II. To the Initial Arguments on Both Sides

354. To the arguments for both sides:

To the first [n.279]: if it be posited to be an absolute form, it can be called either a power or a habit, according to the two ways already stated [nn.346-347].

355. To the second [n.280], it is plain what species of quality it would be put in and how [nn.336-345].

356. To the next [n.281]: quantity is an absolute form, and yet it is not posited to be active. Therefore,                 it is necessary to explain that it has an operation with respect to which it is a sufficient principle, or that it in some way is disposed to operation. And so I concede in the issue at hand that this form is a remote disposition for good operation.

357. As to the fourth [n.282] the answer is plain from the end of the preceding question [n.272].

358. To the first argument for the opposite [n.283]: it is not unacceptable for some relation to make disposition for an absolute form, speaking of disposition not in respect of a natural agent nor of a disposition that is the idea of a receptive subject, but of a suitable disposition in respect of a supernatural agent, that is, a disposition by which he who has it is suitably of a nature to be acted on by such supernatural agent; because also in this way a relation can be a disposition in respect of any voluntary agent - just as when someone willingly has a son as suitable object of some action, but someone foreign to such relation, although equal in everything absolute, does not have [such relation] for suitable object of action.

359. To the next about likeness [n.284], it is plain how a likeness is not only founded on quality as it is a distinct genus, but as the idea of it is found generally in all forms; for in this way someone mentally crucified can be said to be like Christ bodily crucified, and the like.