E. Objections to the Third Article

147. Against the third article [nn.133-141] there is an objection from the fact that the senses of the blessed would sense every difference in sensible things. Therefore, if someone blessed were in the fire he would be changed intentionally by it the way the damned are, and yet he would not suffer an afflicting passion. Therefore, the afflicting passion does not come through the intentional passion alone.

148. Again, every operation is delightful to the operating power, because it is a perfection of it; therefore, any sensation that accompanies an intentional action will be delightful; therefore, none will be painful.

149. Again, the sense appetite only exists because of nature; therefore, nothing is disagreeable to it save because it is disagreeable to nature.

150. To the first [147]: either no sensible thing would be excessive for the senses of the blessed, or the senses will be so perfect that no sensible object will, because of its excess, be able to be disproportionate to them; and then it follows that they would be changed intentionally by the fire but not painfully, because not by anything disagreeable.

151. Or in another way, since pain is not caused in the senses but in the sense appetite (as was said [n.132]), and since the sense appetite in the blessed is totally at rest (or completely satisfied) in sense delight, and since excelling delight excludes all sadness whatever (Ethics 7 [n.110]), no pain could be caused in the sense appetite of the blessed.

One should therefore concede that, if the sensible object were excessive for the senses of the blessed, pain would be caused in his appetite save for the fact that there is in his appetite from a more efficacious cause something that excludes all pain.

152. To the second [n.148]: a disproportionate operation is not delightful; such is the sensation of an excessive object; and no wonder, because an operation is not delightful save because it is about a delightful object; but an excesssive object is disagreeable, therefore it causes sadness or pain.

153. To the third [n.149]: it is true that nature makes a thing to be disagreeable to sense appetite because that thing, or what accompanies it, is commonly corruptive of nature. However, let it be that sometimes there is no such accompaniment; the initial disagreeableness remains. So in the issue at hand, although the heating up that accompanies the species of the excelling hot thing not be extreme, yet the disagreeableness of the hot thing, as it impresses the species on the sense appetite, remains.