B. Whether there Can be a Definition of a Sacrament

188. About the second main point [n.180] one must consider in order whether any of the five conditions [n.187] prevents a sacrament from having a definition properly speaking. And in this regard, this second article has five conditions [n.187].

1. About a Definition’s First Condition

189. The first condition does not get in the way [sc. of a sacrament’s having a definition], which I show by conclusions arranged in order.

190. The first is this: it is possible for God to cause some invisible effect pertaining to the salvation of man as wayfarer. There is no need to prove this, because it is manifest to a theologian from divine omnipotence.

191. Secondly I say that it is possible for God to impose some sign to signify the invisible effect. This is plain because we can impose signs to signify whatever is intelligible by us. But since a sign is divided into memorial sign (which is of the past) and prognostic sign (which is of the future) and demonstrative sign (which is of the present), it is possible for God to institute any of these signs to signify his effects. There is also the proof that we can institute any of these signs to signify our effects; for thus are oaths instituted by us, and promises and signs of this sort that impose obligations, to signify a future effect of ours - and assertoric signs to signify a past or present effect of ours.

192. I further posit that it is possible for God to determine and dispose himself to cooperate with any sign (instituted by himself) so as to cause the effect signified, unless it is impeded by the indisposition of him to whom it is applied. - This is plain because it would be thus possible among us that someone, by instituting a sign of his effect, would dispose himself always to cooperate with this sort of sign unless impeded by him to whom it was applied (as that if someone were to institute as a sign of peace or kindness the touch of the hand or the raising of the finger or something of the sort, he would be able, by instituting such a sign, to determine himself always to cooperate for the signified effect, unless the indisposition of him to whom it was applied got in the way). But such a sign, with which the institutor disposes himself always to cooperate, can be called a ‘true’ or ‘certain’ sign, to distinguish it from an uncertain or equivocal sign which as equally brings with it cooperation with the thing signified or the opposite. But a sign is properly called efficacious if, when the sign is used, the thing signified follows in order of nature and not conversely, for if a sign followed the thing it signified in order of nature, although it could be a certain sign if it never lacked the preceding signified thing, yet it would not be efficacious, because in no way would its being posited have efficacy with respect to the thing signified, but conversely.

193. Lastly I say that it is possible for God to institute some sensible sign to signify the aforesaid effect and in the aforesaid way, namely with certainty and efficacy. - This is clear because we too can institute some sensible sign for signifying our effect with the other aforesaid conditions. And not only can some single sensible sign be instituted but also one including in itself several sensible elements, and sensible either to the same sense or to different senses. For just as we, in order to signify the divine perfection which is the simplest essence, can institute this statement ‘God is perfectly infinite’, which statement is constituted of many audible syllables, so we could institute some audible things and some visible things to be together a sign of our concept (as that some definite words, along with some movement of the hand and a kiss, would signify an act of benevolence).

194. From these points follows this conclusion, that the following whole statement is not in itself false (in the way that the Philosopher talks of a statement false in itself in Metaphysics 5.29.1024b26-25a2, 6.1015b16-34): ‘A sensible sign efficaciously signifying, by divine institution, the grace of God or his gratuitous effect - an effect, I say, ordered to the salvation of man the wayfarer’. For it is plain from what has been said that no particle of this statement is repugnant to another; and a statement is not false in itself (according to the Philosopher ibid.) unless the parts are contradictory with each other. This statement, then, is not about pure non-being, that is, about a pure impossible, because nothing is a pure impossible unless its account is false in itself, as is plain in Ord. I d.2 nn.70, 133. It is also plain that this account is not about a pure negation or privation, because it per se includes certain positive things. But if it is posited that this account is an account of this word ‘sacrament’, it follows that a sacrament is not a pure non-being, neither as impossible nor as negation.

195. But that this account is the account of this word ‘sacrament’ cannot be proved but must be assumed from the use of those who speak about sacrament, in the way that the signification of words must be assumed from use.

2. About a Definition’s Second Condition

196. One must consider then the second condition [n.187], namely per se unity, whether it prevents there being a definition properly speaking of a sacrament, or of what has the account of this sort of name. - But that a being that is not per se one is not definable can be understood in two ways, namely that it consists of beings either of the same genus or of different genus that however are not of a nature to constitute something per se one. The first has the name of an aggregated being (as a mound or heap), and the second is properly called a being per accidens, as is plain from Metaphysics 5.6.1015b16-34. But neither of these is properly definable: not the first, from Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-25, and not the second, from Metaphysics 7.4.1029b22-30a7.

197. It is in fact said [Richard of Middleton] that a sacrament does not properly have unity, so it is not properly definable. For it includes many things (as is touched on in the first argument to the opposite [n.175]), from which something per se one cannot come to be, namely an element (as water in the case of baptism) and spoken words (and these two are material parts) and the idea of signifying (as something formal): the first of these is a real being, the second a being of reason. From such things it is impossible for something per se one to come to be.

