D. About the Opinion of Peter Lombard

153. One must understand, however, on behalf of the opinion of the Master, Sent. IV d.5 ch.3 n.3, that if an accidental form were created (as is posited about grace and charity), some subject could well precede it that disposes for the term (as the soul precedes in this case). And although there could not be any disposition necessitating the term simply in such a subject, there can yet be a disposition necessitating the term in a certain respect, that is, by divine disposition.

154. And thus can the Master be expounded, that God could give such disposition to a minister so that he might cause some disposition in the soul that would be necessary for grace - in the way that God had universally disposed to give grace to anyone so disposed (as the organization of the body is a disposition that necessitates for the intellective soul). And this potentiality would be superior to any that is given to a minister of the Church. For no minister operates on the soul mediately or immediately, so as to make grace to be simply necessarily conferred, as was said of animation in another part [sc. of the Ordinatio, I d.17 n.146].

155. Nor should one impose on the Master that he thought God could give a minister the ability to act for grace by attaining the effect itself, because a minister has no capacity for this active virtue, for the soul is by grace or charity formally accepted by God - with a specific acceptance - as worthy of eternal life [Ord. I d.17 nn.148-153]. But a creature cannot have an active virtue for making anything of this sort worthy or accepted by God.

156. This is also plain in another way, because the end and the efficient cause have a mutual reference to each other, so that the superior agent causes an effect for the sake of a superior end. Therefore, that which immediately disposes for the ultimate end is immediately from the first efficient cause, and of this sort is grace. There is a confirmation, that if grace could be from an inferior agent, it would seem that it could be for some inferior end.

157. But these reasons are not very cogent.

The first is not [nn.153-155], because a creature can be the formal reason for such acceptance, as is admitted about charity [Ord. I d.17 nn.165-168, II d.27 nn.8-9]. There seems no reason, then, as to why it is not an effective cause.

158. The second is not [n.156], because although the first agent only acts for the ultimate end, there is no need that an inferior agent in any action act ultimately for an inferior end. For an angel, if he elicits a beatific act, does not elicit it for an inferior end ultimately. So grace, therefore, could be immediately created for the ultimate end and yet be created by an inferior agent.