2. Scotus’ own Solution

345. I respond, therefore, that if character be posited as an absolute accident, it can be put in the second species of quality or also in the first.

346. And neither of these can be evidently disproved.

For if it is argued [Bonaventure] that character is not a power because it is supernatural and that to the second species belongs only natural power - this is a nothing, because although the Philosopher was only speaking of natural power by way of exemplification, howeverThe Vatican editor’s punctuation of the Latin here, which seems misleading, has been altered in the translation. ⁶⁰ a spiritual power, if it is absolute and accidental and spiritual, can well be reckoned to belong to the same intermediate genus, under quality, as natural power, just as also supernatural habit is reckoned to belong to the same intermediate genus as natural habit.

347. Also if it be posited to be the first species, as a habit, because it is movable with difficulty - this cannot be disproved.

348. Even if it be argued against this [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1] that it is a supernatural power, therefore not a habit (and the consequence is proved by way of likeness, because a natural power is not a natural habit); and second, because it is a disposition for grace therefore it is not a habit; and third, because every habit disposes to acting well or badly (Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17), but character does not; fourth, because every habit disposes to facility of action (Ethics 2) - these are not probative:

349. Not the first [n.347] because a supernatural power, that is, a supernatural form, movable with difficulty can well be a principle of acting or of resisting what is corruptive of it, and thus have the idea of supernatural power. Nor is the likeness [n.348] valid, because a natural habit states a certain induced facility over and above the natural power, because a natural power is that whereby we are naturally able to do the acts we can do; but a supernatural power can be an immovable spiritual form, and to this extent can be called a habit, yet it is a principle whereby we can do such spiritual or supernatural act.

350. The second [n.348] is not compelling, because one habit can well be the disposition for another habit, just as, according to those who distinguish the habit of the principle from the habit of the conclusion, the habit of the principle disposes to the habit of the conclusion; neither is a disposition, as distinguished from a habit, for this reason in the first species, for it is a quality easily movable, by contrast with a habit.

351. Third, about acting well or badly [n.348], this is not necessary, because there can be an indifferent habit; for thus, from frequent acting absolutely, an aptitude is acquired for acting by such action with neither goodness nor badness, just as neither was or is the generative act of such sort, namely bad or good. And this is clear: for someone, who is frequently considering a geometrical conclusion, can have an extensive aptitude for considering a conclusion in that science, and the habit there is not good or bad, just as neither is the act from which it was being generated. And so can it be in a supernatural habit.

352. And if you say [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.3 ad 1] that a supernatural habit is not such, because it is given for the perfection of the receiver - I reply that this sort of supernatural habit can be a disposing for a good act, though it not be the proximate or sufficient principle elicitive of it; and in this way infused faith is not a sufficient principle of eliciting an act of believing, nor infused charity of eliciting an act of loving, but they incline (when the other necessary things concur) so that a good act be elicited. I say thus that some supernatural habit can incline rather remotely and imperfectly to a good act; and such is character posited to be, as first and very remotely disposing to good acts.

353. The fourth [n.348], about facility, has no validity, because it is not true save of an acquired habit; for an infused habit does not bestow facility for act, as is plain in a recent convert for whom it is not easy after conversion to elicit good acts but difficult, until from a frequency of good acts he will have acquired some acquired virtue.