3. About a Definition’s Third Condition

200. Third I say that in the aforesaid idea of the name [n.194] is included something that states a being of reason, namely that the sign is ‘by institution’. For this relation does not follow a foundation from the nature of the thing, because although there is an aptitude in the thing for signifying the effect signified, yet the actual signification only belongs to it by act of the one who imposed it. So, by restricting the definition to a ‘what’ properly speaking outside the mind, this definition does not express a ‘what’ of a sacrament, and therefore cannot be a definition in the way that a definition is the idea of a complete being outside the soul. But in the way that a definition expresses ‘one concept per se in the intellect’, whether the concept is of a thing outside the soul or of a thing of reason, a sacrament can very well be defined.

201. And in this way only, and not otherwise, are all logical intentions defined. For these intentions do not signify quiddities outside the soul. but only concepts per se one in the soul; and having a definition in this way is sufficient for science properly speaking, otherwise logic would not be a science. Also, in these definitions are found genus and difference and property, in the way that a logician speaks of genus, difference, and property; for found there is a classification in the ‘what’, in the essential ‘what sort’, and in the accidental ‘what sort’ convertible with it.

202. And so in the aforesaid idea [n.194] ‘sign’ is posited as genus, ‘by institution’ and ‘efficacious’ as difference, ‘sensible’ as the foundation of the relation, and ‘grace’ or ‘gratuitous effect of God’ as correlative.