The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 1

B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. Against him who Holds this Opinion from his own Statements

290. Argument against this:

First against the one who holds this opinion from his own statements, because he contradicts himself:

For he himself says [Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.2, ST IIIa q.73 a.2] that this is the definition of a character: “A character is a sign of communion in the faith and in holy order, given by a hierarch,” or that it is “a sign of communion in divine things and the sacred order of the faithful.” In whatever way it is defined, this way or that, he says that ‘sign’ is placed in the definition of character as the genus.⁵⁴

291. From this it is argued that a character cannot be any absolute form, because to the quiddity of an absolute form no respect essentially belongs, because then the quiddity would be for itself and not for itself; nor even can it be said that relation is put there as genus and is not truly a genus because in this way a subject is put in the definition of an accident, but it is plain that a relation is not the subject of an absolute, nor either is it the idea of being receptive.

292. Again, just as ‘more things are not to be posited without necessity’ [n.205, d.1 n.300], so when something is posited precisely because of something else, it is not to be posited more perfectly than is required for that something else, or than could be concluded from that something else, for the further perfection that would be posited would be posited in vain; but there is no necessity that, because of all the things because of which a character is posited, a character should be an absolute perfection; for all those things can also be sufficiently preserved if it is a relative form; therefore superfluously and without reason is it posited to be an absolute form.

293. The minor [sc. ‘there is no necessity that, because of...absolute perfection,’ n.292] will be plain when solving the reasons for the opinion [nn.294ff.].

2. Against the Reasons Brought Forward in the Opinion

a. To the First Reason

294. The first of these reasons takes a false major [sc. ‘change is only toward absolute form’, n.286]. I prove this in two ways: first by reason, second by authority.

295. [By reason] - First thus: a respect cannot come more intrinsically to a foundation than what necessarily follows the foundation when the term is posited, because a respect altogether cannot be in a foundation when the term is bracketed, because then it would not be a respect but an absolute form. Therefore, if some respect can come from without to a foundation, it follows that it does not necessarily follow the foundation, even when the term is posited; therefore, the respect can be new altogether without newness of foundation or of term; so for its new being there can be a change, because it is not a change to anything absolute.

296. But if you say a respect comes extrinsically to a subject but not to a foundation - this is nothing, because intrinsic relations (as similarity, which follows whiteness and the like) can come extrinsically to a subject, because the foundation comes anew to it; so therefore, if these are intrinsic and the others extrinsic, the difference between them will be in relation to the foundation.⁵⁵

297. Again, a natural agent cannot act newly unless something new is posited either in it or in the passive thing undergoes it, or a new relation is posited between them (this is plain, because all things that are related uniformly will have action uniformly, since such agent acts by necessity of nature); therefore if some natural agent has some new action, there will be either some absolute form in the agent before the new action, or some new form in the passive subject, or some new relation of the agent to the passive subject. But neither the first nor the second is necessary, for fire can newly act on wood without the fact that, before the action, the fire or the wood receive a new form, because the first absolute form that the wood receives is there through this action [sc. the form of being ash or cinders is received by the wood through the action of burning]; therefore by this action there is a new relation there of the fire to the wood without any newness of absolute form.

298. This is plain by experiment, because when an active thing is disposed in the same way according to its active form, and the passive thing is disposed in the same way according to its proximate passive potency, if there were some impediment interposed between them, the agent will not act on the passive thing; but when the impediment or obstacle is removed, it will act; therefore a new relation of agent to passive thing is present there without a new absolute form.

299. [By authority] - This is proved from the Philosopher’s intention in Physics 5.2.225b11-13, because although he deny being moved is in the genus of ‘to something’, insofar as to the genus ‘to something’ belong relations that arise intrinsically [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.54], yet he does not deny that motion or change is in the genus ‘to something’ arising intrinsically, rather he concedes it; for he concedes that motion is properly in the genus ‘where’ [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.61], and yet ‘where’ is only a certain respect of the circumscribing body to the located thing or is the circumscribing body.

b. To the Second Reason

300. The second reason too [n.287] has a false major, namely that ‘a relation cannot be founded on a relation’, because according to Euclid Elements of Geometry V def.4, ‘proportionality is a likeness of two proportions’: therefore on a proportion, which formally states a relation, or on its unity, is founded a likeness.

301. And if you argue that ‘likeness is unity in quality’ Metaphysics 5.15.1021a9-12, I say: although in one way ‘what’ is appropriated to the genus of substance, and in the same way ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ (which follow something insofar as ‘what’ is founded on substance), and although ‘equal’ is founded on unity of quantity (taken strictly), ‘like’ on unity of quality - yet taking them in another way ‘what’ is found in every genus, taking the idea of genus very precisely, and ‘what sort of’ is found in every genus (taking form in that genus in the idea of form), and ‘quantity of virtue’ is found in every genus; and so there is found, in this way, in every genus ‘one’, ‘like’, and ‘equal’. For in this way things possessing relations of one species can be said to be alike according to the unity of one relation, just as things possessing one substantial form can be said to be alike according to substance or according to species.

302. And as to what is said [n.262] about the second relation, which is founded on character, namely ‘sign’, I say that if, according to Augustine On Christian Doctrine II ch.1 n.1, “a sign is what, besides the knowledge that it brings to the senses, makes something else come to knowledge” (which is true not only of a sensible sign, taking ‘sense’ strictly for bodily sense, but is true also when taking ‘sense’ generally for cognitive power) - therefore, taking ‘sense’ in this other way for cognitive power, I say thus that there is nothing from the knowledge of which one could come to the knowledge of something else (at least as this is from knowledge of a posterior to a prior), without that posterior thing being able to be called a sign. And thus I concede that on a real relation can be founded the relation of sign to something prior; but such relation not only leads to knowledge of itself but also of something else.

