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Fourth Distinction. First Part. About Reception of the Sacrament and the Thing in Children Receiving Baptism
Question One. Whether Children are to be Baptized
12. To the first [n.11] it is argued that they are not to be baptized:
Because baptism is a remedy for sin; but children do not have sin, for they have use neither of reason nor will, and according to Augustine, On True Religion ch.14 n.27, “sin is so far voluntary that if it not be voluntary it is not sin.”
13. Again Mark 16.16, “He who will not have believed will be condemned.” A child cannot believe; therefore by baptism he cannot be saved; therefore he is baptized in vain.
14. To the contrary:
Augustine [in fact Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter n.70, “Hold most firmly that children who pass from this age without the sacrament of baptism are to be punished with eternal punishment, because by carnal conception they contracted original sin.”
I. To the Question
15. Here was the error of Pelagius, that children do not have original sin. This and its rejection was touched on in Ord. II dd.30-33 nn.55-66.
16. I hold the opposite therefore, that according to Scripture and faith children contract original sin, and for the deletion of it, which is necessary for salvation, they are to be baptized; because in the time of Gospel Law baptism is instituted as remedy against that guilt [cf. supra d.3 nn.139-145].
II. To the Initial Arguments
17. To the first argument [n.12]: the authority from Augustine must be understood of actual sin; and original sin was voluntary in this way in the first parent; however it is not necessary that every sin be voluntary with the will of him in whom it is.
18. As to the other argument [n.13], it is plain that it must be understood of adults because of what precedes it [Mark 16.16] “He who will have believed and will have been baptized...” Or it can be said that he who will not have believed either in act or habit will be condemned, because according to the Apostle, Hebrews 11.6, “It is impossible to please God without faith; for he who approaches God must believe;” now children, though they cannot have the act of believing, can yet have the habit of it (as will be said in the next question, nn.27, 39).
Question Two. Whether Baptized Children Receive the Effect of Baptism
19. Process thus to the second question [n.11], and argument is made that baptized children do not receive the effect of the sacrament:
Because the effect of baptism is grace; but children do not receive grace, because grace is not infused without faith, because, Hebrews 11.6, “without faith it is impossible to please God,” and therefore not possible to be in God’s grace either. But children do not receive faith, which I prove:
20. First, by the authority of the Apostle, Romans 10.17, that “faith comes by hearing;” children cannot thus receive faith.
21. I prove it, second, with this reason, that he who has faith can use it when he wants, if not impeded; a baptized child, when he will have come to the use of reason, has no power for an act of faith, because he cannot proceed to an act of believing the articles of faith.
22. And there is a confirmation of this, that he who has faith is disposed differently toward act than is he who does not have faith; for a habit is in some way disposed toward act, and in this way the haver of faith differs from the non-haver [cf. Ord. I d.17 nn.32-53]. But a baptized child is in no way differently disposed toward the act of believing than if he had not been baptized; because if, having been baptized, he be nurtured among infidels and be taught by them, he would acquiesce in their error just as another would who was not baptized; if too a non-baptized child be nourished among the faithful and be taught in their Law, he would acquiesce in that Law just as a baptized child would. If therefore a baptized child is in no way differently disposed toward the act of believing than the non-baptized child, in no way does he have the habit of faith.
23. If it be replied that an acquired habit is disposed in some way to the act, an infused habit not so - against this, and for confirmation of the main argument [n.22], that if God were to infuse the habit of geometry into someone then, when the ideas of geometrical terms occur to him he could, from that habit, assent to the truths of geometry. Therefore, similarly in the matter at hand: by infused faith, were it present, the one possessed of it could assent to the ideas of terms when they occur to him, and so when the idea of ‘dead’ and ‘resurrection’ is apprehended, someone could assent to this truth, ‘the dead will be resurrected’, of which we experience the opposite.
24. There is a confirmation of what is proposed, because a habit bestows some facility and delight in the act, from Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17; for no one works more easily or more delightfully against a habit than according to it. But a baptized child, after he will have become an adult, more easily dissents from matters of belief than assents to them, as we experience; 
therefore etc 
.
25. Again to the main point: no one receives grace from God unless he is in some way conjoined to God, for God does not give grace to one who is actually averse and totally indisposed. The first conjunction with God is through faith; therefore, to one who does not have faith, grace is not given. But a child does not have faith before baptism; therefore , grace is not given to him in baptism.
I. To the Question
26. On the contrary:
Augustine says in his Enchiridion ch.13 n.43, “From a child recently born up to one decrepit [with age], just as none is held back from baptism, so there is none who does not die to sin in baptism;” but no one dies to sin unless he receives grace; therefore etc .
