VII. To the Initial Arguments of the Second Question

331. As to the first argument of the second question [n.270], it is plain that the virtue is the efficacy of the sign with respect to the thing signified, which efficacy is not a real form, above all not an absolute one, but is the truth of a practical sign virtually preceding the thing signified.

332. As to the second argument [n.271], if health could only be induced by a voluntary agent, and if this agent instituted some sign that would be an efficacious or necessitating sign with respect to himself for inducing health, the sign would be a medicine possessing virtue - not however through some absolute form that would be the principle of curing, but only through the ordaining of the efficient cause for health.

333. As to the third argument [n.272] one can say that the foundation is new as often as the sacrament is new, and then no new relation is there without a change in the foundation. But the change is not to anything absolute in the foundation, but to the being of the foundation.

334. It can be said in another way that a relation of reason can be new in something without newness of what is absolute in it, for a new comparison of the absolute to another thing by act of intellect is sufficient. In this way can God be said to be newly ‘Lord’ without any new absolute in him. Or more to the point, money can be said to be newly the price, for to be a ‘price’ only states a relation of reason, just as to be ‘exchanged’ for something else states only a relation of reason. For to be ‘exchanged’ does not state a real relation any more than to be ‘given’ does; but since to be given, as is manifest, states the relation of an object to the will, it states only a relation of reason in the thing given. Likewise, to be ‘understood’ in the understood object states only a relation of reason. 233].