d. Response to the Second Objection

130. As to the second [n.114], one must say that to baptism belong some things as extrinsic, some things as intrinsic; and I concede that nothing belongs to it intrinsically or to its foundation save what is sensible.

131. However, just as an efficient cause is necessarily required for it as extrinsic cause, so there is necessarily required for it what serves as the principle of acting for such efficient cause. Now the ultimate principle determining an intellectual agent to act is intention, because such an agent is cause by command of will of the acts of the other powers that are subject to command of will.

132. When therefore it is said that nothing belongs to the sacrament unless it be something of the sacrament or the thing of it [n.114], this is true of that which is intrinsic either to the sacrament itself or to what is signified by the sacrament. But intention is intrinsic in neither way; it is, however, required on the part of the agent.