303. And in this way, if someone were to see ‘paternity’ in its foundation, it could be a commemorative sign of a past act of generation. And this is the way it is in the matter at hand.

304. And especially is this not unacceptable, because this relation of sign is only a relation of reason - speaking of a sign instituted at will, of which sort is character with respect to the sacrament or the received sign.

305. As to what is added there [n.287] about the relation of conformity or obligation, it is not cogent; for a religious can, by a vow of religion, be obligated to keeping religion, and he who has done homage can, through the act of doing homage, be obligated to his lord, and in these sort of cases universally [there is obligation] through a preceding promise; and yet there is not there any new absolute form on which the obligation is founded, nor perhaps any relation save one of reason. And so the idea of obligation could be abundantly preserved if it were posited to be a relation of reason, just as filiation in a son could be the idea of some relation to the father (as an obligation to natural love), although it would be possible for it to be filiation alone.

306. And to the proof that then there would be a process to infinity in relations [n.287], it is not valid of real relations, because there is an ultimate relation on which another real relation cannot be founded - just as there is an ultimate accident in beings that cannot be a further subject for another accident; and therefore it does not follow that, if an accident can be in an accident, there is a process to infinity in accidents. However, I readily concede about relations of reason that there can be a process to infinity, because any relation at all, whether real or of reason, can further found another relation of reason.

c. To the Third Reason

307. The third reason [n.288] either equivocates over ‘power’ or contains a false proposition.

For if ‘power’ be taken simply for some act that, without the power, simply could not be obtained, I deny that character is thus a power; for he who is baptized has power simply for no act for which he did not have power when unbaptized, and this whether speaking of an act for which he has power actively or of an act which he receives in some way from another, for in this way someone not baptized could be anointed with chrism just like someone baptized, and he could thus be washed just like someone baptized.

308. But if we speak of the power of ministry, that is, the power by which he is a suitable minister of some principal agent (and without that power he would not be a suitable minister of that principal agent), there is no need that that power be an absolute form, but it is enough in many cases that it be only a relation of reason.

309. The proof of this is according to them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.24 q.3 a.2], because they do not say that the episcopacy is an order beyond the priesthood, and yet a bishop has a ministerial power of a sort that a non-bishop does not have. For he is a suitable minister in an act God assists with, as in the act of ordaining, and God would not assist similarly if someone else, a non-bishop, were to carry out a similar act. Likewise, if an appointed judge pass a sentence, the sentence holds; but it would not have held before, because a sentence passed by its non-judge is null.

310. Nor yet does this judge or that bishop have any real absolute form, nor perhaps a relative form, save only one of reason.

311. For by that relation of reason by which he is appointed judge by the prince, the will of the prince ratifies the sentence passed by him, and wills it be observed; but he does not ratify the sentence of another who has not been appointed judge, nor does he will it to be observed. And so the judge, by that relation to the will of the prince, has in respect of the prince (as principal agent) a ministerial power for suitably carrying out some act ministerially that, without such relation, he could not suitably carry out.

312. And much more could a real relation, were it present, be posited to be this sort of power of suitably carrying out some act ministerially. For it is plain that a son, because he is a son, can have some authority for carrying out some act in his father’s house that a non-son does not have, and again a nephew [can have authority] for some act but an inferior one; and this power, in authority this way or that, of prescribing or commanding, is only kinship or sonship.

313. In this way is the response clear to the powers about which in particular the argument is.

For the power of ordaining and confirming, if it is an active power, is only for ministering suitably in such an act for such a lord, so that the lord himself, operating principally, may assist with the ministerial act in the way he would not assist with such ministry shown by another.

Now the baptismal character, if it is posited to be a passive power, is not simply passive, either as being receptive or as being the idea of receiving, for nothing absolutely can the soul of someone baptized receive that the soul of someone not baptized cannot receive; but the character is a certain power, relative by way of congruity, from the principal such agent disposing it to act on a passive subject possessing such form and not on any other passive subject.

314. Now such an idea, relative by way of congruity in respect of some principal agent acting voluntarily, can be a relation alone, just as when someone disposes to do something to someone because he is son or kin, and does not want to cause anything similar to one who does not have such relationship.

d. To the Fourth Reason

315. The fourth reason [n.289] destroys the first. For if in the other sacraments there were caused universally a new relation to the action or undergoing of the sacrament and not a character, then there is a new relation there without a new absolute, unless you imagine [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.1 q.1 a4; cf. supra d.1 n.279] that in any other one there is posited some absolute corresponding to character, as for instance some ornament. But if that ornament is a supernatural form it will be indelible in the way that the character is indelible, because it will not be able to have a demeritorious cause. And then it seems to be a fiction: why could it not be said to be a character, since it is a form prior to the principal effect of the sacrament, and an indelible form? Why also will that ornament not be able to have an effect (when pretense ceases) on the other sacraments, as is posited of character in the sacraments that imprint a character?

316. I respond, therefore, that the reason proves nothing save that character is not a relation to the action or undergoing of the sacrament any more than if it were an absolute form. The proof that it is not any absolute form is that in the other sacraments, according to them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.1 q.1 a.1, ST IIIa q.63 a.2], some absolute form is impressed but a character is not. And thereby can it be said that in any other sacrament there is not impressed any relation that remains after the act; but a character, if it is a relation, remains after the act of baptism received; indeed it remains always.

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