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All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49. > book four. distinctions 43 - 49 > forty ninth distinction. second part. about the qualities of body of a blessed man > single question. whether the body of a blessed man will, after the resurrection, be impassible > i. to the question > a. a doubt about the cause of impassibility, and its rejection > 1. scotus’ own explanation of the reasons about impassibility > b. about the second opinion of others
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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.
Book Four. Distinctions 43 - 49
Forty Ninth Distinction. Second Part. About the Qualities of Body of a Blessed Man
Single Question. Whether the Body of a Blessed Man will, after the Resurrection, be Impassible
I. To the Question
A. A Doubt about the Cause of Impassibility, and its Rejection
1. Scotus’ own Explanation of the Reasons about Impassibility
b. About the Second Opinion of Others

b. About the Second Opinion of Others

430. For the second opinion (namely a gift in the body [n.426], [Thomas Aquinas]) argument is given from the remark of Augustine Letter 118 To Dioscorus 3 n.14, “So powerful has God made the soul that from its full happiness there redounds to the body perpetual health and incorruptible vigor.” The manner is as follows [Henry of Ghent]: as hardness is a certain impassibility [cf. Ord. IV d.1 n.319], namely one that prevents a certain suffering (as being easily cut), so is it possible for there to be a quality in the body that prevents all corruptive suffering.

431. Against this:

This quality is not a heavenly quality, first because it is not transparency nor light nor luminosity, second because, since the human body is a mixed body, it is not capable of a heavenly quality. Either then it will be a quality of an element or a quality proper to a mixed body; but whether this or that, it is not an impediment to all action or suffering. The thing is plain in their example, because although hardness prevents cutting, yet it does not prevent burning or some other destructive suffering.

432. There is also proof of it through reason, that all forms of the same proximate susceptive subject are of the same physical genus, from Metaphysics 5.28.1024a29-b9; but all such forms are contraries or intermediates, and all forms of this sort do not prevent mutual action; rather they are principles of mutual action as is said in Metaphysics, 10.7.1057a18-19, 30-31, b2-4. Therefore, this quality, whether it belongs to an element or a mixed body and consequently to the same susceptive subject, does not prevent all corruptive passion, but is rather a principle of acting or suffering.

433. Again, this quality is either repugnant to other qualities (and then it does not prevent all action, because it is of the same genus), or is not repugnant (and then it does not prevent an action of any of them on another, because those others are repugnant to each other and so principles of mutual action) - and thus is it not repugnant to any action of them.