a. Three Positions or Opinions are Set Down About the First Doubt

321. About the First

Either [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VIII q.9] the position is that beatitude is essentially necessary of itself, and then beatitude cannot not be perpetual - of itself indeed formally, but causally by a causality other than extrinsic cause [cf. Ord. I d.8 nn.232-249].

322. Or, second [Aquinas ST IaIIae q.5 a.4], the position is that beatitude is perpetual from the fact that the will necessarily enjoys the object seen, for there is not any idea of evil or deficiency of good shown in the object. And this position differs from the first [n.321] in the way opinions about the heavens differ - the opinion that posits the heavens to be moved necessarily because of the uniform relation that the mover has to the movable [n.322], and the opinion that would posit the motion of the heavens to be formally necessary of itself [n.321]. The first opinion but not the second would be the one posited by a philosopher, as is plain from Averroes Metaphysics 12 com.41 [cf. Ord. I d.8 nn.232-293].

323. Or, third [Aquinas ST Ia IIae q.2 a.8, q.3 a.8, q.10 a.3; Richard of Middleton, Sent.IV d.49 Princ.1 q.6], the position is that the power is determined to action and is so by a necessary habit, namely that the intellect is determined to seeing by the light of glory, and the will is determined to enjoyment by consummate charity.

α. Reasons for and against the First Opinion

324. Argument for the first of these positions [n.321] is as follows: some bodily form is simply incorruptible, not only some substantial bodily form (as the form of the heavens) but also some accidental one, provided it is the proper perfection of an incorruptible body (as perspicuity in the heavens and luminosity in the stars); therefore the supreme perfection of spiritual nature will be formally incorruptible.

325. Again, a form that takes away every privation from its matter constitutes an incorruptible composite (the point is clear about the heavens [below, n.417]); but beatitude takes away every privation from a nature capable of beatitude, because it takes away imperfection and potentiality, since beatitude is ultimate act in its own order more than is the form of the heaven in the order of substantial forms.

326. There is a confirmation of the reason in that, to the extent an extrinsic end includes eminently the perfection of every other end, it removes, as regards the extrinsic end, all privation or lack; for no extrinsic end is here lacking to him who perfectly has that end. Therefore similarly (or by way of causality) the ultimate intrinsic end, because it joins one to the ultimate extrinsic end, takes away all privation of a further intrinsic end, and so it will constitute a composite that is formally incorruptible intrinsically and in its conjunction with the extrinsic end.

327. Again, third, if beatitude were of itself a potential form, then it could be destroyed (and yet be so while nature remains, because the nature is incorruptible), and consequently someone blessed could become wretched, and thus someone blessed would not be blessed, because he would not have whatever he wants (for he wants never to become wretched [nn.3, 118]).

328. Against this [n.327]: created beatitude is an accident; therefore it is not less dependent than its subject is; but the subject depends on being conserved by God contingently conserving it, and consequently the subject does not have necessary existence formally; therefore much less does an accident have it.

329. I reply: although beatitude have an absolutely contingent being yet, from the fact of its once existing in a nature, it necessarily remains while the nature remains; and so it has necessary existence from its having been brought into being - and this as it is in its own order of being (although, as the argument proves [n.328], it is not absolutely necessary).

330. Against this [n.329]: God can conserve the essentially prior without the posterior; the nature, because it is the subject, is essentially prior to beatitude; indeed it is prior in time. There is a confirmation: a third has no greater necessity in relation to a first than a third has in relation to a second; but here the relation of the third to the second is a contingent relation only; (as is plain from the idea of the terms);     therefore etc  . [cf. Ord. I d.1 nn.139-140].

331. I concede, therefore, that, other than God, nothing has formally necessary existence, but simply contingent existence. Nevertheless, a created thing is said to have incorruptible being insofar as it does not have a contrary, or insofar as it cannot be destroyed by any created thing but can only be annihilated by God not conserving it. And in this way can it be conceded that beatitude is incorruptible. But what is thus incorruptible is only perpetual of itself in possibility; because just as it has its existence from God contingently conserving of it, so too does it have its perpetuity.

