IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

327. To the principal reasons [nn.212-218]. - To the first [n.212] I say that Averroes in comment 49 on the Physics 8, whose text begins “Whether each of the moving things,” is only speaking expressly of man, and on this point he is contradicting Avicenna (On the Nature of Animals, XV ch.1 59rb-va), as he himself says in the same place. He imputes to Avicenna, then, that he posited that man could be generated equivocally, - and in that case the conclusion of Averroes [n.212] is true, because nothing univocally generable can be generated equivocally unless it is so imperfect that an equivocal or a univocal cause is sufficient for its generation; and therefore imperfect beings can be generated univocally and equivocally but not perfect ones. However, the reasons of Averroes [nn.213-214] seem to prove the conclusion not only about man but about any species of natural generable things; and if he does not intend this, his conclusion is false and his reasons not conclusive.

328. That his conclusion [n.212] is false is plain from Augustine On the Trinity III ch.8 n.13. And the reason of Augustine, in the same place, is that a generated thing propagates other things through putrefaction; but the propagators are univocal with the things generated by them; therefore things propagated and generated by putrefaction are univocal.

329. But if Averroes deny the assumption of bees and of animals, he cannot deny it of plants, because plants equivocally generated, that is, not generated from seed, do afterwards produce semen univocally, from which are generated other plants of the same species.

330. Augustine also contradicts him in Letter to Deogratias q.1 n.4,Note cancelled by Scotus: “Note: the instances against the antecedent are about the matter of distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un], however some are touched on here, at least the first one [n.304]; the second [n.305] can be against the preceding solution [nn.221-241, 258] rather than here, and the argument about the distinction, in idea of principle, of intellect from nature [nn.216-217] is proper here. The instances against the consequence [nn.307-308] pertain to the question ‘Whether two Sons’, in distinction 7 [n.309]. See in the other part of the folio the four instances [nn.316-319] against the rejection of the second article of the opinion [nn,290-296]: of which two are put first for confirming the opinion [nn.316-317], the other two are against the reasons against the second article of the opinion [nn.318-319].” ¹⁹⁷ and so does Ambrose On the Incarnation at the end, ch.9 nn.101-102.

331. But Averroes himself also contradicts himself in other places about this conclusion. For about the equivocal generation of accidents he himself makes it plain in On the Heavens 2 com.42, where he himself concedes that in accidents there is not always generation by a univocal cause; and he sets down an example about heat and fire; for he posits that heat is generated equivocally from the motion and the concourse of rays, and also univocally from heat. - In substances too it is plain that fire is generated univocally and equivocally. That it is generated equivocally is plain from On the Heavens com.56: “The proceeding of fire from a stone is not in the chapter on transfer but in the chapter on alteration,” that is, it is not generated by transference but by alteration; it is also generated by local motion, Metaphysics 12 com.19, and Meteorology 1 summa II ch.1, about the generation of ignition by striking.Note of Scotus: “Note how in the production there is a double principle ‘by which’, how the essence alone is not a ‘by which’ sufficient for communicating existence, how something quasiposterior can be a principle ‘by which’ for communicating which is quasi-prior in perfection, how essence is not as it were the root of everything equally in anything whatever [n.304] (but the Son is first knowledge and the Holy Spirit first love, and as it were concomitantly with essence; distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un. nn.11-25]).” ¹⁹⁸ - The same is plain about animals, that many are generated equivocally, Metaphysics 12 com.19: “For wasps seem to come to be from the bodies of dead horses, and bees from the bodies of dead cows, etc.”

332. But that all the aforesaid generated things are of the same species with things generated univocally is proved by the fact they have the same operations, and operations about the same objects; they are preserved by the same things and are corrupted by the same things. They have the same motions, either as to going up or down, or as to progress forward and as to the same organs of progress forward; but from the unity of motion Aristotle concludes, in On the Heavens 1.2.269a2-7, to the unity of nature, and the Commentator in com.8 at the same place says: “unity of motion only comes from unity of nature.” These - the former and the latter generated things - also have limbs of the same species, and “the limbs of a lion do not differ from those of a deer save because soul differs from soul,” Averroes On the Soul 1 com.53. And generally all the middle terms that prove unity of species, whether these terms are taken from acts or from operations, prove the intended proposition about the univocity of things generated in this way and in that.

333. Averroes’ conclusion is also contradicted by the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.9.1034a9-14, 30-b7, where his intention is that, just as some of the same things come to be by nature and by chance, namely when the principle is in a matter similar to what would be the principle of the motion of making if the same thing were to come to be by art, so his intention is that some of the natural things come to be by nature and by chance, and some do not; and in the same place Averroes’ intention - and the text beings “Therefore just as in syllogisms” [Metaphysics 7 com.31] - is that those thngs can be generated without semen, and consequently, according to him, equivocally, in whose matter some virtue, similar to the virtue of semen in propagated things, can be introduced by the virtue of the heavens.

