II. To the Initial Arguments

28. As to the first argument [n.19], although God could, of his absolute power, give grace without faith (if one has posited that two absolutes are simply distinct), yet because “God’s works are perfect,” Deuteronomy 32.4, and because, when God heals a man, he heals him totally, therefore must it be conceded that he does not infuse grace into a child without faith and without hope.

29. Now as to the proofs about faith [nn.20-21] (which are against this [n.28]), they have their place in III d.23 [not in the Ordinatio; see Lectura III d.23 nn.48-58], for they prove absolutely that no faith is infused; and therefore they have to be solved there, just as it has to be declared there why [infused] faith is to be posited - for either it is posited as having some causality with respect to act, and then the act could not, without that causality, be of the sort it is when that causality is posited; or faith is posited as having no causality, and then it is manifest that faith cannot, from the act, be reckoned to be present.

30. But if it have some causality, then still this is possible: either it has a precise causality, namely which could not belong to anything else, or a non-precise causality, namely if a like causality could belong to acquired faith.

31. And if the first of these were posited, it could perhaps with certitude be set down that faith is known to be present by the fact that someone would know a condition of such sort to be present in his act as could not be present without infused faith.

32. If the second be posited, then it can simply not be known from the act, or from any condition of the act, that infused faith is present. And then it would have to be said that, although nothing is in the act or belongs to the act by which he who has faith may be distinguished from him who does not have faith, and that thereby it could not, by natural reason, be known that faith was present, yet this is something believed.

33. And thus it could be said generally that no supernatural virtue can be proved to be present either from any act or from any condition of the act; but perhaps neither can it be proved universally, by natural reason, that any supernatural virtue is present

34. More will be said about this in book III [Lectura III d.23 nn.48, 56-58, Ordinatio III d.26 n.132, d.27 n.66], in the material about the virtues.

35. To the second initial argument [n.25], it is said that a child is conjoined to God through the faith of the parents.

36. To the contrary: posit the parents to be heretics.

37. It is said he is conjoined through the faith of the Church.

38. To the contrary: let it be that in the Church Militant no one were faithful yet they [the ones who baptized the child] intended to do what Christ did; the child would still truly be baptized and receive grace.

39. I say therefore to the argument that in fact grace is given to no one save through some meritorious cause that merits the child’s conjunction with God, and this meritorious cause is Christ; but besides this cause, there is no need to grant another cause intrinsic to the recipient whereby he may be conjoined to God before he receive grace.