4. Scotus’ own Judgment about these Opinions

190. As regards this article I reply that the third opinion seems more probable. For the first opinion, about the return of all things, is altogether improbable, because it is at least against the faith. Nor is the reason given for it effective, because the reason about the return of the heaven both presupposes a dubious antecedent and its inference is dubious.

191. The second opinion does not sufficiently prove the impossibility of the return by nature of anything at all.

192. And therefore the third opinion can be maintained, because it does not appear why nature could not bring something back that is numerically the same. For when there is continuous action by an agent natural in respect of what it produces, as there is in the sun in respect of its rays, if the sun be posited to produce a ray in a first instant and to conserve it in succeeding time, then in the last instant, for example b, there will be the same ray, since the identity of a ray in a second instant with itself in a first instant does not depend on its existence in the intermediate time, because the numerically same thing could have been produced in the same instant without the intermediate existence. It follows that, with the intermediate existence destroyed, the same thing could exist in both extremes; and although in the case of other agents, where the agent would not be said to act after the first instant, there might be evasion on this point in respect of the proximate agent, yet the argument remains the same with respect to the remote agent on which the effect continuously depends; and the intended conclusion follows about this effect dependent immediately on the proximate agent.