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B. Recapitulation of the Things Said about the Three Propositions
131. I say, then, about these three propositions [n.53], from which is formed a reasoning for the resurrection that is in some way a priori (because the propositions are taken from the form of man who is to be resuscitated), that the first of them is naturally known. And the error opposed to it, which is proper to Averroes and his alone [n.59], is worst, not only against the truth of theology but also against the truth of philosophy. For it destroys science, because it destroys all acts of understanding as distinct from acts of sensing, and all acts of choice as distinct from acts of sensitive appetite, and so destroys all the virtues, which are not generated without choices made according to right reason. And consequently, someone who so errs would need to be exterminated from the community of men who use reason.
132. But the other two propositions are not sufficiently known by natural reason, although there are certain probable persuasions for them. For the second, indeed, the persuasions are more numerous and more probable, and hence the Philosopher seems to have more expressly perceived it; for the third proposition, however, they are fewer. And consequently, the conclusion that follows from them is not in this way [sc. a priori, n.131] sufficiently known by natural reason.
133. The second way to the conclusion is from arguments a posteriori, some probable ones among which were touched on in the initial arguments, as about the beatitude of man [nn.46-47].
134. Added to this is also the argument about the justice of God as exacting retribution, whereas now in this life the virtuous suffer greater pains than the vicious. And this argument the Apostle seems to touch on I Corinthians 15.19, “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are more miserable than all men etc.”
135. But these reasons a posteriori [nn.133-134] are less conclusive than those taken a priori from the proper form of man [n.131]; for it does not appear through natural reason that there is for all men a single Judge ruling according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice.
136. Let that also be true which might be said in this way, that for each man there is in his own good act a sufficient retribution, as Augustine says [Confessions 1.12 n.19], “You have commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every sinner is a punishment to himself,” so that sin itself is the first punishment of sin. Hence it is plain that the Saints, when arguing for the intended conclusion a posteriori, only intend to give certain probable persuasions. As Gregory says, after he has set down certain persuasions for the purpose [Moralia 14.55 n.70], “He who will not believe for these reasons, let him believe because of the faith.” Likewise too is the teaching of St. Paul in Acts 17.4, 12, 34; 26.8, 19-20, and I Corinthians 15.12, 35-38, 42-51, through the example of a grain of wheat that falls [in the ground], and through the resurrection of Christ, that if Christ is risen the dead too will rise, and through just retribution - these are only probable persuasions, or taken only from premises of faith. The fact is plain by running through them one by one.
137. In brief, then, it can be maintained that neither a priori (namely by reason of the intrinsic principle in man), nor a posteriori (namely by reason of some operation or perfection befitting man), can the resurrection be proved necessarily by relying on natural reason. Hence the resurrection is only held as absolutely certain through faith. Indeed, neither is the second proposition taken in the first way [nn.93-102] held by reason, as Augustine says On the Trinity 13.9 n.12,5 but only through the Gospel, when Christ says [Matthew 10.28], “Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.”