Question Three. Whether Character is in the Essence of the Soul or in Some Power of It

360. Proceeding thus to the last point [n.195], and argument is made that character is not in the essence of the soul as in the proximate subject.

Because a disposition and the form for which it disposes have the same proximate subject; a character is a proximate disposition for faith, but faith is in the intellect.

361. To the contrary:

From the same major [n.360] together with this minor, that character is a proximate disposition for grace; but grace is in the essence of the soul, because it is its first and second life [sc. natural life and spiritual life]; it follows therefore that character (which is spiritual life) is in the essence of the soul.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

362. There is here an opinion [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.3“Just as grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, so character too, which is a spiritual power, is in the natural power of the soul as in a subject, and not in the essence of the soul.. .save through the intermediary of the power of the soul.” ⁶¹] that just as grace is in the essence of the soul, so a power for grace is in the power of the soul; but character is a power or disposition proximate to grace; therefore, it is in the power of the soul as in its proximate subject. But it is not in every power of the soul, because then it would not be a single form; therefore, it is in a single power, and it is more reasonable to posit that it is in the intellect.

363. The reason for this is that character is for configuring the created trinity to the Uncreated Trinity; but the created trinity, or the ‘image’, consists principally in the intellect, because from it, as from the root, arises the will.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

364. On the contrary, because a disposition for form should never be put in a receptive subject that is posterior to form (this is plain by running through individual forms and their dispositions [cf. Averroes Sufficientia I ch.10]); but character is a disposition for grace, as you concede [n.362], and grace is in the essence of the soul for you [n.362, ST I-IIa q.110 a.4]; therefore character cannot be in any receptive subject posterior to the essence of the soul; but, for you, a power is posterior to the essence of the soul, because it is an accident [Aquinas, Sent. I d.3 q.4 a.2].

365. Nor is the stated reason or the consequence valid whereby it is said, ‘grace is in the essence of the soul, therefore a power of disposition for grace is in a power of the soul’ [n.362]; rather the opposite follows, namely that the receptive subject itself of grace is the receptive subject of the disposition, or at any rate the disposition cannot be in any subject posterior to that in which the form is.

366. This is also plain in other things, because a supernatural habit is not in a natural habit, but in the natural power in which is the natural habit, and this for the reason that a natural power is prior to both habits.

367. Again, his proof by which it is proved that grace is in the essence of the soul immediately [n.362] is not probative, because a natural perfection is present in someone before a supernatural power is, for a natural and intrinsic perfection follows at once the nature of what is perfectible by it; although it be an accident according to him [n.364], yet it is an intrinsic perfection of the soul itself; therefore the power is naturally in the soul before grace is, and consequently it could have the idea of receptive subject.

368. Nor is the argument about life [n.362 fn., 361] probative, because spiritual life is first in the soul as it is joinable to God; hence, according to Augustine City of God XIX chs.16, 18, God is for this reason said to be the life of the soul, because the life of the soul is only in its conjunction with God as with its object; but the soul is not joinable to God in idea of object save through a power.

369. As to what he afterwards adds about the will, that it arises from the intellect [n.363], I ask: either the intellect has to the will only the priority of generation or origin, and in this way perfection in the intellect with respect to the will is not proved but rather imperfection is, because universally the more imperfect things precede the more perfect things in order of generation, Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-5 [Aquinas, Metaphysics 9 lectio 8, Scotus Ord. I d.5 n.130]; but if you mean that the intellect is prior or root with respect to the will as eminently or virtually containing the will, this is refuted from what has been said [here supra], because what is ordered to another as prior in origin does not contain the other eminently or virtually; but an act of intellect is ordered essentially to an act of will

370. And if you deny this, dispute about it has to be in the material on beatitude, below [Ord. IV d.49 p.1 qq.4-5].

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

371. I say therefore to the question, taking as supposed what was said in Ord. II d.26 nn.24-26, namely that grace is the same as charity and is consequently first in the power, namely in the will, and further, along with these, that a disposition for form is in the same receptive subject as the form, and that character, if it be posited to exist, is suitably posited to be a disposition for sacramental grace (as was shown in the solution of the preceding question about character in its first congruence [n.247]) - therefore it is fitting to put character formally in the will.

372.From here to the end of the question the Vatican editors do not number the paragraphs. I have added numbers on my own account. ⁶² And there is a confirmation for this, that if character is a sign or foundation for the obligation of the soul to God [n.334], it is reasonable that it be put in the power to which first belongs being obligated or being the idea of obligating. But such is the will, because through its act precisely does anyone principally obligate himself; for the things that concur there on the part of the intellect or another power in man are only certain preambles for firmness of willing, which is proposing or vowing reasonably or certain signs manifesting that the willing is firm.

II. To the Initial Argument

373. As to the argument for the opposite side [n.360], it is plain that character is not the proximate disposition for faith as it is faith, but it is a disposition for the perfection that principally conforms the whole soul to God, and this is grace, which is the same as charity and is in the will, as was said [n.371].

III. To the Reason for Thomas Aquinas’ Position

374. To the reason for the other position [of Aquinas, n.363]: although it badly prove that character is in a power of the soul [n.369], yet I concede this because of the other antecedent that he accepts [n.362], namely that the form for which it disposes is in a power, and I concede that it is in one power and in that power which is more principal in the Image and in whose configuring consists principally the whole configuring of the soul or of the Image to the Trinity.