b. Second Reason

219. Second, argument is given principally in the way following, and it returns to the same truth [n.205; d.1 n.300], namely that a plurality is not to be posited without necessity. And the argument is as follows: nothing in vain is to be posited in the works of God, because “God and nature do nothing in vain” [On the Heavens 1.4.271a33]; but a character according to this understanding [nn.198-199], if it be posited, is posited in vain.

220. Proof of the minor: first by comparison with the main effect of baptism, which is grace [n.198]; second by comparison with those effects that are attributed to character, namely to assimilate, to distinguish, etc. [n.199].

221. As to the first [n.220] the argument is as follows:

If [a character] is required as a disposition for grace, either then on the part of what receives or on the part of the agent. Not on the part of what receives, because a soul that does not have sin actually [sc. those just now baptized] is supremely disposed to receive grace; nor on the part of the agent, because the agent [sc. God] is of infinite virtue.

222. And if you say it is required as a permanent disposition for inducing, at some point later in time, an effect that is not induced at once (as for this purpose, that he who has, in pretense, been baptized may afterwards receive the effect of baptism) - against this as before [n.221]: a character is required for that later time (when he receives the ultimate effect of baptism) as a disposition either on the part of what receives or on the part of the agent, and the reasoning stands as before.

223. There is argument specifically for this, that God could, without such a sign, be present to the one baptized to cause the effect of baptism (after the pretense is removed), just as he would have been present in the baptism itself if the one baptized had not before been in pretense. And there is a confirmation, that the effect of baptism is not given to him who is supposed to have the character unless he truly repent; but by true penance, grace would, without such a form, be given.

224. As to the other effects [nn.220, 199] the proof of the point is that the one baptized could, without an inherent form, be assimilated to the baptized and distinguished from the non-baptized through receiving baptism, as is plain in many other cases (because someone professed in religion is assimilated to another who is professed, and distinguished from another who is not professed, not by some other form inherent in him after profession, but because he had such act [of profession] in the past).

225. In the same way about the third effect [in fact the fourth, n.199], namely that the sign is posited as configuring or obligating [the baptized] to Christ; for someone can be obligated to someone, and so be configured to him as to the obligation of configuring, without any inherent form; just as he who does homage to some lord is, after the homage, obliged to him to keep faith and so to a certain configuration, and someone professed is bound by his profession to be conformed or configured to his superior; and yet he who does not do homage or is not professed receives some absolute form to be a sign of configuration.

226. About the fourth effect [the third in n.199], namely that a sign commemorating the sacrament itself is posited, the argument is as follows: either because such a commemorative sign is posited in respect of the sacrament on account of the excellence of the sacrament in itself, or it is posited on account of some relation to others who may recognize from the sign the one signed.

227. Not in the first way, because faith and charity are more excellent than having received baptism, and yet they do not possess any commemorative sign after they have become present within.

228. Not in the second way, because either in comparison to God or to one’s neighbor; not as to God, because God would recognize, without any existent sign, him who has received the sacrament; not as to one’s neighbor, because either to the blessed in glory (for his greater glory in having the sign), or to the damned in hell (for his greater confusion who does not have such a sign). It is necessary to grant neither, because it is a greater glory for the blessed to have had an act of charity than to have received baptism, and it is a greater confusion for the damned to have fallen from charity than from the reception of baptism; and yet no commemorative sign for charity or a meritorious act is posited in the blessed or in the damned.

229. Now specifically about beatitude the argument is that, if the sign were in the haver of it for special excellence in glory, it would follow that only a priest among all Christians could have such an excellence in glory, because only a priest has all the characters. It would also follow that Christ would lack that excellence of glory, because he is not baptized thus with the baptism of Christ, because the baptism of John did not impress a character; nor was he a priest with the priesthood as it is conferred in priestly ordination, because he was not ordained by anyone; for equal reason neither was he confirmed with sacramental confirmation. It also follows that the holy Patriarchs and the Blessed Mother did not have that excellence in glory.