3. About an Adult with the Use of Reason
68. About the third case, namely an adult using reason [n.63], I make a distinction about the ‘not consenting’ [n.56] that is put in the question, which can be understood as the negative or the contrary: the negative denies only actual consent, while the contrary posits actual dissent.
69. And the distinction is plain, because ‘not willing’ is not the same as ‘willing against’. If ‘contrary’ is taken as ‘dissenting in act’, then the adult dissents either simply or in a certain respect. And I mean ‘simply’ in the way it was expounded in Ord. III d.15 nn.58-59, 119, that when someone, who wills something simply so as to escape some disadvantage, wills that something (as throwing merchandise overboard into the sea to escape sinking) he wills simply to throw the merchandise overboard, for his will by commanding moves his power to throw overboard, and his will moves itself freely because it cannot be compelled. He is willing simply, then, when he throws the merchandise overboard, but he wills against it in a certain respect, that is he wills against it under a certain condition, because he would will against it if he could save his life in another way.