b. The Second Way of Speaking

126. In another way it is posited that the negative conclusion can be shown by reason [Thomas Aquinas, William of Ware], and this universally about any creature. For just as material and formal cause in their whole genus necessarily require each other in causing a thing in its being (for never is the form the formal cause of anything unless the matter is at the same time the material cause of the same thing), so the whole genus of efficient cause, which includes every limited efficient cause, necessarily accompanies the matter as to the ‘coming to be’ of the thing. For just as matter and form are causes in a thing’s being, so are the efficient cause and the matter causes in a thing’s coming to be. It is therefore impossible for any limited efficient cause to act to produce the effect, unless, at the same time, the matter is concurrent as a principle equally requisite for the coming to be, and in this coming to be is received the form, which is the formal term of the action and from which, as from a part, the composite is constituted that is the primary product. But God does not require concomitant matter in his action, because he is, as an unlimited agent, above the whole genus of efficient cause.

127. This response, although perhaps it states the ‘reason why’ of the conclusion (namely the limitation of the efficient cause, which determines it to require matter in its acting), yet the ‘reason why’ is not much more evident than the conclusion, as is evident from looking at it.