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Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 1 - 7
Book Four. Distinctions 1 - 7
First Distinction. Third Part. On the Causality of a Sacrament as regard Conferring Grace
Question Two. Whether it is Possible for some Supernatural Virtue to Exist in a Sacrament
V. To the Initial Arguments of the First Question

V. To the Initial Arguments of the First Question

326. To the first argument [n.263] I say that the water cleanses the heart, that is, the soul, not indeed by causing a disposition between it and the cleansing grace, but that it cleanses as a disposition proximate and immediate to grace (in the way in which merit is said to induce blessedness, or that cutting or some other preparation is said to induce health). For if it caused a disposition for grace and was thus said to cleanse, it would still be necessary to say that the disposition cleansed more immediately, as was argued above about the order of causes with respect to a third thing [n.314].

327. To the second [n.264] I say that in his definition of a sacrament the Master understands by his addition ‘and exists as its cause’ nothing other than that it is an efficacious sign. And by this he means that it is practical and certain and true, and naturally precedes what it signifies. I use the same to reply to the point about the distinction between the sacraments of the New Law and the Old Law [n.264]. For these are not distinguished by the fact that ‘actively acting for something spiritual in the soul’ could belong to neither of them, but those of the New Law cause grace as an efficacious sign, while those of the Old Law did not, if one is speaking of the sacraments, that is, the ceremonies, of the Old Law. The matter will be made plain in the next question [nn.372-381].

328. To the other one [n.265] I say that if the motion of a saw were the proximate disposition for inducing some form, and if it [the form] were not from the nature of some motion but from the disposition of some natural agent cooperating at the same time, one could reasonably ask of the agent that the motion would perfect [the form] that [the agent] contains, that is, that just as [the motion] contains [the form] as a preceding disposition contains [the form], so [the motion] would perfect [the form], that is, that [the form] would follow on [the motion] immediately. This is how it is in the proposal maintained here.7