a. To the First Reason

294. The first of these reasons takes a false major [sc. ‘change is only toward absolute form’, n.286]. I prove this in two ways: first by reason, second by authority.

295. [By reason] - First thus: a respect cannot come more intrinsically to a foundation than what necessarily follows the foundation when the term is posited, because a respect altogether cannot be in a foundation when the term is bracketed, because then it would not be a respect but an absolute form. Therefore, if some respect can come from without to a foundation, it follows that it does not necessarily follow the foundation, even when the term is posited; therefore, the respect can be new altogether without newness of foundation or of term; so for its new being there can be a change, because it is not a change to anything absolute.

296. But if you say a respect comes extrinsically to a subject but not to a foundation - this is nothing, because intrinsic relations (as similarity, which follows whiteness and the like) can come extrinsically to a subject, because the foundation comes anew to it; so therefore, if these are intrinsic and the others extrinsic, the difference between them will be in relation to the foundation.Sc. if intrinsic and extrinsic relations can both come extrinsically to a subject, the difference between them must be in something else and not in the subject directly, which something else will be the foundation. ⁵⁵

297. Again, a natural agent cannot act newly unless something new is posited either in it or in the passive thing undergoes it, or a new relation is posited between them (this is plain, because all things that are related uniformly will have action uniformly, since such agent acts by necessity of nature); therefore if some natural agent has some new action, there will be either some absolute form in the agent before the new action, or some new form in the passive subject, or some new relation of the agent to the passive subject. But neither the first nor the second is necessary, for fire can newly act on wood without the fact that, before the action, the fire or the wood receive a new form, because the first absolute form that the wood receives is there through this action [sc. the form of being ash or cinders is received by the wood through the action of burning]; therefore by this action there is a new relation there of the fire to the wood without any newness of absolute form.

298. This is plain by experiment, because when an active thing is disposed in the same way according to its active form, and the passive thing is disposed in the same way according to its proximate passive potency, if there were some impediment interposed between them, the agent will not act on the passive thing; but when the impediment or obstacle is removed, it will act; therefore a new relation of agent to passive thing is present there without a new absolute form.

299. [By authority] - This is proved from the Philosopher’s intention in Physics 5.2.225b11-13, because although he deny being moved is in the genus of ‘to something’, insofar as to the genus ‘to something’ belong relations that arise intrinsically [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.54], yet he does not deny that motion or change is in the genus ‘to something’ arising intrinsically, rather he concedes it; for he concedes that motion is properly in the genus ‘where’ [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.61], and yet ‘where’ is only a certain respect of the circumscribing body to the located thing or is the circumscribing body.