A. Whether the Receiving of Baptism was Simply Necessary

146. As to the first point [n.145] I say that the institution preceded the promulgation; for a law is not promulgated unless it is first determined by the legislator so as to be fixed (and this determination can be called institution), and also unless it be revealed to someone as to solemn herald (and that, if he [the legislator] wanted it to be promulgated through a herald).

147. About this institution I say two things:

First that, before this institution, it was not simply necessary to be baptized, which is plain from John 15.22, “If I had not come and not spoken to them, they would not have sin.” From this statement I take this proposition, that ‘no one is held to any divine precept unless it be promulgated through someone suitable and authorized, or comes from true report and the testimony of good men, which anyone rationally ought to believe’; and I understand this of positive law, which is not known interiorly in the heart. Therefore, by this institution alone, preceding promulgation, the people were not by necessity obligated to baptism, and this especially about the precept, because it was a positive precept only. Now the positive precept, about circumcision, that preceded it, did not at once have to be dismissed (from the fact that it was certain it had been instituted by God) unless there were certitude also that the second precept [sc. about baptism] had been given by God. And this certitude about the second precept could not have been had without an authoritative promulgation.

148. Second I say that the promulgation of this sacrament could have been set down as double: one by way of counsel, another by way of precept.

149. Now the fact that it was first promulgated by way of counsel was fitting for two reasons: First because the Law of the Gospel, which is most perfect, should not be hastily imposed, but men should be attracted to it first while it still fell under counsel, so that, after they were practiced in it, it might be imposed under precept. Second, because the Old Law was not bad the way idolatry is, and therefore should not be rejected suddenly (for then it would have been rejected as if something evil), but the Synagogue had to be buried with honor, so it might be shown to have been good for its time.

150. Now the imposition of baptism by way of precept [n.148] was a voiding of circumcision, at least as to the necessity of it. But promulgation by way of precept had at some point to follow, because otherwise this Law [of baptism] would never have fixity or necessity, at least as regards the sacrament.

151. And one should in general note that the promulgation made about divine counsel does oblige as to not despising it; for he who despises the counsel despises the one giving the counsel insofar as he gives counsel; and therefore he who does not wish to keep the divine evangelical counsel, as if despising it as irrational and fruitless, sins mortally. Hence let those who attack evangelical poverty see to it lest, if they do not wish to keep it (because it is not necessary), it happen that, by despising and belittling it, they despise Christ who urged to its observance as meritorious and useful for eternal life (as is contained in the sixth book of the Decretals 5 tit.12 ch.3, ‘On the Signification of Words’ [Nicholas III, 1279]).

But promulgation by way of precept obliges, not only to not despising it, but also to observing it if it is positive, or to guarding against it if it is negative.

152. Now I have said this about divine counsel and precept because it is otherwise with human ones, even when speaking of the counsel and precept of a superior or a prelate. For it is licit to despise both a precept and a counsel of some superior, that is, to judge it irrational and fruitless, but it is not licit, while he is a prelate, to despise it by not observing it, because it is said in Matthew 23.2-3, “For the Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat; therefore keep and do whatever they tell you, but do not do according to their works; for they say and do not do.”

153. The proof of this (about despising the precept or counsel of a superior) is that we are not necessarily bound to have a true opinion about one’s superior, but his advice or precept can be in itself irrational and fruitless; and then one must work rationally and usefully for its revocation, and for the correction and admonition of such a prelate, who is giving precepts fatuously. However, a subordinate is not bound to repudiate the prelate’s precept as a mortal sin, or to repudiate it as irrational and fruitless, but he can think the opposite about it, the way it is, and despise it by not approving of it.

154. It is thus plain, therefore, that the first obligation of baptism, the one by way of counsel, has obligated everyone not to despise it. But the second obligation, the one by way of precept, has obligated everyone to the reception of it to whom it has legitimately come.