β. Reply to the Aforesaid Reasons

332. To the reasons for the first opinion:

To the first argument [n.324] the answer is plain from what has been said, that neither the heavens nor any accident of them is incorruptible save in the aforesaid way [n.331].

333. To the second [n.325] I say that no form can take away privation from a subject susceptive of it (namely a subject that is of a nature to receive another form) save to the extent the subject is of a nature to receive that other form, because, while the subject remains in some aptitude for receiving, a lack cannot be taken away unless that [sc. the subject being of a nature to receive] is posited, and it is not removed in another way save as that [sc. the subject being of a nature to receive] is removed.The Latin here is obscure. The sense seems to turn on what it means for a subject to have a privation, namely that a subject can only be deprived of something if it is of a nature to receive that something. A blind man, for instance, is deprived of sight because a man is of a nature to receive sight, but a stone is not deprived of sight because it is not of such a nature. So, if a form is to take away a privation from a subject, the subject must first be posited as being of a nature to receive that form. The only other way of removing a privation would be to remove from the subject its being of a nature to receive the relevant form, for then the absence of the form would no longer be a privation. ⁵³ Since the form of the heaven, therefore, does not include in itself the forms of inferior things simply (but neither does it include them eminently, the way that infinite being includes all other things), the result is that the form does not take away from its matter the privations of those forms (provided, however, its matter has the capacity for those formsThere is a view, derived from Aristotle, that the matter of the heaven is matter only for the form of the heaven, in which case the heaven would be incorruptible because its matter would be incapable of receiving another form. But then the analogy between the form of the heaven and beatitude would cease to hold, since the argument says that beatitude, like the heaven, is incorruptible because it includes everything else one could want just as the form of the heaven is incorruptible because it includes all forms. But the heaven will not be incorruptible for this reason if its matter is incapable of other forms. ⁵⁴). Hence this seems an irrational way of positing that the heaven is incorruptible, because corruptibility is not in this way removed as far as concerns the intrinsic principles it comes from -although the view is saved that the heavens could not be corrupted by a natural agent, for this form so contains others that it cannot be expelled by any natural agent.The form of the heaven does not remove privations by supply of what is lacking, for it does not contain simply or eminently the inferior forms that the matter of the heaven is of a nature to receive. Neither does the form of the heaven remove privations by taking from the matter of the heaven its being of a nature to receive other forms (for the aptitude for other forms remains in the matter). So the heaven remains corruptible in principle, because it remains still of a nature to receive forms other than the form it has. The heaven is only incorruptible, then, in the sense that no natural agent could corrupt it (no natural agent could remove from the heaven its form), but not in the sense that the heaven is intrinsically incorruptible. For its matter still has a nature to receive other forms and so, in principle, to lose the form it has in favor of those other forms. ⁵⁵

334. An example of this is plain: the intellective soul, which is a more perfect form than the form of the heaven, does not take away from matter the privation of other forms; indeed, it does not even constitute something incorruptible with respect to a natural agent, insofar as it requires some concomitant form [sc. bodily form] that a natural agent, by corrupting, can reach to. Only an infinite form, then, if it could perfect matter, could in this way (that is, by taking away privation), constitute an incorruptible composite. Yet there would still be a doubt whether the susceptive subject would be in potency to the forms in their proper ideas which, in that infinite form, it possesses eminently. Therefore, it is plain that the antecedent is false [sc. “a form that takes away every privation from its matter constitutes an incorruptible composite,” n.325], speaking of what is incorruptible, that is, indestructible; but if the discussion be about something not corruptible by a natural agent as by something contrary to it, I concede the antecedent, and thus concede the conclusion.

335. To the next [n.326] I say that, as regard the intrinsic end, the consequence does not hold that the intrinsic end removes every privation formally from a subject as the extrinsic end removes every defect of the extrinsic end. For the extrinsic end is formally infinite while the intrinsic end is finite, and so the latter cannot include intrinsic things the way the former includes extrinsic things.

