature; but the supposit is incommunicable by the opposed twofold incommunicability.

381. On this basis the intended proposition is made clear.

And first in this way: any nature is communicable to several things by identity,     therefore the divine nature too is communicable (for this is plain from the question set down before [nn.353-370]); but the nature is not divisible, from the question about the unity of God [nn.157-190]; therefore it is communicable without division.

382. Again I argue thus: ‘perfection simply’ as far as concerns itself, whatever may be incompossible with it, is better than any supposit absolutely taken according to idea of supposit; the divine nature is not thus better, ex hypothesi; therefore etc     . Proof of the minor: divine nature determines for itself a single subsistence, therefore it is of itself incompossible with any other subsistence, even precisely taken as it is another subsistence, namely without considering that it may be in another nature; and so, further, it is of itself not better than any other thing as this other thing is another subsistence.

383. The proof of the first consequence is that, just as anything of itself determines for itself a single supposit, so anything else incompossible with that is repugnant to it; ex hypothesi divine nature of itself determines for itself not only a subsistence which is in one nature (a trinity would stand along with this), but a single subsistence - this subsistence as it is a this - in idea of subsistence, without considering only the fact that it is in this nature.

384. The proof of the second consequence is that, just as divine nature is incompossible with this other thing, so it is no better than this other thing than is anything else incompossible with itself.Text cancelled by Scotus: “The idea of the supposit then exists in a double incommunicability.” ²¹⁵

385. There is a clarification from the infinity which is a condition of nature, and that as follows: form, which is in some way unlimited in perfecting matter, can, without distinction in itself, perfect several parts of matter.

386. An example. The intellective soul, which is not limited to perfecting this part of an organic body, can, without any distinction or extension of itself, whether per se or per accidens, perfect another part of an organic body. But this property, namely that the form is not distinguished and yet it perfects several parts of body or matter, does not belong to the soul by reason of imperfection, because the soul is posited as the most perfect form among all natural forms, and all other more imperfect forms lack this grade in perfecting; for all are limited to perfecting one thing, nor do they perfect several parts of matter without per accidens extension.

387. From this I argue as follows: if such a oneness may stand with plurality, and not from the imperfection of that which is ‘one’, then, when everything of imperfection is removed from each part, perfect oneness can stand with plurality. But the fact that the soul perfects matter belongs to imperfection in it; the fact too that the several perfected things are parts of the same whole belongs to imperfection. If, therefore, the ‘perfecting matter’ is taken from the soul, and from the many distinct things the ‘being parts of one whole’, there will remain a form that has perfect unity, but does not perfect matter, but does give total being, and that to several distinct things, which distinct things will not be parts of one whole but per se subsistent; and then there will be one nature giving total being to several distinct supposits. Therefore the divine essence, which is wholly unlimited, which has everything of imperfection taken away from it, can give total being to several distinct supposits.

B. On the Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

388. But there still remains a further difficulty. For it does not seem intelligible that the essence is not multiplied and that the supposits are several unless a distinction is posited between the idea of essence and the idea of supposit. And therefore, to preserve the aforesaid compossibility [nn.376-387], one must look into this distinction.

389. And I say, without assertion and without prejudice of a better opinion, that the idea by which the supposit is formally incommunicable (let it be a) and the idea of essence as essence (let it be b) have a distinction that precedes every act of created and uncreated intellect.

390. I prove this as follows: the first supposit formally or really has a communicable being, otherwise it could not communicate it; also it really has an incommunicable being, otherwise it could not be a positive supposit in real being. And I understand ‘really’ thus, that which is in no way by an act of an intellect considering it, nay that which would be a being of this sort there if no intellect were considering it; and to be in this way there if no intellect were considering it I call ‘existing before every act of intellect’. - But it is not the case that some entity before every act of intellect, such that it is not by an act of intellect, is communicable and that another entity is of itself incommunicable, unless there is before every act of intellect, that is, not precisely through an act of understanding, some distinction between this entity and that;     therefore etc     .

