1. Against him who Holds this Opinion from his own Statements

290. Argument against this:

First against the one who holds this opinion from his own statements, because he contradicts himself:

For he himself says [Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.2, ST IIIa q.73 a.2] that this is the definition of a character: “A character is a sign of communion in the faith and in holy order, given by a hierarch,” or that it is “a sign of communion in divine things and the sacred order of the faithful.” In whatever way it is defined, this way or that, he says that ‘sign’ is placed in the definition of character as the genus.A sign is a relation, because x’s being a sign of y is a relation that x has to y. ⁵⁴

291. From this it is argued that a character cannot be any absolute form, because to the quiddity of an absolute form no respect essentially belongs, because then the quiddity would be for itself and not for itself; nor even can it be said that relation is put there as genus and is not truly a genus because in this way a subject is put in the definition of an accident, but it is plain that a relation is not the subject of an absolute, nor either is it the idea of being receptive.

292. Again, just as ‘more things are not to be posited without necessity’ [n.205, d.1 n.300], so when something is posited precisely because of something else, it is not to be posited more perfectly than is required for that something else, or than could be concluded from that something else, for the further perfection that would be posited would be posited in vain; but there is no necessity that, because of all the things because of which a character is posited, a character should be an absolute perfection; for all those things can also be sufficiently preserved if it is a relative form; therefore superfluously and without reason is it posited to be an absolute form.

293. The minor [sc. ‘there is no necessity that, because of...absolute perfection,’ n.292] will be plain when solving the reasons for the opinion [nn.294ff.].