336. On the contrary: another intrinsic end cannot succeed to this intrinsic end unless it join one to another extrinsic end; therefore if it joins one to an extrinsic end that excludes every defect, it will also intrinsically exclude every defect of the [intrinsic] end that does the joining.An intrinsic end is the condition in the subject that joins it to the extrinsic end. This paragraph and the next ones are about arguments to show that an intrinsic end joining one to an extrinsic end that is without defect will itself be without defect. The arguments, their responses, and the Latin are obscure in their terseness. ⁵⁶

337. I reply: this [intrinsic] end, while it remains, excludes defect (as whiteness, while it is present, excludes the defect of blackness); but it is not simply present necessarily, because it is not in itself necessary; but the extrinsic end is in itself necessary.

338. And when you say that ‘another intrinsic end can join one to another extrinsic end’ [n.336], I concede the fact; but then the extrinsic end is not the end for it,Sc. the extrinsic end is not the intrinsic end for the subject - nor is it an intrinsic end supplying all defects of any extrinsic end. ⁵⁷ nor an end supplying every defect of any extrinsic end whatever. The response to the confirmation [n.326] is plain from this, because then it [the ultimate intrinsic end] is not in conjunction with it [the ultimate extrinsic end].

339. To the third argument [n.327] I say that if the nature remain the same, the nature is always capable of beatitude and misery, and consequently it is not contradictory that, with the cessation of beatitude (which is a per accidens accident in that nature), misery should be present. And when you say that ‘then it did not have before whatever it wanted’, I reply that it did have whatever it wanted when the ‘whatever’ is taken unitively, not when taken distributively, in the way expounded above [n.334], that is, that it had God in whom it had eminently everything rightly want-able.

γ. What is to be Said about the Second Opinion

340. Against the second position [n.322] argument is given in Ord. 1 d.1 nn.139-140.

341. And I concede that although the intellect see, with natural necessity, a proportioned object present to it, yet the will does not, with natural necessity, enjoy this seen object, as was stated there [ibid., n.340].

342. Nor too is the necessity of seeing a necessity simply but only a necessity if the object remain present - and this supposing the object is merely contingent, because the object moves any created intellect voluntarily and contingently. If too the will contingently enjoys the thing seen, it also contingently joins intelligence with memory, provided however the will there has its act.

343. As to the argument that in the object nothing of evil nor any defect of good is shown, response was given before [ibid. n.340].

δ. What is to be Said about the Third Opinion

344. Against the third position [n.323] it can be argued that the habit cannot be a cause of operation before the power is, but it is always second, because a power is that whereby we have the ability simply. Hence the habit does not use the power, but the power uses the habit as second cause and as instrument; now a prior cause is not determined to act, nor consequently is it necessitated, by a second cause, but the reverse holds.

345. Again, the Blessed Virgin had as wayfarer a greater charity than the charity of any of the blessed of lower degree, and yet her charity did not necessitate her to enjoyment, even when she was contemplating God.

346. Again, let it be that the light of glory necessitate the intellect to seeing the object present to it, yet if the will is the cause that commands the seeing, the will is able not to command it; for it contingently conjoins the intelligence to the memory of the object that it contingently loves. But it seems that it would there [sc. according to this position] have to conjoin it thus, because, from Augustine in many places of On the Trinity [9.8 nn.13-14; 15.10 n.19, 27 n.50], the will in the generation of a perfect word concurs in joining it thus; now the seeing is the perfect word, according to Augustine ibid. [15.12 n.22].

347. I concede, therefore, that no necessity or necessary perpetuity arises from the habits determining powers to their acts, but that from the habit of glory there is only a necessity in a certain respect, because the habit has its natural inclination from charity; and there is no such necessity in the will, because the will can freely use or not use charity.

