1. Consideration of the Diverse Opinions or Solutions

a. About the First Solution

336. It is said [Richard of Middleton] that because it is a supernatural quality it is not necessary for it to be put in the genus of quality (which is proved through the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.10.1058b11-12, “Corruptible and incorruptible differ by more than genus”); natural and supernatural differ more than corruptible and incorruptible, because corruptible and incorruptible are contained under a single member of the division, namely natural; therefore much more do natural and supernatural differ more than in genus.

337. To the contrary:

Faith, hope, and charity are certain supernatural things, and yet they are conceded [Bonaventure, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] to be properly in the genus of quality.

338. This same thing appears in another way, because natural and supernatural are not conditions save in comparison to the agent; but comparison to an agent does not vary something as to its being in a genus, because something is put in a genus by its formal proper quiddity, relation to an agent being bracketed.

339. Nor is the statement of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.336] compelling, because he is speaking of physical genus, for in this way no two things are of the same genus unless they are mutually changeable; but the same logical genus can well contain many things that do not belong to the same physical genusAn interesting remark that can usefully be used to understand Scotus’ notorious claim that ‘being’ is a univocal concept; for it can thus be a univocal concept logically while an analogical one physically or really. ⁵⁹ - it is plain about corporeal and incorporeal substance, and corporeal and spiritual quality.

b. About Other Possible Solutions

340. In another way it is said [Richard of Middleton, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] that, according as it is a principle of configuring, it can be put in the fourth species; according as it is a principle of assimilating, it can be put in the third species; and as it is a power, in the second species; and as it is a disposition for grace, in the first as a disposition but, insofar as it is immovably permanent, in the same species as a habit.

341. But this is not valid, because although it could have many properties according to which it is assimilated to the forms of the diverse species of quality, yet it cannot in itself be so many quidditatively; for it is in itself only one quiddity simply; therefore it will be in only one species.

342. However this statement [n.340] could have some probability about one other opinion, because in truth the division of quality into four species is not properly of a genus into species but is only according to diverse modes agreeing with diverse qualities. And perhaps to the same quality in itself in its essence there could belong several modes that are posited as proper to diverse qualities.

c. About another Peculiar Possible Solution

343. In another way it is said [opinion reported and rejected by Bonaventure and Aquinas] that it is in the fourth species of quality, because it is a certain spiritual figure.

344. But this is nothing, because nothing is placed in a genus through metaphorical properties, otherwise Christ would truly be in the genus of inanimate substance (for he is metaphorically called ‘rock’ [I Corinthians 10.4]), and in the genus of irrational animal (because he is said metaphorically to be a ‘lion’ [Revelation 5.5]), and in the genus of quality (because he is said to be ‘light’, “I am the light of the world,” [John 8.12]). But from metaphors is to be collected the proper condition of a thing in itself, and according to this condition must it be placed in genus and species; for in this way could ‘intelligible species’ be put in the fourth species of quality, because it configures the soul to the very subject [sc. of thought].