27. To this question I say that just as it is believed that original sin is discharged in baptism for a child, so too is it believed that grace is infused into him, because, as was said in the question on Circumcision [d.1 n.370], God remits guilt (conformably to the state of fallen nature) to no one save one to whom he gives grace; for he liberates no one from perdition unless he ordains him for this, that he be a son of the Kingdom.
II. To the Initial Arguments
28. As to the first argument [n.19], although God could, of his absolute power, give grace without faith (if one has posited that two absolutes are simply distinct), yet because “God’s works are perfect,” Deuteronomy 32.4, and because, when God heals a man, he heals him totally, therefore must it be conceded that he does not infuse grace into a child without faith and without hope.
29. Now as to the proofs about faith [nn.20-21] (which are against this [n.28]), they have their place in III d.23 [not in the Ordinatio; see Lectura III d.23 nn.48-58], for they prove absolutely that no faith is infused; and therefore they have to be solved there, just as it has to be declared there why [infused] faith is to be posited - for either it is posited as having some causality with respect to act, and then the act could not, without that causality, be of the sort it is when that causality is posited; or faith is posited as having no causality, and then it is manifest that faith cannot, from the act, be reckoned to be present.
30. But if it have some causality, then still this is possible: either it has a precise causality, namely which could not belong to anything else, or a non-precise causality, namely if a like causality could belong to acquired faith.
31. And if the first of these were posited, it could perhaps with certitude be set down that faith is known to be present by the fact that someone would know a condition of such sort to be present in his act as could not be present without infused faith.
32. If the second be posited, then it can simply not be known from the act, or from any condition of the act, that infused faith is present. And then it would have to be said that, although nothing is in the act or belongs to the act by which he who has faith may be distinguished from him who does not have faith, and that thereby it could not, by natural reason, be known that faith was present, yet this is something believed.
33. And thus it could be said generally that no supernatural virtue can be proved to be present either from any act or from any condition of the act; but perhaps neither can it be proved universally, by natural reason, that any supernatural virtue is present
34. More will be said about this in book III [Lectura III d.23 nn.48, 56-58, Ordinatio III d.26 n.132, d.27 n.66], in the material about the virtues.
35. To the second initial argument [n.25], it is said that a child is conjoined to God through the faith of the parents.
36. To the contrary: posit the parents to be heretics.
37. It is said he is conjoined through the faith of the Church.
38. To the contrary: let it be that in the Church Militant no one were faithful yet they [the ones who baptized the child] intended to do what Christ did; the child would still truly be baptized and receive grace.
39. I say therefore to the argument that in fact grace is given to no one save through some meritorious cause that merits the child’s conjunction with God, and this meritorious cause is Christ; but besides this cause, there is no need to grant another cause intrinsic to the recipient whereby he may be conjoined to God before he receive grace.
Question Three. Whether a Child Present in the Womb of his Mother could be Baptized
40. Process thus to the third [n.11], and it is argued that a child in the womb of his mother could be baptized.22
Because the gift of God is more perfect than the sin of Adam, as is plain in Romans 5.15-21; but a child in his mother’s womb can be infected by Adam’s sin; therefore he can be perfected by the gift of God, and thus can receive the most perfect sacrament.
41. Again, a child in the womb can be liberated from temporal servitude, because according to the laws, if a mother frees a maidservant, the child too who is in the maidservant’s womb is freed; therefore, a child in the womb can be freed from the spiritual slavery of sin; therefore he can be baptized.
42. Again, Romans 11.16, “if the root is holy, the branches are too;” therefore, if the mother, who is compared to the tree, is holy, the offspring in her womb, who is compared to the branch, will be holy.
43. To the contrary:
I Corinthians 15.46, “What is spiritual is not first, but what is animal, then what is spiritual;” therefore it is necessary to be born carnally first before being reborn spiritually.
44. Isidore [Sentences I ch.22 n.5] maintains the same, “One born according to Adam is not; he cannot be re-born through baptism” [sc. one cannot talk of regeneration if generation has not happened first].
I. To the Question
A. Opinion of Others and Rejection of It
45. A negative answer is given to this question, because a child in his mother’s womb is conjoined with the cause of his own corruption; but such a one so conjoined cannot be cleansed while he is conjoined.
46. To the contrary:
The flesh of the mother in the child is not the cause of corruption save mediately; but the flesh here of the child is the immediate cause, speaking of the corruption of original sin. For as soon as the soul of the child informs his flesh, it is infected with that corruption; the flesh then causes the corruptions in the child more immediately, because it is his flesh, than the mother’s flesh does. If then, while conjunction with the cause of corruption remains, he cannot be purged from it (according to you, n.45), it follows that a child possessed of his own flesh can never be purged from original sin, which is against the faith.
