2. As to the Second Question

296. Against this opinion as to the second question I argue as follows:

If there is a supernatural virtue in the sacrament, it is there either indivisibly or divisibly, that is, either as whole in the whole and in each part, or as whole in the whole and as part in a part. Not in the first way because among all forms that perfect matter only the intellect is posited to be such. Not in the second way because the supernatural virtue would be per accidens extended in the subject, which is against the idea of a spiritual virtue.

297. Again, many words are commonly required in sacraments (as will be clear below [in the discussion of each sacrament]). Either then the same virtue would exist altogether in each syllable, or there would be different virtues in different syllables. If in the first way one would have to say that the same accident moved from subject to subject and would remain after the subject ceased to be. If in the second way the result would be that the sacrament (which consists in the whole utterance) would not have a single virtue.

298. And if you say that the sacrament has a single virtue combined from the many virtues of the many parts, this is refuted by the second argument against what the opinion says about the preceding question [n.291]. For it would not be possible to say which of these virtues was the principle of causing the spiritual effect in the soul. Nor does it seem probable that a sacrament formally one (since the formal idea of it comes from the idea of supernatural virtue) would have so many combined spiritual virtues.

299. Again, I ask when this supernatural virtue is caused in the sensible reality that pertains to the sacrament - is it before the application of it to act and use or in that very application?

If before, then the sacrament’s causation is purely miraculous, because it is by divine act and not by any disposition that abides or is stabilized in the Church; for it does not follow on anything that would enable one to say it followed naturally, as it were, without a miracle (like animation [Ord. IV d.43 q.2 n.20, on the natural animation of the body]).

But if the supernatural virtue is caused in the very application to use, this seems unacceptable. For an instrument is not formally adapted for use because someone uses it as an instrument. The point is plain by induction; and by reason, for the suitability of an instrument naturally precedes the use of the instrument as instrument (for it is not because I immerse a child in water, or use some sensible sign for the act of the sacrament, that the child receives the spiritual virtue; therefore, it is not possible to say when the child receives it).

300. A final argument is, as before [n.294], that here plurality is posited without necessity. For that there is any necessity for such a virtue as is imagined to exist in the sacrament is not plain either by natural reason (as is manifest) or by faith. For just as he who follows natural reason should not posit more beyond what is concluded by natural reason [Physics 1.4.188a17-18, 8.6.259a8-9], so he who follows faith should not posit more than what is required by the truth of faith. But the truth of faith does not require the positing of such supernatural virtue in water or in words (as will be plain below [in the discussion of the individual sacraments]), nor does reason compel this plurality.     Therefore etc     .

301. The examples that are adduced for virtue received by the instrument do not prove it.

302. The first about sensible speech [n.283] assumes something manifestly false, for audible speech does not formally have any intention of the soul in it.

As proof is that speech that does not have the signifying of anything imposed on it has no such form (as is plain to everyone); and speech does not receive any absolute form from the imposition, nor any relation save perhaps a relation of reason.

There is also proof in another way, that when there is the same principal agent and an instrument sufficient for it the same action follows. But if a Latin speaker speaks Latin words to a Greek, there is the same principal agent and the same instrument that there would be if he spoke to another in Latin, but no effect follows because no concept is caused in the Greek hearer. Therefore, the speaking was not of itself an instrument for causing a concept of the soul in the hearer.

303. The example fails, then, to this extent, that audible speech is a sign that brings a concept to memory, so that when the sense of hearing is affected by the speaking, and when further the nature of the concept as it is such a nature is understood, the intellect that knows the speech is imposed to signify such nature refers the speech to something else and understands that something else. Not, however, in such a way that the speech causes a concept of something by some form. Rather the concept is previous to what is conceived of the thing [spoken about] as caused in the soul by the proper species or phantasm of the thing.The sense of the Latin here is obscure. The point seems to be that the spoken word only informs us about the thing spoken of because, first, we already have the concept of that thing, and because, second, we are moved by the words to turn to the relevant species or phantasm of the thing so as thereby to bring actually to mind the concept we already have of it. The words, then, do nothing over and above stimulating us to turn to some species or phantasm in which to remember or rethink the concept (as the previous example of a Latin speaking to a Greek illustrates). ⁶ The point is plain because however much a speech is spoken, if the hearer does not have in himself the species of the thing spoken of, then no concept of the thing would be caused in him. Hence, we understand by spoken words only things of which we have the species. But that we actually consider these things is because we refer the sign to the thing signified.

304. The second example about the instrument of an artisan [n.283] fails, for it seems highly improbable that a spiritual form would be caused in the saw as many times as it was moved by the artisan, and that a spiritual form would cease to be as many times as the saw ceases to be actually moved.

305. The third example about motion [n.283] is not compelling because, in whatever way substances are caused by the heavens, at least the local motion of the heavens cannot be the formal principle of producing them.

306. But as to what the formal principle is, and likewise about the fourth example [n.283] from the Generation of Animals, see Lectura II d.18 nn.70, 72.