391. If you say that before every act of intellect of the Father there is not there any distinction but an entity of altogether one idea,Interpolation: “such that matter is actually a being through form.” ²¹⁶ and thus the Father has no positive entity in himself which he does not communicate to the Son; therefore he communicates to him paternity just as he does essence!

392. There is an argument, second, as follows: one distinction exists in the intellect in virtue of a diverse mode of taking the same formal object, and this either by taking it grammatically, as ‘man’, ‘of man’, or logically, as ‘man’ and ‘this man’; another distinction, a greater one, exists in the intellect by conceiving two formal objects in two acts, and this whether diverse things correspond to them, as when understanding man and ass, or whether one thing corresponds, as when understanding color and that which diffuses [sc. sight].

393. From this I argue: the Father, when understanding himself in the first moment of origin, either understands the essence and property a [n.389] as diverse formal objects, or he understands them as precisely the same object under this and that mode of conceiving. But not in the second way, because then there would be no greater difference than when conceiving God and deity, and so one would not conceive the property a as more incommunicable than deity is, for man is not incommunicable if humanity is communicable, nor conversely; so it is in the intended proposition. And then too the intellect of the Father would not be more blessed in the divine essence than in a, which is said to be a property of the Father, nor more in a than in a property of the Son, and thus in two objects, as in the property of the Father and of the Son, he would first be blessed.

394. And if the first mode be given, that the paternal intellect has the essence and a as two formal objects [n.393], then I argue: that intellect understands nothing save intuitively, because - as will be plain from I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24, 28 [above n.139] - every abstractive and non-intuitive intellect is in some way imperfect. But intuitive knowledge is of an object as the object is present in actual existence, and this either in itself or in another containing eminently its whole being; therefore, as to the things that are known intuitively as formal distinct objects, either one is contained eminently in another, or each according to its own existence terminates the act as the act is of it. But nothing intrinsic to a divine person is properly contained in something eminently, because then it would not be a being save by participation in the thing containing it; therefore all intrinsic things that are diverse formal objects, according to their proper actual existence, terminate intuition as objects, and so they have some distinction before the act of understanding.

395. If you say that the essence makes of itself one concept in the intellect of the Father but that concerning it the paternal intellect can make diverse ideas, and that it is precisely in the second mode that essence and a in the paternal intellect are distinguished, but not in the first mode [n.393], - on the contrary: whatever the intellect, without the action of the object, causes concerning the object precisely by the proper virtue of the intellect, and this when speaking of the object as it has known being in the intellect precisely and from the intellect as considering it, that thing is precisely a relation of reason. But now the idea which the essence makes of itself is plainly absolute, otherwise it would not beatify the intellect of the Father; beyond this absolute idea there is no other in reality before the act of the intellect, or the intended proposition is attained [n.389]; also there is for you no other idea in the intellect of the Father save by an act of intellect being busy about it and not through an impression made by the object, which, for you, only imprints one concept; therefore any idea other than the absolute idea of the essence would be precisely a relation of reason, and thus the property of the Father by which he is incommunicable will be a relation of reason, which seems discordant.

396. Second, it is necessary to see [n.388] of what sort the difference is that is posited to precede every act of intellect.

I say that both in things and in the intellect a major difference is manifest, and that from it a minor difference is frequently inferred that is not manifest, just as from the difference of creatures a difference of ideas is inferred in the divine intellect, as is plain from Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.46 n.2. In reality, however, a distinction of things is manifest, and this a twofold one, namely of supposits and of natures; in the intellect there is manifest a twofold difference, namely of modes of conceiving and of formal objects [n.392].

397. From what has been said is inferred the difference here intended, which is not manifest, namely because it is least in its order, that is, among all those that precede the intellect.