47. Again, although the child in his mother’s womb is conjoined to her as to place, yet he is distinct from her as to person, because he has another body and another soul. But personal distinction suffices for distinction as to sin and not-sin, because sin or justice are present in the person insofar as the person is ‘this’ person, not because he is in such and such a place. Therefore, notwithstanding this conjunction as to place, the child can be just because of this distinction in person, though his mother be disposed to justice whichever way.
48. Again, if grace in the child could not stand along with this conjunction to the cause of corruption, then the child in the mother’s womb could not have the baptism of desire or blood, each of which is false.
As to desire the fact is plain [about Jeremiah] in Jeremiah 1.5, “Before you came forth from the womb I sanctified you,” and about John the Baptist in Luke 1.41-44, and the Church firmly holds this about the Mother of Christ.
As to the second [blood], the fact is plain from this that, if someone is pursuing a pregnant mother, he is pursuing the child in her womb for the same reason as that by which he is pursuing the mother; therefore, the child is killed for justice if the mother be killed for justice. Also, if the child were killed outside the womb, he would have the baptism of blood if he were killed for justice or for the faith (even when not baptized). Therefore, it is reasonable in the same way that God not contemn him who suffered for a like cause in his mother’s womb.
49. And from this an argument against the opinion can be made, that if a child can have the baptism of desire then he can have purgation from original sin; but when conjoined to his mother, who is cause of corruption for you, he can have the baptism of desire;23 therefore, he can have purgation from original sin [sc. he can be baptized].
B. Scotus’ own Opinion
50. To the question I say that either a boy is in his mother’s womb as to all his parts or he appears outside the womb as to some part.
51. If in the first way, I say that a child cannot be baptized - not for the earlier reason, that ‘he is conjoined with the cause of corruption’ [n.45], but for this reason ‘that baptism is a washing or cleansing in water’ [d.3 nn.101-103]; a child in the womb cannot in this way be washed because neither can he in this way be touched immediately by water. From this a corollary follows, that if a child were wrapped in animal hide, and were placed in water so that the water did not touch his body, he would not be baptized, but if he were touched by water, it is well; similarly if he were thrown from a bridge, he would not be baptized, because this throwing is not ordered to life or to washing but to death.
52. If in the second way [n.50], as follows: either a principal part appears (as the head), and then the child can be baptized on that part, and in this way be also simply baptized; for it is not likely that on the day of Pentecost, when three thousand men were baptized, Acts 2.41, each of them was washed with water as to their whole body, but precisely as to the face by sprinkling, or as to the head by pouring; and in the case at hand, if afterwards [sc. after the appearing of the head] the boy was born, there would be no need to baptize him again. But if a less principal part appears (namely hand or foot), this part is to be baptized, because the whole soul is in it, though not every sense is, as in the head. And should this lesser [sc. washing] suffice for the fact that the child was simply baptized, if he were born alive afterwards, he should be baptized conditionally, as Decretals II tit.42 ch.2 of Gregory IX, ‘On baptism and its effect’ teaches. For one must believe that God would supply what powerlessness impeded; for such a child, even if he is born dead, is yet to be buried in consecrated ground, for the reason stated [sc. that the whole soul is present in less principal parts of the body].
II. To the Initial Arguments
53. To the first argument [n.40] I concede that God can by his own gift justify an unborn child, as was in fact the case with Jeremiah and John the Baptist and the Virgin Mary [n.48]; but not by this sacrament, because while a child is in the mother’s womb has not the capacity for this sacrament.
54. To the second [n.41] I say that, as to temporal servitude, a child, while he is in the womb, is not distinct from the mother; for the master does not have lordship over the child save because he has it over the mother. But as to spiritual servitude or liberty things are not alike, because this has regard to the distinct person, and a child in the womb is as distinct in person from his mother as he is outside the womb.
55. To the third [n.42] I concede that fruit, insofar as it is something of the tree, follows the condition of the tree; yet insofar as it is something in itself, it can have conditions opposite to the tree in itself, for the fruit of the tree can be soft and the tree hard. So it is in the issue at hand, because justice and injustice have regard to the person in himself, not as he is conjoined or divided in place, but as he is divided personally in respect of the other person; therefore justice can belong to the offspring though not to the mother, or conversely. - A response can be made in another way to the intention of the Apostle.24,a
a.a [Interpolated text]: For there [Romans 11.1-24] he is restraining the Romans from insult of the Jews. They were saying that the Jews were branches cut off and themselves branches ingrafted. For this reason does he say that some Jews are good and not cut off but natural branches, speaking thus: ‘if the root is holy’ (that is, the Patriarchs, who were the roots as it were of the Jewish people) ‘the branches are too’, namely they are holy (it is plain of the Apostles, who were Jews).