3. Scotus’ own Response to Others’ Reasons

447. To the reasons for these three positions [nn.427-436].

To the first [nn.427-429], about the lordship of the soul over the body, I reply that God will not then make the will of the soul omnipotent, and so not powerful either to do whatever it wish to do; but sufficient for it is that whatever it wish be done will be done; and thus its body will be perfectly subject to its will (that is, it will be as the will wishes it to be), just as it is perfectly subject to God. But this subjection of its body will be from the divine will effectively.

448. To the reason for the second [nn.430-433], it was said what Augustine’s understanding [nn.430, 438] is about that gift: that it is a certain right possessed in the body, insofar as it is animated by this sort of soul, for such passive preservation from all corruption

449. To the third [nn.434-436]: the motion of the heaven has a certain priority relative to the others, namely of uniformity and velocity, but not a priority of causality, save insofar as it brings forward the generator [n.436], which is per accidens - the way the motion of fire to wood has a priority, namely of burning the wood, and without such prior there cannot be a posterior; [there can be] ifInstead of ‘if’ another ms. has ‘unless’, which is required if the ‘[there can be]’ is not taken to be implied ⁷⁰ something supply the place of such prior.