334. Therefore the opposite of the conclusion of Averroes is plain, if he be understood generally and universally.

335. His arguments too are not conclusive. - To the first [n.213] I reply: matter according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.2.1013a24-25 is that “from which, when present within, a thing comes to be;” ‘when present within’ is added to differentiate the opposite case, when a thing comes to be from something that is transmuted and corrupted but that is not present within the thing made. - But if he take the phrase ‘a form of the same nature belongs to matter of the same nature’, speaking properly of matter as it is a part of a thing which exists within that thing, I concede the point; but if he take matter for the opposite, for that from which, when corrupted, the composite is generated, I deny it; for fire of the same species is generated either from corrupted wood or from corrupted air. In propagated things, however, and things putrefied, the matter is of the same nature in the first way but not in the second way.

336. To the second [n.214] I say that something is not said to happen rarely or for the most part because it is in itself a frequent or rare contingency; for a falling stone breaks someone’s head more frequently than the moon is eclipsed. But the difference should be understood by comparison of a thing to its cause; and that effect is said to come about for the most part which has, ordered to the effect, a cause which produces the effect for the most part; that is said to come about rarely which does not have a cause ordered to its coming about but arises only from some cause that is ordered to another effect but that has been prevented from the effect it is ordered to, and from this preventing the thing comes about rarely. - The rare or for the most part are also taken as they distinguish between contradictory opposites, not as they distinguish between disparate things.Interpolation: “where he says: ‘Many kinds of animals are procreated from earth without parents, and yet they produce their like among themselves something; nor is there because of the diversity of their birth any difference in the nature of those which are procreated from earth and those which come from their coition; for the live and die in similar way despite have a dissimilar birth’.” ¹⁹⁹

337. So when he [Averroes, Physics 8 com.46] argues that if this generable thing is generated equivocally, or not from semen, ‘then either it is from necessity’, and this I concede it is not, ‘or it is for the most part or rare’, and this I concede it is for the most part, by comparison to determinate cause and also as distinction between contradictories,Interpolation: “Fire, then, that is generated from a stone by the motion of striking it and that is generated from the reflection of the rays of the sun is generated equivocally, and the fire thus generated univocally generates fire.” ²⁰⁰ although it more rarely happen that this generable thing is generated not from semen than that it is generated from semen, namely as two things disparate among themselves are compared.

338. Now, the proof that in the first way a thing happens for the most part is: for thus is the sun per se a cause ordered to generating not from semen, just as a propagating cause is ordered to generating it from semen. If he infers that if in the second way something happens rarely then it happens ‘by chance’, the consequence does not follow, - and he argues further in this way about causality insofar as those things are said to be by chance that happen only from an impeded cause of another thing; and therefore, as he says, chance things are monstrous and not perfect in any species [n.214].Interpolation: “Between contradictories, because for the most part and more often than not a mouse will be generated if the sun comes close to such and such matter.” ²⁰¹

339. When the argument is made, third, about motion and its term [n.215], I reply that this proposition ‘of motions different in species the terms are different in species’ is not an immediate one, but it depends on these two: the first is ‘in motions differing in species, the transient forms, or forms according to which there is transience, are different in species’; the second is, ‘a transient form, or a form according to which there is transience, is of the same nature as the terminating form’. When one of these two is false, the assumed proposition is false. So it is in the proposed case, because the form introduced by the production is not of the same nature as the form which is quasitransient or according to which there is quasi-transience.Interpolation: “namely by comparing an equivocal effect with an equivocal cause under disjunction to contradictories.” ²⁰²

340. But the difficulty of Averroes’ arguments still seems to remain. For although the same nature might be communicated equivocally and univocally, yet not by something of the same species, but it is only univocally caused by an individual of one species and equivocally by a superior cause; but divine nature is not communicated by any superior cause, but only by something in the same nature; therefore it seems that the nature would not have a communication save in one idea.

341. I reply that created nature cannot be communicated save by a communication in one idea from a supposit of that nature; the reason is that the effect does not exceed the cause. But the communicated effect from such a supposit is nature; therefore the principle of communicating should be nature, because nothing more perfect than nature, nor anything equally perfect with nature, exists in such a communicating supposit. But nature is a communicative principle in one idea; therefore to a supposit acting by virtue of nature there belongs a communication only in one idea.

342. The opposite exists in the proposed case [sc. of the divine nature], because a supposit of that nature can have principles of a different idea in producing, each of which is equally perfect with nature, and therefore each can be a principle for communicating nature; and so here there can be a twofold communication by supposits which are of this nature.Text cancelled by Scotus: “which chance things - in the proper sense of chance - do not come about from a cause ordered to producing them, but what produces chance things is an impeded cause ordered to producing something else.” ²⁰³