ε. Scotus’ own Opinion

348. I say, therefore, that the cause of this perpetuity is neither the form of beatitude (as if beatitude thereby be formally necessary), nor the nature of these powers (as if it necessarily operate perpetually about the object), nor the habit in the powers (as if it necessarily determines the powers to operating perpetually), but the cause is from the divine will alone, which just as it perfects such nature intensively so it conserves it in such perfection perpetually.

ζ. A Doubt and its Solution

349. But now occurs a doubt how Blessed Michael will be impeccable, because by nothing intrinsic to himself is he able to prevent his enjoyment from being contingent, and consequently he is able not to enjoy and so to sin. The consequent is false, since Augustine says in Against Maximinus 2.13 n.2, “To whatever nature is given that it not be able to sin - this comes not of nature proper but the grace of God” (and it is in Lombard I d.8 ch.2 n.3). The same Augustine in Enchiridion ch.28 n.105, “Just as our soul now has ‘not wanting unhappiness’, so will it always have ‘not wanting iniquity’.” But now our soul so has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ that it cannot want unhappiness; hence Augustine says ibid., “not only do we not want to be miserable, but in no way can we want it.”

350. I reply: it is plain that Blessed Michael is impeccable in the sense of composition, that is, he cannot be blessed and at the same time sin. But in the sense of division, that while he remains blessed he not have power and possibility for sinning, this can be understood in two ways: either by something intrinsic to him that would remove such power, or by an extrinsic cause that would remove proximate power from him. For example: although someone possessed of sight have the intrinsic power to see any material body, yet through some extrinsic cause he can be made perpetually incapable of seeing with proximate power, as that if the power [sc. extrinsic cause] makes distance of sight from that body perpetual, as would be if there were a perpetual obstacle between the empyreal heaven and the eye of the damned. That eye would not be able to see the empyreal heaven, speaking of proximate power, and this by an extrinsic cause perpetually hindering the power; yet it could by remote and intrinsic power see it, so that there would be no intrinsic cause of impotency.

351. So I say that there is no intrinsic cause in the will of Michael, now blessed, by which the power otherwise to sin would, in the sense of division, be removed; there is no intrinsic cause altogether preventing the power from being altogether reduced to act. But by extrinsic power does the intrinsic power to sin lack possibility, namely by the will of God forestalling the will so that it always continue the act of enjoyment and so can never reduce to act its remote power of not enjoying, or of sinning - since indeed a second cause, hindered by a superior cause that is acting for one of a pair of opposites, can never, by its proximate power, issue in the other opposite.It is easy enough to see how an extrinsic barrier can prevent the damned from seeing the heaven, though they have the intrinsic power to see it. It is less easy to see how God’s extrinsic power can put a barrier in the way of Michael exercising his intrinsic power to sin. Perhaps it is simply that God makes himself always so present to Michael that this presence is itself the barrier to Michael’s sinning. At all events Michael retains the power freely to sin but God ensures, extrinsically, that he never exercises it. There is some similarity here to so-called ‘Frankfurt cases’, where a person is free to choose between a and b but, if he is about to choose b, some outside agent intervenes to prevent it and ensure choice of a. In fact, however, the person chooses a without ever being about to choose b, and the agent does not have to intervene. The person, then, freely chooses a without in fact being able to do otherwise and choose b. Blessed Michael’s case, on Scotus’ view, seems similar: Michael actually chooses enjoyment, but remains free not to choose it and to sin, save that God would prevent that choice - not intrinsically by removing the power, but extrinsically by preventing its exercise. Or, as Scotus puts it [n.352], Michael remains able by remote power to do otherwise and sin, but not by proximate power [n.353]. ⁵⁸

352. I concede, therefore, the inference that, when one speaks of remote power, beatified Michael is, in the sense of division, capable of sin.

η. To the Authorities from Augustine

353. To the authorities of Augustine:

To the first [n.349] I say Augustine means ‘that it not be able’ by proximate power ‘to sin’; ‘this comes not of nature but the grace of God’, that is, of God gratuitously forestalling and conserving the nature in right action.