198. But against this: for although one accident may be in many subjects, yet it would be definable properly just like other accidents, because the manyness does not pertain per se to the idea of the accident but is as it were something added. Now in the aforesaid idea of the name [n.194] it is plain that what is called ‘sensible’ is posited as an addition to the sign. So however much there is no unity in it, yet while the other things that pertain to the formal idea of the name do not prevent per se unity, a sacrament will not for this reason be non-definable. I mean that the plurality under discussion here [n.197] is a plurality of things that come together in the sensible thing as the sensible thing signifies the foundation of the formal idea that a sacrament involves.

199. I say therefore that in the aforesaid definition [n.194] the formal element is understood to be the sign and also to be the things that per se determine the idea of a sign. Of such sort are ‘by divine institution’ and ‘efficaciously’ (the other two there, namely ‘sensible’ and ‘gratuitous effect of God’, are there as additions: the first as subject or foundation, the second as correlative of the sign). But a plurality of accident with subject, or of the subject in itself, or of correlative with correlative does not prevent the relation from being definable simply. Therefore a sacrament is not excluded by non-unity from having a definition. For this concept ‘per se one in the intellect’ is as conventional and efficacious a sign as is the concept of paternity. And just as paternity could be properly defined (notwithstanding per se unity) if paternity were in two subjects and these two were posited as additions and the correlative of father were posited as an addition, so too in the issue at hand.

3. About a Definition’s Third Condition

200. Third I say that in the aforesaid idea of the name [n.194] is included something that states a being of reason, namely that the sign is ‘by institution’. For this relation does not follow a foundation from the nature of the thing, because although there is an aptitude in the thing for signifying the effect signified, yet the actual signification only belongs to it by act of the one who imposed it. So, by restricting the definition to a ‘what’ properly speaking outside the mind, this definition does not express a ‘what’ of a sacrament, and therefore cannot be a definition in the way that a definition is the idea of a complete being outside the soul. But in the way that a definition expresses ‘one concept per se in the intellect’, whether the concept is of a thing outside the soul or of a thing of reason, a sacrament can very well be defined.

201. And in this way only, and not otherwise, are all logical intentions defined. For these intentions do not signify quiddities outside the soul. but only concepts per se one in the soul; and having a definition in this way is sufficient for science properly speaking, otherwise logic would not be a science. Also, in these definitions are found genus and difference and property, in the way that a logician speaks of genus, difference, and property; for found there is a classification in the ‘what’, in the essential ‘what sort’, and in the accidental ‘what sort’ convertible with it.

202. And so in the aforesaid idea [n.194] ‘sign’ is posited as genus, ‘by institution’ and ‘efficacious’ as difference, ‘sensible’ as the foundation of the relation, and ‘grace’ or ‘gratuitous effect of God’ as correlative.

4. About a Definition’s Fourth and Fifth Condition

203. As to the fourth and fifth conditions [n.187] there is no need to dwell on them, for it is plain that a sacrament according to the idea of the name posited above [nn.185-186] does not have a simply simple concept nor a singular concept but a universal one.

5. Conclusion

204. From what has been said [nn.189-203], the second article [nn.180, 188] is plain, that a sacrament (supposing that the idea of the name posited above [n.187] is of that sort) can be simply and per se defined in the way that second intentions are per se definable; and that absolutely nothing opposes its being most truly and absolutely defined or rather properly stated, save because in its proper formal element it is a being of reason and save because it includes something that is a being of reason.

205. From this article is plain as a corollary how knowledge ‘what it is’ and knowledge ‘whether it is’ are disposed to each other in order. For in the knowledge ‘whether it is’, according as it precedes the knowledge ‘what it is’, the understanding is not about actual existence, otherwise ‘a demonstration of which the middle is a definition’ could not be had of what does not exist (the opposite of which is maintained by the Philosopher Posterior Analytics I.8.75b21-36 and Metaphysics 7). But the ‘whether it is’ is understood of a being to which existence in fact is not repugnant. In the first of the five conditions, applying it to the issue at hand, the ‘whether it is’ was shown about a sacrament in this way, because it was shown that a sacrament is the sort of thing to which existence in fact is not repugnant [nn.191-192]. And on this supposition inquiry was further made in particular about what it is [nn.193-194].

206. Plain too is the order that knowing the sort of ‘what’ stated by the name has to knowing the ‘whether it is’, because in the first of the five conditions what was meant by the name was presupposed, and from this presupposed idea the conclusion as to ‘whether it is’ was drawn. And although the ‘what of a name’ and the ‘what of a thing’ are the same in things that have a ‘what of a thing’, yet it is first known that something is the ‘what of a name’ before it is known that it is the ‘what of a thing’. For the first is known in knowing that the name is intelligible and signifiable, and the second is known in knowing that it is of something able to be in fact. And from the idea of a concept able to be conceived and signified can be concluded that something is able to fall under the concept, and consequently that the idea expresses a true ‘what it is’.