1. About a Definition’s First Condition

189. The first condition does not get in the way [sc. of a sacrament’s having a definition], which I show by conclusions arranged in order.

190. The first is this: it is possible for God to cause some invisible effect pertaining to the salvation of man as wayfarer. There is no need to prove this, because it is manifest to a theologian from divine omnipotence.

191. Secondly I say that it is possible for God to impose some sign to signify the invisible effect. This is plain because we can impose signs to signify whatever is intelligible by us. But since a sign is divided into memorial sign (which is of the past) and prognostic sign (which is of the future) and demonstrative sign (which is of the present), it is possible for God to institute any of these signs to signify his effects. There is also the proof that we can institute any of these signs to signify our effects; for thus are oaths instituted by us, and promises and signs of this sort that impose obligations, to signify a future effect of ours - and assertoric signs to signify a past or present effect of ours.

192. I further posit that it is possible for God to determine and dispose himself to cooperate with any sign (instituted by himself) so as to cause the effect signified, unless it is impeded by the indisposition of him to whom it is applied. - This is plain because it would be thus possible among us that someone, by instituting a sign of his effect, would dispose himself always to cooperate with this sort of sign unless impeded by him to whom it was applied (as that if someone were to institute as a sign of peace or kindness the touch of the hand or the raising of the finger or something of the sort, he would be able, by instituting such a sign, to determine himself always to cooperate for the signified effect, unless the indisposition of him to whom it was applied got in the way). But such a sign, with which the institutor disposes himself always to cooperate, can be called a ‘true’ or ‘certain’ sign, to distinguish it from an uncertain or equivocal sign which as equally brings with it cooperation with the thing signified or the opposite. But a sign is properly called efficacious if, when the sign is used, the thing signified follows in order of nature and not conversely, for if a sign followed the thing it signified in order of nature, although it could be a certain sign if it never lacked the preceding signified thing, yet it would not be efficacious, because in no way would its being posited have efficacy with respect to the thing signified, but conversely.

193. Lastly I say that it is possible for God to institute some sensible sign to signify the aforesaid effect and in the aforesaid way, namely with certainty and efficacy. - This is clear because we too can institute some sensible sign for signifying our effect with the other aforesaid conditions. And not only can some single sensible sign be instituted but also one including in itself several sensible elements, and sensible either to the same sense or to different senses. For just as we, in order to signify the divine perfection which is the simplest essence, can institute this statement ‘God is perfectly infinite’, which statement is constituted of many audible syllables, so we could institute some audible things and some visible things to be together a sign of our concept (as that some definite words, along with some movement of the hand and a kiss, would signify an act of benevolence).

194. From these points follows this conclusion, that the following whole statement is not in itself false (in the way that the Philosopher talks of a statement false in itself in Metaphysics 5.29.1024b26-25a2, 6.1015b16-34): ‘A sensible sign efficaciously signifying, by divine institution, the grace of God or his gratuitous effect - an effect, I say, ordered to the salvation of man the wayfarer’. For it is plain from what has been said that no particle of this statement is repugnant to another; and a statement is not false in itself (according to the Philosopher ibid.) unless the parts are contradictory with each other. This statement, then, is not about pure non-being, that is, about a pure impossible, because nothing is a pure impossible unless its account is false in itself, as is plain in Ord. I d.2 nn.70, 133. It is also plain that this account is not about a pure negation or privation, because it per se includes certain positive things. But if it is posited that this account is an account of this word ‘sacrament’, it follows that a sacrament is not a pure non-being, neither as impossible nor as negation.

195. But that this account is the account of this word ‘sacrament’ cannot be proved but must be assumed from the use of those who speak about sacrament, in the way that the signification of words must be assumed from use.