343. If an instance be made that the twofold principle of operating in us, namely intellect and will, is equally perfect with the nature, because it is equally perfect with the form, according to one opinion about the powers of the soul, - I replyText cancelled by Scotus: “But that the assumed proposition is false when one of those two propositions is false is plain, because the same ‘where’ can be acquired by circular and by direct motion, which are also motions of a different species and incomparable, according to the Philosopher Physics 7.4.248a10-b6; but this is because the form which is the term of the transience does not have a specific distinction, just like the form which is transient or according to which there is transience. However it may be with the example, one must perhaps expound the Philosopher there and hold that the ‘where’, which is transient in a circular or straight line, is of the same species insofar as the ‘transient wheres’, whether straight or circular, which are accidents of the line or magnitude over which the motion is, are not of the same nature; and therefore in this respect they are incomparable, but not in respect of the ‘where’ or the ‘transient where’ per se; and therefore not in respect of the motion per se. At least this is true as to the example here adduced, because when the transient form is of a different nature from the terminating form, one should not conclude from a distinction of motions to a distinction of terms. But in the proposed case production is of a different nature from the terminating essence, as from the terminating form taken from it, because production is relation but essence is for itself; therefore a plurality of productions does not prove a formal distinction of their terms.” ²⁰⁴ that although in us there is a twofold operative principle, will and intellect, and both are perfect principles of operating and can have perfect operations adequate to themselves in idea of perfection of operation, yet they do not have operations adequate to themselves in being, that is, although by our intellect we can have an intellection as perfect as any that can belong to our nature, yet this intellection will not be as perfect a being as nature, because an intellection adequate to the intellect, as to a power or object, in idea of operation, is not adequate to the object or intellect in being. The intellect therefore and will, namely in the creature, although they are principles of producing adequate to themselves in idea of operation, are yet not so in being, and consequently much more are they not really adequate to the nature of which they are the intellect and will.

Thus can one argue about any productive principles in creatures, the distinction between which principles stands in the same supposit of some nature.

344. But in divine reality the operative principle is not only equal with the nature in idea of operative principle but also in being; the operation is also equal with the operative principle, and that in being, and consequently it is equal with nature. Likewise the productive principle is equal with nature in being.Note by Scotus: “This response [nn.241-242] is valid in responding to the first instance brought against the solution of this question [n.304].” ²⁰⁵

345. To the arguments which prove that there are not just two productive principles in God [nn.216-218]. - First, when it is argued about nature and intellect that they are two distinct productive principles, from the Philosopher Physics 2.5.196b17-22, I reply that the Philosopher spoke little about the will as it is distinguished from the intellect, but he commonly conjoined intellect with will in idea of active principle; and therefore in the Physics passage, where he distinguished these active principles, namely nature and intellect, the intellect should not be understood there as it is distinguished from the will but as it goes along with the will, by constituting one and the same principle in respect of artifacts.

346. This will be plain from the response to the instance of the Philosopher [n.217], to which instance I say that the intellect is contrasted with its own nature and with its own proper operation, of which it is in some sense the elicitive and productive principle; and it is contrasted also with the operations of the other powers, with respect to which it is the directive and regulative power. If it is taken in the first way, I say that it is merely nature, both in eliciting and in producing; for whatever act of understanding it produces when the object is present in memory, it produces merely naturally, and whatever operation it operates, it operates merely naturally.

347. Now the will as productive with respect to its proper operation has an opposite mode of producing, and this is sufficiently clear from the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.5.1048a8-11, where he treats of how a rational or irrational power is reduced to act; and he argues that a rational power, which of itself is related to opposites, cannot of itself proceed to act; for then it would proceed to opposites at the same time, because it is of opposites at the same time; and from this he concludes that one must posit, in addition to that rational power, another rational power, a determinative one, by which it is determined, and, when determined, it can proceed to act.

348. And from this it follows that the intellect, if it is of opposites, is of opposites in this way, namely by way of nature, because, as far as concerns itself, it is necessarily of opposites; nor can it determine itself to one or other of them, but requires something else as determinant which can freely proceed to act on one or other of the opposites; but this is appetite, according to him, or choice.

349. An example. The sun has the virtue of producing opposites, namely liquefaction and constriction. If there were two things nearby, one of which was liquefiable and the other constrainable, the sun would, by necessity of nature, have to elicit those two acts on them, and if some one and the same thing were nearby that was of a nature to receive opposites at the same time, the sun would, by the necessity of nature, at the same time produce the opposites, or neither of them.

350. The power of the sun, therefore, is merely natural, although it is of opposites, because merely by itself it is of them in such a way that it cannot determine itself to one or other of them. Such a power is intellect, as it is precisely intellect, with respect to understood opposites; and there is no determination there to one of them and not to the other save to the extent the will concurs.

351. But the Philosopher commonly speaks of intellect according to how it constitutes along with the will one principle with respect to artifacts, and not as it is naturally elicitive of its own operation; and therefore as to the fact he sometimes distinguishes intellect against nature, and sometimes art against it, and sometimes the thing intended, it is the same intellect in the case of all of them.

352. When, finally, the statement is made about the will, that it is the principle in respect of creatures [n.218], I say that the will of God is naturally the productive principle of some product adequate to itself before it is the productive principle of something non-adequate; what is adequate to the infinite is infinite, and so the creature is willed secondarily, and produced by the will of God secondarily.