398. Now the inference is made from the difference in reality in this way: the distinction of divine supposits is real; therefore since with the same one formally, which is something of itself, the same one cannot agree in reality to such an extent that it cannot be distinguished from it, and since it cannot differ from it in reality to such an extent that it cannot agree with it (because if it is altogether the same in reality, why is this one so great a principle of identity and non-distinction and the same one so great a principle of distinction and non-identity?), there is inferred some difference or distinction of the essence in which the supposits agree from the ideas in which the supposits are distinguished.

399. Likewise in the second way [n.396]: from the difference of formal objects, neither of which is contained eminently in something, and this in an intellect considering intuitively, there is inferred in the things known intuitively some difference prior to an act of intellect [n.394].

400. But is this distinction to be called real?

I reply that it is not an actual real, understanding this in the way ‘actual real difference’ is commonly said to be that which is a difference of things and actually so, because there is not in one person any difference of things, on account of the divine simplicity; and just as the distinction is not an actual real so it is not a potential real, because nothing is in potency there that is not actual.

401. But it can be called ‘a difference of reason’, as a certain doctor said [Bonaventure]; - not as ‘reason’ is taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but as ‘reason’ is taken for the quiddity of a thing as quiddity is an object of the intellect.

402. Or, in another way, it can be called ‘virtual difference’, because what has such a distinction in itself does not have thing and thing, but it is one thing having virtually and pre-eminently two realities as it were, because to each reality, as it is in one thing, there belongs, as if it were a distinct thing, that which is a proper principle for such reality; for in this way this reality distinguishes and that one does not distinguish, as if the former were one thing and the latter another.

403. Or, most properly in a way, let it be said: just as we can find in unity many grades - first, there is the least degree of aggregation; in the second grade there is unity of order, which adds something more to aggregation; in the third there is unity per accidens, where beyond order there is an informing, although an accidental informing, of one thing by another of those that are in this way one; in the fourth there is a per se unity of a thing composed of essential principles that are per se in act and per se in potency; in the fifth there is the unity of simplicity, which is truly identity (for each of what exists there is really the same as any other, and is not just one with the unity of union, as in other modes) - thus, further still, not every identity is formal. But I call it formal identity when that which is called thus the same includes that with which it is thus the same in its own formal quidditative reason and per se in the first mode of per se. Now in the proposed case essence does not include in its formal quidditative reason the property of supposit, nor conversely. And therefore it can be conceded that before every act of intellect there is a reality of essence by which the essence is communicable and a reality of supposit by which the supposit is incommunicable; and before every act of intellect this reality is formally not that one, or it is not formally the same as that one in the way that what ‘formally’ is was previously expounded [n.390].

404. But should some ‘distinction’ then be conceded?

It is better to use the negative ‘this is not formally the same’ than to say this is ‘distinct’ thus and so.

405. But surely this follows, a and b are not the same formally, therefore they are formally distinct?

I reply that it need not follow, because formality is denied in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent.

406. Briefly then I sayText cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued as follows: divine nature, and whatever belongs to this nature as it is nature, is ‘perfection simply’; every ‘perfection simply’ is communicable to several things; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: ‘perfection simply’ is that which in anything whatever “is better existing than not existing,” Monologion ch.15; which fact is understood in this way, that ‘perfection simply’ is better than whatever may be incompossible with it, whatever supposit absolutely considered it may be in, that is, not determining what nature it is subsistent in. But if the divine nature determined itself to incommunicable subsistence, it would in no other subsistence be better than anything incompossible with it save in that subsistence to which it determined itself, because it would be incompossible with any other subsistence; therefore it would not be ‘perfection simply’.” Text following on from this also cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued on the part of the idea of supposit; for because a supposit is of its idea incommunicable simply, that idea should not include any idea of existing through identity, and thus another distinct idea of supposit can stand, and therefore the idea of supposit is not ‘perfection simply’ in the aforesaid way [in the previous paragraph of this footnote]; but if two distinct ideas of supposit can stand, then so can two distinct supposits, and without division of nature; therefore etc. - This fourth...” ²¹⁷ that there is in the divine essence before an act of intellect entity a and entity b, and this one is not formally that one, such that the paternal intellect when considering a and considering b has, from the nature of the thing, that which makes this composite true ‘a is not formally b’, but not precisely from any act of intellect about a and b [n.389].

