1. The Reason Proposed by Thomas Aquinas.

76. An argument against this opinion is as follows [Aquinas ST Ia q.45 a.5 ad 1]: “What participates in some nature does not produce another like itself in that nature save by applying the nature to something else (for man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely because thus he would be cause of himself; but man is cause that human nature is in ‘this generated man’, and so he presupposes the matter whereby ‘this man’ is). But any created thing participates in the nature of being, because only God is his own being. Therefore no created thing can produce any being unless something is presupposed to its action whereby the product may be a ‘this’. But this sort of supposition cannot hold in the case of an immaterial substance, because an immaterial substance is a ‘this’ through its own form, by which it has being. Therefore, an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance as to that substance’s ‘being simply’.”

77. This reasoning, which has in some way been rejected elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 nn.229-233, 241-246], supposes first that ‘this man’ is a ‘this’ only through matter, and second that an angel is a ‘this’ through its form.

78. Likewise, when in the major is taken “What participates in some nature does not produce another like itself in that nature save by applying the nature to something else,” then: - Either this is for the reason that the nature must be participated by the product, and then, from the fact that the nature is participated by it, something must be presupposed to which the nature is applied. And then it would follow that God could not create an angel: First because an angel would participate ‘being’ and so something must be presupposed to which ‘being’ might be applied, which is against the idea of creation. Second because, as the proof of the major shows [n.76], the product would have to be a

‘this’ through what was presupposed; but, according to them [Aquinas and his followers] an angel cannot be a ‘this’ through anything that is presupposed, because it is a ‘this’ through its form. Therefore, the reason the major is true cannot be because the nature to be communicated is participated by the product.

79. Or if, alternatively, it be said that the major is true is because the nature communicating the nature participates in the nature [n.76], this cannot be the reason, because nothing is presupposed to the being itself in that very agent (for otherwise the producer itself could not be created). Therefore, neither is it necessary that anything such be presupposed in what is made like the producer in being.

80. Again, being is participated either as some act different from essence, or as the same as essence or as the first act of the thing.

If in the first way, no proof is given that the product cannot create, for although being presupposes something in which it is received, yet essence presupposes nothing; and so, although what participates being is not created as to being, there is no proof that it could not be created as to the substance or essence that is presupposed.

If in the second way, even less is the proposed conclusion got that being cannot be created and cannot be so by what participates being just as by something else. For in things here below each individual participates the nature of the species, and yet this nature can be the first term of production in one individual and the principle of producing in another individual. And that matter is presupposed in this case is not on account of the nature to be participated, but because the form, which is part of the participated nature, is a material form.