354. As to the next [n.349], Augustine does not say that just as now the soul necessarily has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ so then does it necessarily have ‘not wanting iniquity’ - for neither is true when speaking of ‘not wanting’ as it is an elicited act; but just as now the soul perpetually has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ so then will it have ‘not wanting iniquity’.

355. And when you argue: “now our soul so has ‘not wanting’ that it cannot ‘want’,” I say that our soul is not able to want unhappiness, notRemoving the misleading punctuation ‘.. .non. Ideo non potest...’ in the printed text, and replacing it with ‘.. .non ideo non potest.’ ⁵⁹ for the reason that it necessarily has ‘not wanting it’, but because unhappiness cannot be the object of an act of willing. On the other hand, it does not follow that thus our soul could never want iniquity, because iniquity - speaking of what is the substrate in sin - can be the object of a created will. Or one could say briefly that just as now the soul never wants unhappiness but always has ‘habitually not wanting’, so will it then never want [iniquity] - and thus the cases are alike de facto on this side and that.

356. And if you argue, “the soul now is not able to want unhappiness, therefore it will then not be able to want iniquity” - the consequence is not valid, because there can well be a likeness on this side and that as regard ‘is not’ although not as regard ‘cannot’.Sc. the likeness between the soul not wanting unhappiness now and not wanting iniquity then carries over only as regard the fact and not as regard the ability. The soul now both does not and cannot want unhappiness; the soul then does not but can want iniquity (in the way explained above in n.351). ⁶⁰

357. Against this: the indifference of the will is taken away by its determination by a higher cause no less than by a lower cause; therefore if, by reason of its own causality, the will is indeterminate as to operation, it is as repugnant to its nature that this indifference be taken away by a superior cause as by an inferior cause; just as, therefore, it is against the nature of the will that a habit necessarily determine it, so is it against its nature that God determine it.

358. There is a confirmation, that a superior cause more determines an inferior cause than the reverse; therefore, a superior determining cause takes away the indifference in acting of an inferior cause more than if the inferior cause were to do the determining.

359. Again, it is not in the power of the will to act thus or not to act thus, because what a thing is determined to by a superior cause cannot be in the power of the determined thing, for the determined thing acts as it is moved by what determines it; therefore, its act will not be praiseworthy, nor properly voluntary.

360. I reply: the fact that the will in its order of causing causes this thing is proper to this cause [sc. the will]. I reply further that, since contingency on the part of the will is in every way contingency on the part of the effect, this requires the contingency of everything else that concurs in the effect. Now it is repugnant to the will’s nature (or to its freedom) that the contingency that exists necessarily on its part not simply posit the contingency of the effect (as far as the side of all the lower concurring factors is concerned), because this takes away from it its being a cause in an order superior [to those lower factors]. But there is no repugnance to the will’s nature that its own contingency not posit contingency simply in the effect as far as the side of a superior cause is concerned, because a superior cause is not determined by the will. Therefore, it is not simply against the will’s nature that it be determined by a superior cause (that is, that doing the opposite not be against its natureThe meaning of this remark here is obscure. ⁶¹), as it would be against its nature to be determined by a habit or by an inferior nature.

361. To the form of the argument then: it is against the will’s nature to be determined in its own order, and nothing else is primarily repugnant to it; but, as a result, it is against the will’s nature to be determined by an inferior cause, because then it would itself not be the superior cause. Yet it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, because there stands along with this that it is cause in its own order.

362. On the contrary: if the superior cause determines it, then the will is determined in its own order of causing; therefore, in its own order of causing it is not contingent.

363. I reply: by its nature, or because of its determination in its own order, the contingency is as equal as that of the effect which proceeds from it and from other causes. But that the will is not altogether contingent comes from its own contingency, that is, because some prior cause is determinate for that effect.

