C. Two Doubts as to the Question

318. But there remain two doubts: first about the proximate foundation of the relation; the other, how the characters of diverse sacraments can be distinguished from each other.

1. About the First Doubt

319. About the first, it may seem to someone [Aquinas, Metaphysics 5 lect.17] that the act of reception of the sacrament, when it crosses over into the past, would be the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of founding the relation [n.317].

320. But that is false, especially in the matter at issue, because the idea of founding and the relation are in the same proximate subject (the reception of the sacrament and the character). Even if they be in the same supposit, yet not in the same proximate subject; because the reception of baptism was in the supposit according to the body, the character according to the soul.

321. Now it is generally false here and in other cases, for two reasons;

First, because non-being cannot be the foundation or idea of founding any real relation, because neither can it be the term. For on this account, ‘relation of reason’ is reckoned a contradiction, because it has a negation as foundation or term [cf. Scotus, Praedicamenta, q.25 nn.22-24]; an act crossing over into the past, after it has crossed over, is simply not; therefore after it has crossed over, no new relation is founded on it.

322. The fact, second, is plain because to an immutable term and on an altogether immutable foundation a relation cannot be founded unless it simply necessarily inheres in the foundation - hence if some essence of a creature were simply immutable, its relation to God would be simply immutable; therefore if character state some relation to God (about whom it is plain that he is an immutable foundation), and it is founded on an act as it is past, and the past act as past is simply necessary (insofar as it cannot by absolute divine power be non-past), it follows that that real relation would be altogether immutable, even when speaking of God’s absolute power. But this is unacceptable, because there would be some real relation, different from its foundation, that God could not by his absolute power eliminate from its foundation, as eliminating a posterior from a prior.

323. And these last two proofs [nn.321-322] prove that paternity is not founded on ‘having generated’.

324. And if you bring against this the remark in Metaphysics 5.15.1021a21-25 [“‘father’ is so called by the fact he generates”], I reply that an act could be the cause in the coming to be of the relation (and indeed, when the cause was, then the relation was coming to be present), but it is not a cause of the relation’s being present, just as it does not remain while the relation does; but a foundation is not only cause of coming to be present but also of being present.

325. What then is the foundation of paternity?

I say that the proximate foundation is the very generative power, not when speaking of the respect that power of itself states, but of the absolute that is denominated by the respect.

326. I say therefore, by way of similarity to the matter at hand, that if character is a real relation, its proximate foundation is the bare soul itself (but whether a power or the essence will be discussed in the following question [nn.371-372]); because a respect that arises extrinsically can be founded on a foundation whose principles it in no way leaves, nor need its proximate foundation be in any way determined for it by its own proper idea (because then the respect would not arise extrinsically), but is only determined for it by the very agent; so it is in the matter at hand.

2. About the Second Doubt

327. To the second doubt [n.318] I say that just as, if character were reckoned an absolute form, characters would be said to be distinguished from each other formally, so, if they be posited to be those respects, although they could be distinguished extrinsically from what is extrinsic, yet they are distinguished from each other formally.

328. But if you ask, ‘why then are there only three characters?’,Namely the characters of the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and holy orders. ⁵⁶ I say (because I will not make special mention of this in the matter about confirmation or of orders) that this is plain in these polities that are worldly. For no one has a determinate rank in the family of a king because he eats or drinks, or because after an offense the lord is reconciled to him, or because he multiplies persons in the polity; for these common acts can exist in everyone in any rank at all; but someone has a rank when he is received into the family of the lord, another when he advances further and is constituted a soldier for defending the republic, another when he is constituted a superior under the lord for constituting others in determinate ranks in his family - as for instance an official general or immediate under the lord, to whom is committed a general authority for receiving others into the family of the lord.

329. And therefore if a name were imposed that signified rank in the family or dignity or bailiwick, someone would not be said to have rank or dignity because coming to the dining table or married or returning to grace after an offense; but he who was taken up from the people into the family of the lord would be said to have a rank, and he a further rank who would be constituted in the family for defending the house, and he a further rank in the family who would be constituted as superintendent for receiving others into the family and instructing an inferior.

330. So is it in the issue at hand; three sacraments (namely eucharist for spiritual nourishment, matrimony for bodily procreation, penance for reconciliationScotus oddly does not mention here the fourth sacrament of the seven, namely extreme unction or the sacrament of the sick, perhaps because it is implied under the sacrament of penance. ⁵⁷) constitute someone in no definite rank in the Church; rather they can be common to every member of the Church in any rank whatever.

331. But the first rank in the Church and the most universal is to be received into the family of Christ, which happens in baptism; the second special one is to be constituted a soldier for the defense of the Christian faith, which happens in confirmation; the third is to be constituted a father and pastor for introducing others into the Church and for instructing and directing others in the Church, which happens in orders.

332. And just as in the polity [n.328] it is not fitting for the three dignities to be repeated, namely reception into the family, promotion to the military, and superintendence as to doctrine, but nutrition and procreation and reconciliation [n.329] can well be repeated, - so in the issue at hand, it is not proper for the three orders to be repeated, but the others are repeated; and in those that are not to be repeated an unrepeatable rank is acquired and a character said to be conferred; not in the ones that are not to be repeated.