II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as its object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore the fruit is said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not the fruit, but that is which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, - which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea under which, as to be attained by the power, it is expected.

75. To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but an act, able to have for object those passions which are as it were proximate to its first object. - And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit per se’, this is not to be understood in the sense of formal principal, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the sense of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in the sense of formal cause, we enjoy by. But the authority does not say that enjoyment is something consequent to act but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.

76. The opinion that love and delight are the same is shown by four reasons: first, there is a single act of the same power about the same object; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same as well; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. - Love and delight differ in idea just as from this to that and the reverse differ; also just as union and rest differ, or the privation of division and the privation of motion.

On the contrary: the definition of love in Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in Rhetoric 1.11.1369b33-35 are different.

Response:

To the opposite about sadness, in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; not to want is most intense before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do not want.

To the opposite about love: delight is the per se object of love, just as it is of the preceding desire, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.”

Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine On the City of God XIV ch. 28 and Anselm On the Fall of the Devil ch.4.

Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. Ethics 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death].

Against the first distinction in idea, the agent is different [n.76, end of first paragraph]; against the second, union is a relation. The solution is in Ethics 10.2.1174a4-8.Interpolation (from Appendix A): “Now some say that love and delight are the same really but differ in reason. The first point is proved in four ways. Firstly, because in the case of one power about one object there is one act. The proof is that the distinction of an act is only from the power or the object. - Secondly thus: on something the same there follows immediately only something the same; but, once the object possessed, love and delight immediately follow. - Again: things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same; but hatred and sadness are the same. The fact is plain because each introduces a certain inquietude. - Fourth thus: for they have the same effects and the same consequences. The fact is plain because each has to perfect an operation of the intellect. The second is shown thus, that love is asserted on the basis of what comes from the power to the object, but delight on the basis of the reverse. Also, delight implies rest, which is the privation of motion; but love states union, which is the privation of division. Now these two privations differ only in reason. But to the contrary. Firstly, that the opposites of them are not the same. The proof is that hatred is a certain refusal to will, but refusal to will does not require an existing object, while sadness does. - Secondly, that a very intense refusal to will precedes the event of a thing, but from the event such sadness arises. - Thirdly, because delight is per se the object of enjoyment, but love is not. -Fourthly, because a bad angel can love himself supremely. The thing is plain from Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.28: “Two loves” etc. - Fifthly, because in Ethics 10 [no such reference is found, though there is something close in Eudemian Ethics 7.2.1237b35ff.] it is said that one loves old friends more, but finds more delight in new ones. - Again, the definition of love and that of delight differ. The thing is plain from Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2. - Again, where sometimes the love is more intense, there the delight is less. The thing is plain in the devoted. To the first of these: the major is false. - To the second: the minor is false. - To the third: it has been shown that the minor is false. - To the fourth I say that they do not perfect in the same way, but delight is as it were an accidental perfection of it, as beauty in youth, from Ethics 10.4.1174b31-33, but love is as it were a commanded act or an act joining the parent with the offspring.” Interpolation: “Note the reasons that the same John [Duns Scotus], in d.1 q.3 in the Parisian Lectura [Rep. IA d.1 p.2 q.2], gives against this conclusion, that enjoyment and love and delight are the same really. The first reason is founded on this that hatred and sadness, which are the opposites of love and delight, are really distinct. His proof for this is that to hate something is not to want it; now not to want and to be sad are not the same thing, because the act of not wanting does not require an object apprehended under the idea of existing, which is what makes one sad, according to Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.6. He also proves the same because it happens that the will changes from not being sad to being said when there is a not wanting equally in place, because a thing intensely not wanted can precede the happening of that not wanted thing itself. Therefore, when the not wanted thing is posited as existing, the not wanting will not be more intense and it is then necessarily sad but before not. Third, because the will freely elicits the act of not wanting as of wanting, but it is not voluntarily saddened; therefore not wanting is not being saddened. A confirmation is that when the will turns itself back on an act voluntarily elicited it has pleasure in itself, and so a will willing itself freely not to want has pleasure in itself; but a will that turns itself back on being sad does not have pleasure in itself but is displeased; therefore etc The second reason: in God there is properly found the act of not wanting, but not the act of being sad. The assumption is plain, because just as God is by his willing the cause of things that come to be, so by his not willing he is a cause preventative of bad things. The third reason: delight can be the per se object of some love of which love cannot be the per se object. The proof of this is that the will can choose to be delighted in the delightful thing itself when that delightful thing is absent, and of that choice delight is the per se object, but choice or love is not, because then the will would be turning itself back on its own act; but it is not necessary that the will turn itself back on its own act when it desires to be conjoined to its delightful object, or when it desires to be delighted in the delightful object when it will have become present; therefore when by an act of love it chooses the delightful thing or chooses to be delighted, it is not necessary that it be turned back, therefore delight can be the object of a love of which it is not the love. Again, a bad angel can love itself supremely, and yet does not have delight. The thing is plain in Augustine On the City of God ibid. ch.28. Again, a more intense love is compatible with a less intense delight, as in the case of the devoted/infatuated. ²⁰