B. Scotus’ own Opinion

146. So therefore, by positing only one effect of baptism, namely grace, I respond to the question that, since for the effect of baptism there is concurrent the principal cause (namely God), and the meritorious cause (namely the passion of Christ), and the one receiving baptism himself, equality or inequality can be considered on the part of each of these.

1. About the Effect of Baptism Flowing Forth from the Principal Cause

147. As concerns God, who determines himself to cooperate with this sign through the effect signified, and who therein institutes this sign in idea of certain sign (as was said above, d. 1 nn.192-193) - there can in some way be a difference, in some way not.

148. For he made disposition to confer, as a matter of rule, some grace by this sign, such that he confer a lesser grace on no one; and this grace can be said to be conferred by virtue of baptism, because conferred by the truth of this sign; and just as, with respect to this degree [of grace], the universal determination is uniform, so is the effect equal.

149. However, because God has predestined diverse of the elect to diverse degrees of glory (and this before the determination of this sign for conferring in baptism such and such an amount of grace), and because a greater grace can rationally be conferred on someone ordered to greater glory - God could, in determining the truth or certitude of this sign, make disposition to confer on some recipient precisely the grace that is required for the certitude of the sign, and to confer a greater grace on someone whom he predestined to greater glory. But that nobler degree [of grace] would not be conferred by virtue of baptism but by a special divine benevolence.

150. Because of this, therefore, it can be said that the effect given by virtue of baptism on the part of the principal cause is equal, and also that as a matter of rule the effect by virtue of baptism is equal, because the supposition is that, by common law, the first grace is not given greater without any difference beyond the principal cause.

2. About the Effect of Baptism Flowing Forth from the Meritorious Cause

151. About the second [n.146] it can be said that this meritorious cause can more efficaciously work for grace in one person than in another, either because this cause was offered, as to the intention of the offerer, more specially for one than for another, or because, as to its execution, it was offered for one in fact, for another only in divine foresight [n.153].

152. In the first way, as Christ is commonly posited to know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision [Ord. III d.14 nn.25-27], and as consequently he knows all the elect and for what degree of glory they have been elected, he therefore could make a special offer of his passion for those destined to greater glory, and especially as he offered himself for the human race for this purpose that divine predestination be fulfilled in them [cf. Scotus, Lectura III d.20 nn.36-39].

153. In the second way the passion of Christ was more effectively operating for us, who are in the Law of the Gospel, than for the fathers in the Law of Moses, because an obedience performed is accepted for giving a greater good in return than is an obedience foreseen. And in this second way there is inequality in those who receive grace by circumcision and those by baptism, because of the unequal application to them of the meritorious cause, and perhaps also [there is inequality] in those who were baptized before the passion and those after the passion.

154. But whether in the first way (namely because of a more special oblation in the will of Christ [n.151]), there is inequality of grace in some even of the non-baptized, is doubtful in fact, but the possibility has been shown.

3. About the Effect of Baptism Flowing Forth from the Receivers

155. About the third [n.146] I say that the baptized are children or adults.

156. Comparing child with child, since they have no motion proper, they therefore also on their own part have no inequality as to receiving grace.

157. However there can be in the parents of one child a greater motion than in the parents of another for their little one, or in some other things ministering to or assisting the baptism - and because of the merits of these parents God can confer on one of the little ones a greater grace than on the other, but this not by virtue of baptism but by virtue of merit. And in this way perhaps the parents of Blessed Nicholas merited for him by their prayers a greater grace, which was in him, even as a child, a principle of so marvelous an effect that in two days in one week he rested content with only a single breast feeding.Jacob de Voragine, Golden Legends, ‘On Saint Nicholas’ [ed. Maggioni, Florence, 1998, 38] “In addition, on the fourth and sixth weekday he sucked at the breast only once.” ²⁵ And in this regard it is more to be desired that a boy is baptized by a good priest than a bad one, because the prayers of a good priest (of which prayers he makes many before and after baptism) are heard more and avail more for him for whom they are made than do the prayers of a bad priest.

158. But if the baptized be adults, since they could by their own motion be unequally disposed, and since in the sacrament grace is conferred according to the proportion of the disposition in the receiver, there follows an unequal effect.

159. But if you compare a child with an adult, a child as a rule has no merit; an adult, however slight a will he may have, provided however he consent to receive the sacrament and does not put an obstacle in the way, seems to have some proper merit, and to this extent he is more disposed than a child is;     therefore etc     .

160. But let it be that an adult, for the whole time of his baptism, is sinning venially, it seems that he is indisposed in some way; but a child has no indisposition; therefore in that case the child will receive a greater grace.

161. I reply: venial sin does not prevent grace being infused, nor even prevent possessing a meritorious act at the same time; yet because the soul cannot be equally perfectly intent at the same time on several acts, the good act, with which the venial sin is concurrent, is less intense, and therefore less meritorious than it would be if it were without that venial sin. As to the matter at hand, the consequence is that if an adult does not put the obstacle of mortal sin in the way and is consenting to the reception of baptism, he has a motion (which a child lacks) somehow disposing him, notwithstanding that he has a venial sin at the same time.