C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

51. As to the third article about the power of the creature [n.30] I say that the intellect cannot by its own natural power see the essence without seeing the person, because, since the intellect is of itself a natural and not a free power, when the object acts the intellect acts as much as it can; therefore if the object on its own part acts by manifesting the three persons to the intellect, it is not in the power of the intellect to see part of what is shown and not to see some other part of what is shown.

52. Likewise neither is it in the power of the will to have ordered enjoyment thus by not enjoying thus, because just as it is not in the power of the will not to enjoy in an ordered way (for if it was not enjoying, though unimpeded in this respect, it would be sinning and deserving not to enjoy), so it is not in the power of the will to enjoy something in an ordered way and not to enjoy whatever it can enjoy; and therefore it is not in its power, while remaining in an ordered state, not to have enjoyment under any idea under which it can have enjoyment.Text cancelled by Scotus: “But about the absolute power of the will there is more doubt. However it can be said there that it is not in the power of the will to enjoy in this way and not to enjoy in this way, because although it is in the power of the will that some act be brought to be or not be brought to be, yet it is not in its power that the act once brought to be should or should not have the condition that naturally belongs to the act from the nature of its object. An example: although it is in the power of the will to elicit or not to elicit a sinful act, yet if the act, once brought to be, is disordered, it is not in the power of the will that the act so brought to be should or should not be disordered; now the act of enjoyment, as far as the nature of its first object is concerned, is naturally of the three persons in the essence, because on the part of the object - barring some miracle - it will of itself be of the three persons; therefore it does not seem to be in the power of the will that an act brought to be should or should not be of the essence as it exists in the three persons. If you say that this reason concludes that it is not in the power of God that an act be of the essence and not of the three persons, I say that the conclusion does not follow, for the elicited act is in the power of God as to any condition that might naturally from the object be within his competence, and yet the act as to that condition is not within created power. An example: it is in the power of God that an act elicited by a sinful will be referred back to God because God refers it back to himself, but it is not in the power of the will, once the act has been brought to be, that the will use that act for God because the creature is enjoying the act; but it cannot at the same time enjoy a thing other than God and use that same thing for God. - The example does not, however, seem to be a good one, because that act of the sinner is referred back by one power and not by another. Let the example be dismissed then, and let the reason be held onto, because an accident necessarily consequent to an act once it has been brought to be cannot not be in the act as long as the act persists, and this accident is something subject to the divine will, though not to the created will which elicits it; so let it be said of a condition which, in respect of a secondary object, the act is of a nature necessarily, as far as depends on itself, to have, though not essentially to have; therefore that the condition not be present in the act is something subject to the divine will.” ¹⁵

53. On the contrary: whatever is not necessarily concomitant to an act is within the power of the will that elicits the act; or in this way: whatever the act of will does not necessarily regard, the will itself, which elicits the act, also does not necessarily regard; or in this way: whatever can be separated as it is the terminus of the act of will can also be separated in respect of the power as eliciting the act.