d. Fourth Argument

294. The fourth argument is that this opinion posits plurality without necessity, which is against the teaching of the philosophers, as is plain from Physics 1.2.184b15-16, about the opinion of Melissus against Anaxagoras, and also from On the Soul 3.4.429a18-20 and Physics 8.3.354a24-27, that “nature does nothing in vain.” For fewness, when it suffices for saving the appearances, is always more rationally to be posited [Metaphysics 4.6.1011a17-21, Ord. I d.3 n.315]. But that such a disposition should be brought about in the case of the sacraments seems altogether superfluous. There does not seem to be any necessity for this plurality in the Eucharist, as is plain, because it seems the purest fiction to posit there some preceding disposition, or to posit some intermediate disposition in the species of bread (which are the sacrament [Ord. IV d.8 q.1 n.15]) or in the existence of the body of Christ (which is the thing signified).

295. There is proof of this in the other sacraments too, for in those that do not impress a character there seems no necessity to posit the disposition that they call an ‘ornament’ [n.279]. Indeed, this seems to be against the common opinion of the theologians. For they posit a disposition for the principal effect in some sacraments if, because of some obstacle in the receiver, the final effect is not then caused; but when the obstacle ceases the disposition suffices for the principal effect (this appears in sacraments that cause a character, which sacraments for this reason cannot be repeated). But in the case of a pretended penitent, there is nothing, when his pretense ceases, that suffices for the effect of true penitence; otherwise it would not be necessary for such a pretended penitent to be confessed another time. Therefore, no disposition is impressed in such a sacrament as if to necessitate the effect of the sacrament.