e. An Objection and its Solution

146. If you object [Aquinas on Metaphysics 7 lectio 1, 2] about substantial form and the quality consequent to it that the quality follows the substantial form of the generator, and yet it is in some way cause of the substantial form of the generated thing, so that, although the substantial form and its proper quality in their whole genus have an order (for the substantial form is prior), yet not any substantial form is prior to any quality but rather the substantial form is only prior to the quality in any same substance (though quality could precede substantial form in some different substance, which same point is confirmed by Metaphysics 9.8.1049b3-50a6, about potency and act, that act simply precedes potency in time and yet potency in the same thing precedes act in time) -If you so object, I reply that any substance of the same species precedes any quality in the way that substance in its whole genus precedes quality in its whole genus, namely ‘in definition, in knowledge, and in time’ [Metaphysics 7.1.1028a31-34], that is (as far as concerns itself) in separability. And thus does substance precede the quality of the generator in three ways, though not in time in the sense of temporal and actual duration outside the cause - and the Philosopher’s understanding here is not what you suppose [n.148].

147. And when you say that the quality of the generator precedes the substance of the generated as cause precedes effect [n.146], this is false, but this sort of quality is only the cause of the quality that disposes for the substantial form of the generated thing. And to this extent is it said to be in some way cause of the thing generated, although this is meant in a very extended way.

148. The cited authority of the Philosopher [n.146] is not to the purpose, because the act that is prior in time to every potency is not some material act but a simply immaterial once, as is plain in the same place at the end of the chapter [9.8.1050b16-18]. And the argument of the Philosopher [n.146] proceeded about the act that is posterior in its whole genus to the receptive potency.

149. Similarly, the points about matter [nn.144-145] and the second conclusion [n.142] are manifest among philosophers, who have posited that a secondary order of causes is simply necessary, so that a material form cannot be produced by any agent unless the matter concurs with the agent as a necessary cause that is presupposed to the term of the production.