73 occurrences of therefore etc in this volume.
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cover
The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 1 - 7
Book Four. Distinctions 1 - 7
First Distinction. First Part. On the Action of the Creature in Respect of the Term of Creation
Single Question. Whether a Creature can have any Action with respect to the Term of Creation
II. Opinion of Avicenna for the Opposite Side of the Question
A. Exposition of the Opinion

A. Exposition of the Opinion

72. The opinion of Avicenna seems to be for the opposite side of the question. He allows that a creature can create in his Metaphysics 9 ch.4, where he posits that the second intelligence is a productive cause of the third, and the third of the fourth, and so on and so on. But the second intelligence is a creature, and the production of the third intelligence is creation, in the way he speaks of creation and creature in Metaphysics 6 ch.2, namely in that creation is production from nothing. And creation comes after nothing, not in order of duration but of nature, as Avicenna expounds in the same place, or it comes from nothing, that is, not from supposing anything first of the produced thing. He posits that in this way the second intelligence is produced by God, and the third by the second - with nothing presupposed and after non-being in order of nature, though not in order of duration, because he does not posit any newness.

73. The following sort of reason can be put together for this opinion: from a cause altogether one there is only one immediate effect (for otherwise there would be no reason for a distinction in the effect; for why is this effect different from that if the cause of this and of that is altogether one?); but the first thing is altogether one in itself; therefore since the intelligences are several, they will not come immediately from one thing; therefore one intelligence comes from another intelligence.

74. If Aristotle agreed with Avicenna here in these two propositions - namely ‘intelligence is produced, that is, it is a being from another, though without novelty’ and ‘from something altogether simple only one thing can immediately come to be’ - then he would have to agree with him in the conclusion.

75. One can also argue for this opinion in the following way, that the Philosopher says in Meterologica 4.3.380a12-15, “Each thing is perfect when it can produce another like itself.” But the intelligences are more perfect than corruptible bodily substances.     Therefore , since body can produce body, much more can intelligence produce intelligence. But an intelligence can only be produced by creation, since it does not have matter as part of itself. Therefore etc     .