I. To the Question

A. About the Meaning of the Term ‘Natural’

231. Here one needs to understand that ‘natural’ is taken equivocally [cf. Ord. prol. nn.57-59] - which is plain from the fact it has diverse opposites.

232. And this is one teaching about knowing what is multiple, for in Topics 1.15.106a9-10 the natural in one way is opposed to the supernatural, in another way to the artificial (or to the free or voluntary), in a third way to the violent.

233. For naturality sometimes pertains to the active principle, and then are opposed to it the free in one way and the supernatural in another way - for a natural agent or an agent acting naturally (which is opposed to the free) is said to be that which acts of natural necessity, while the voluntary or the free is that which determines itself to acting. And in this way does the Philosopher speak in Physics 2.3.195a27-b6, 5.196b17-22, when he divides nature from what acts by design, and in Metaphysics 9.2.1046a22-b2, 5.1047b31-8a8, when he speaks about irrational active powers and rational or free active powers. In another way the natural, on the part of the active principle, is said to be what has a natural order of active to passive, and the supernatural what exceeds all such natural order; and in this way any created agent is said to be natural and only an uncreated agent is said to be supernatural.

234. On the part of the passive principle, the natural is spoken of in one way as it is opposed to the violent, insofar as it is said to be moved naturally because it is acted on according to its proper inclination as passive; the violent is what is acted on against its inclination as passive. From this follows that the natural and violent are not immediate contrary opposites; rather there is a mean between them, namely when the passive thing is disposed in neither way, and is not inclined to what it receives nor to what is opposite (as a surface is disposed to whiteness or to blackness or to something intermediate).

235. There follows too that the violent cannot exist in what is primarily passive, namely in prime matter, because prime matter is never inclined against anything that it is absolutely receptive of.

236. And the distinction between these opposites and the intermediate in the passive thing is taken as it is compared to form. But as the passive thing is compared to the agent from which it receives the form, it is said to be moved naturally when it is moved by an agent naturally corresponding to it; however, it is said to be moved supernaturally when it is moved by an agent proportioned to it naturally above the whole order of these sorts of agents.

237. Thus we have, therefore, in two ways the natural as it belongs to the active principle, because we have it as it is distinguished from the free and supernatural [n.233]; and we have in two ways the natural or naturally as it belongs to the passive thing, because we have it as it is distinguished from the neutrals and the violent [n.234].

B. Objection against What has been Said and its Solution

238. But argument is made against the distinction in the case of the two last items [n.236], for Aristotle in Ethics 3.1.1110b15-17 says that “the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic, with the passive thing not conferring any force;” therefore the moving principle is placed in the definition of the violent, and consequently the violent is not just taken essentially from the comparison of the violent with the passive subject [cf. Ord. IV d.29 n.22].

239. I reply (and to however many such instances) with this proposition: ‘that is per se cause on which when posited, and with anything else and any variation in it removed, the effect follows’; but now, although a form against which the receptive thing is inclined is only induced by an agent that per se inflicts violence on the passive subject, yet the per se idea of the ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the passive subject to the form, because as long as the passive subject and the form remain in their idea (namely, that the form can be received, but against the inclination of the passive subject) then, whatever variation there is in the agent, the passive thing receives the form with violence.

240. This is plain, because not only in ‘the being induced’ but also in the ‘persisting’ is some form said to remain violently, and some form naturally, and for a long time, in the passive subject, so that, if one removes the agent (namely because it has no action after inducing the form), the naturality and the violence are there, if one compares the form precisely with the receptive subject [cf. Ord. prol. nn.58-59].

241. I concede, therefore, that in the description of the violent the agent is placed as something extrinsic, but not as per se completing or as per se constituting the idea of the violent, but this idea is completed only by “with the passive subject not conferring any force,” that is, contra-ferring.I.e. the passive subject does not cooperate with the agent in bringing action contra or against itself as passive subject. ⁷ And the violent would remain after the whole action of the agent stops (just as if a stone could rest above without the continuous action of what detains it). However, in the description of the violent is added ‘principle’ [n.238], as being for the most part the extrinsic cause.

242. Similarly, although the passive subject receive some form that is in some way supernatural (and in this respect supernaturality could be called the manner of relation of the passive subject to the form), yet it is never called supernatural save because it receives the form from such an agent. The proof of this is that if it receive from such an agent a form naturally perfective of it, still it would receive it supernaturally -not indeed because of its relation to the form (because in this way it receives it naturally), but because of its relation to the agent from which it receives it.

C. Conclusion of What has been Said

243. To the issue at hand: resurrection signifies a passive undergoing to which resuscitation corresponds as the action undergone; therefore in the question ‘whether resurrection is natural’ [n.225] naturality is only taken as it pertains to the passive undergoing; but in the question ‘whether active resurrection is natural’ natural is taken as it pertains to action and the active cause.

244. In the first way, then, I say that resurrection will be natural as natural is opposed to violent, but it will not be natural as natural is opposed to supernatural. And the reason for each point is plain from what was said in the first article: the reason for the first point is that the passive subject is naturally inclined to the form that it receives [nn.234-235]; the reason for the second is that it does not receive the form from an agent possessing a natural order to what needs to be done to the passive subject, but from an agent above the whole of this sort of order [n.236].

245. If however the question be about whether active resuscitation will be natural, one must reply that in neither way in which natural belongs to action will the action be natural, because it will be from an agent acting freely, not by natural necessity, and from an agent above the whole order of created causes that are said to have a natural order of acting on a passive subject.