a. About the First Solution

336. It is said [Richard of Middleton] that because it is a supernatural quality it is not necessary for it to be put in the genus of quality (which is proved through the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.10.1058b11-12, “Corruptible and incorruptible differ by more than genus”); natural and supernatural differ more than corruptible and incorruptible, because corruptible and incorruptible are contained under a single member of the division, namely natural; therefore much more do natural and supernatural differ more than in genus.

337. To the contrary:

Faith, hope, and charity are certain supernatural things, and yet they are conceded [Bonaventure, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] to be properly in the genus of quality.

338. This same thing appears in another way, because natural and supernatural are not conditions save in comparison to the agent; but comparison to an agent does not vary something as to its being in a genus, because something is put in a genus by its formal proper quiddity, relation to an agent being bracketed.

339. Nor is the statement of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.336] compelling, because he is speaking of physical genus, for in this way no two things are of the same genus unless they are mutually changeable; but the same logical genus can well contain many things that do not belong to the same physical genusAn interesting remark that can usefully be used to understand Scotus’ notorious claim that ‘being’ is a univocal concept; for it can thus be a univocal concept logically while an analogical one physically or really. ⁵⁹ - it is plain about corporeal and incorporeal substance, and corporeal and spiritual quality.