2. Second Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

13. Another statement [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II q.10] is that the flesh formed first, handed on from parents, belongs to the truth of human nature, but the food later passes over into what belongs to the truth of human nature. However, it does so in this way, that it is converted into what pre-exists, not by receiving a new form either in whole or in part, but only by the fact that, when the form of food in it falls away, the preexisting form of the flesh succeeds to it in the matter.

14. This is made clear by an example [Henry, Quodlibet IV q.36], because so it is with the intellective soul, that it newly perfects the matter that was under the form of food, and yet the intellective soul is not new in itself either in whole or in part.

15. It is also made clear by the authority of the Philosopher, On Generation 1.5.321b25-2a4, “The flesh grows in species not in matter, and the flesh remains in species while the flesh in matter flows and reflows.” But if a new form of flesh were introduced in nutrition, and if, by equal reason, a part of the form of flesh that was there before were to cease to be by being lost, then not only would the matter of flesh flow and reflow but the form of it also would, which seems to be against the Philosopher.

16. Third by reason [Henry, ibid.], because if in nutrition the matter of the food were to receive another form of flesh that was not there before, then this matter would only make with the pre-existing flesh a single thing by contiguity or continuity with it, and then nutrition would be a sort of juxtaposition of new flesh with pre-existing flesh, which the Philosopher denies in the aforementioned place [n.15]. There is also the consequence that no part of the nourished thing would be nourished or of the increased thing increased, because the part that the new flesh was put next to would not be.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

17. Against this opinion:

A form that has on its own part no other extension than it had before, which yet perfects a matter that has different extensions, is related indivisibly to that matter (this is because it does not perfect the parts of matter according as they are parts). But the form of flesh is not indivisibly related to matter in this way, because then it would be simple just as the intellective soul is simple, which is not something admitted. Therefore, since it perfects a matter that has different extensions (because the matter is much bigger than before), it must in itself have different extensions. And then, since its prior parts remain, another part of it must be new, otherwise the form would not have a greater extension now than it had before. The proof of the major is that a form which, as per accidens extended, is related to a matter that is extended, is related as itself having different extensions to a matter that has different extensions, because according to Aristotle, Categories 6.5b7-8),“the whiteness is as large as is the surface.” The fact is also plain by reason, because a part [of form] is in a part [of matter], and so a greater part in a greater part.

18. Again, it is admitted that there are, after nutrition, more parts of matter in the whole than there were before. Either then a new part of matter is in the whole without form (which is unacceptable), or it is there under a new form (and this is the intended conclusion), or it is there under a pre-existing part of form - and then either this preexisting part of form will cease to perfect the part of matter that it perfected before, and then the same part of the material form will migrate from one part of matter to another part (which is unacceptable), or the same prior part of form will at the same time perfect the prior part of matter and the new part of matter, and then, as a result, it will perfect two perfectible things, each of which equally exhausts it.

19. Again, flesh is of a nature to be in flux, because it is not incorruptible; but not only is the matter in flux but the form is as well, because this form cannot remain the same unless it remains informing the matter it did before (speaking of the same part of form), because it naturally depends on the perfectible thing it perfects. Therefore, the composite must be in flux, and consequently through nutrition a composite comes back.