B. Scotus’ own Opinion
371. I say therefore to the question, taking as supposed what was said in Ord. II d.26 nn.24-26, namely that grace is the same as charity and is consequently first in the power, namely in the will, and further, along with these, that a disposition for form is in the same receptive subject as the form, and that character, if it be posited to exist, is suitably posited to be a disposition for sacramental grace (as was shown in the solution of the preceding question about character in its first congruence [n.247]) - therefore it is fitting to put character formally in the will.
372.62 And there is a confirmation for this, that if character is a sign or foundation for the obligation of the soul to God [n.334], it is reasonable that it be put in the power to which first belongs being obligated or being the idea of obligating. But such is the will, because through its act precisely does anyone principally obligate himself; for the things that concur there on the part of the intellect or another power in man are only certain preambles for firmness of willing, which is proposing or vowing reasonably or certain signs manifesting that the willing is firm.