θ. Further Explanation of the Aforesaid, to Make it More Evident

364. Note [added by Scotus]: operative power does not prove that the possessor of it can operate, unless one understands ‘can in a certain respect’, namely as for as its own part is concerned. But ‘can simply’ requires that there be possibility on the part of all the other concurring factors, namely that these requisite factors can come together and put a stop to impediments. But, over and above this possibility, the proximate power, or rather possibility, requires that the appropriate things be present and that impediments cease. For just as nothing is in proximate passive potency save (Metaphysics 9.7.1049a8-14) “when nothing stands in the way, nor must anything be added or removed or changed” (understand anything other than the form to be induced), so an operative thing is not in proximate power to operating save when nothing extrinsic is lacking to its operating.

365. As to the matter at issue: a will that is blessed is the same power as it was when it was not beatified, and consequently he who has it is, as far as the part of the power is concerned, capable of the act he was capable of before. Further, it is simply possible for him to act, because nothing simply necessarily gets in the way or, being required, is lacking. But he is not able with proximate possibility to sin, because proximate possibility is impeded or prevented (not suspended) on account of the action of a superior cause preventing him and continually acting for the opposite, namely for the beatific act. And just as a superior cause is, with absolute power (yet not with ordained power), able not to act for the opposite, so it is simply possible for the impediment to cease and for the will to sin. But it is not possible for what is an impediment by ordained power to cease, nor even is it in the proximate power of the will to sin; for it is not in its power that the impediment cease, just as the action of a first cause is not in the power of a second cause.

366. It is contrary to the liberty of a cause that it so be necessarily determined that the opposite to willing well through the habit of charity not be in its power. For you, therefore, it is equally contrary to liberty that the will be thus determined by a superior cause.

367. I reply: to be absolutely determined to willing well, such that the opposite not be under the will’s power, is simply not against its liberty (thus is the will determined now by the divine will, otherwise it could now simply proceed to act, just as it can while a wayfarer, though it never will exit into act - and let this be fixed by law, and so let it be against [divine] ordained power). But that it thus were determined to willing well through an inherent habit - this would not be against its liberty in this way. Because the will would not be the will unless it were a prior cause as regard its own habit, and so of a nature to use habit and to determine it to acting and not to be determined by it such that the opposite is not in its power; for then it would (as far as this is concerned) be totally under the habit. But it is not thus against the will’s liberty or its nature, that it be impeded from one action and determined to another by a cause prior to itself, of which sort is the divine will.

368. But does it not have the power of sinning?

I reply: an abstract term indicating the principle of an act construed with the gerundiveSuch a case is ‘the power of sinning’ itself: ‘the power’ is here the abstract term (the concrete term would be the thing having the power), and ‘of sinning’ is the gerundive. A power without the gerundive would be, for example, ‘the seeing power’ or ‘the visual power’, as later in this paragraph. ⁶² signifies the principle of an act as the act proceeds from the supposit; and if the power is with the gerundive it signifies the proximate power. Thus Metaphysics 9.5.1048a16-19: “there is no need to add ‘with no exterior thing standing in the way’. For it has power as it is a power of doing. Now this is not in all but in certain circumstances, where external impediments are excluded.” In other respects, ‘the visual (or seeing) power’ and ‘the power of seeing’ do not say the same thing, because the first states the principle for seeing and the second the possibility for seeing, and then distinctly the remote and the proximate power.That is, ‘visual power’ states the remote power and ‘power of seeing’ the proximate power. ⁶³

369. As to the second [n.359], the act is praiseworthy to the extent the will in its own order contingently determines itself.

370. In another way can it be said that the contingency of the will in its own order entails the contingency simply of its effect, because the contingency of any cause proves a contingent effect, and consequently it is simply contingent that the will does not sin, although this never happens, because the superior cause always preserves it.

371. If you say ‘it is at least in the power of the will that it happen’, one can say that the will is not for this reason less blessed if the happening of it be in the will’s power, provided however it never do happen; but for this reason will it never happen, because the divine will always will prevent it.