407. This difference is made clear by an example: if whiteness be set down as a simple species not having in itself two natures, yet there is something really in whiteness whereby it has the idea of color, and something whereby it has the idea of difference; and this reality is not formally that reality, nor formally the reverse, nay one is outside the reality of the other - speaking formally - just as if they were two things, although now by identity those two realities are one thing.

408. But this example, although it is in a way similar to the proposed case (namely as to the fact that real identity does not necessarily entail the formal identity of anything in something that is thus the same with whatever is in it), is yet not altogether alike, because there is some composition in whiteness, although not of thing and thing, yet such is not conceded in God, because of formal non-identity. But where formal nonidentity of certain things in the same thing requires some composition, and where it does not, will be stated in distinction 8 in the question about attributes and in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ [I d.8 p.1 q.4.3].Text cancelled by Scotus: “on the contrary: therefore the Father communicates that whole entity of one idea.” ²¹⁸

409. This formal distinction or non-identity, which was proved before by three reasons [nn.390, 394, 398], can also be proved by two or three authorities of Augustine:

On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2 ‘about big things’ or ‘about little things’: “Every essence which is said relatively is something when the relative is removed;” and: “If the Father is not something in himself he is altogether not someone who may be spoken of relatively.” In reality     therefore he is essence in itself and not in relation to another, and in reality the Father, insofar as he is Father, is said relatively, or he is in relation to another thing or another person; but he is not formally the same entity in himself and not in himself; therefore etc     .

410. Again in the same place ch.2 n.3: “He is not Word by the fact he is wisdom, because Word is not said by itself but only relatively, in relation to him of whom he is the Word, as Son is in relation to Father; but he is wisdom by the fact he is essence.”Text cancelled by Scotus: “omitting the words about distinction of reason and virtual distinction [nn.401-402]; not because they are badly said but because it is not necessary to use them; I say...” ²¹⁹ And from this he concludes: “Wherefore not because the Father is not the Son^is there for that reason not one essence, because by these names of theirs relatives are indicated; but both are together one wisdom, one essence.” There is, therefore, according to him such a non-identity of relation with absolute in divine reality, because if one is the ‘by which’ with respect to another, the other will not be the ‘by which’ with respect to the same; but to be the ‘by which’ belongs to one according to its formal idea; therefore one of them is not of the formal idea of the other but is outside it, and consequently it is not formally the same as the other, just as the idea of that which is ‘not to be the same’ was expounded above [n.403].Text cancelled by Scotus: “An example could be posited about a quantitative whole, by subtracting what belongs to imperfection and positing what belongs to perfection [nn.386-387]; but it would be unlike in more things than like [n.408], so let it be omitted.” [It is stated in Lectura I d.2 n.273: “a quantitative whole is taken possessing parts, and we imagine that the extension of the parts is taken away and that the parts remain and that one part is another by identity, the formal idea of the one part will still exist outside the formal idea of the other part.”] ²²⁰ And yet from this does not simply follow a real diversity or non-identity of substance and relation. For that by which the Father is Father is not other than the essence but the same, according to Augustine himselfText cancelled by Scotus: “Augustine therefore understands that in the mode that the Father is in the same way wisdom and essence, in that same mode the Father is not in the same way Father and God” [cf, On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9] ²²¹ City of God XI ch.10 n.1: “God is called simple because he is what he has, except that each person is said relatively to the other;” nor is essence “as the Father has a Son but is not the Son,” but “whatever the Father has in himself, to which he is” as a consequence “not said relatively, that he himself is” by true identity, although not by formal identity.