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Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.
Book Four. Distinctions 43 - 49
Forty Ninth Distinction. First Part. About the Natural Quality of Beatitude
Question Six. Whether Perpetual Security of Possession Belongs to the Essence of Beatitude
I. To the Question
A. About the Perpetuity of Beatitude
1. About the Reality of Such Perpetuity

1. About the Reality of Such Perpetuity

315. About the first point [n.314] the thing is plain because it is so from Scripture, Matthew 25.46, “The just will go to eternal life;” and id. 22.30, “They will be like the angels of God;” and Psalm 83.5, “They will praise you for ages of ages;” and it is repeated elsewhere.

316. Similarly there are many sayings of the saints to the same effect. Let it be enough to adduce Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.8 n.11, “There cannot be blessed life if it is not immortal.” He proves this by the fact that, if such life can be lost, then the blessed loses it willingly (and then he is not blessed because he does not have what he wants), or he loses it unwillingly, or neither willingly nor unwillingly. And on each of these last two members it follows that he is not blessed; for he does not have beatitude, but rather: if he loses it willingly, he hates it; if he loses it neither willingly nor unwillingly then he does not value it; therefore it is not blessed life either. The like can be argued if beatitude is lost through loss of natural life; for if he loses life, he loses it either willingly or unwillingly or in neither way.

317. And this three-membered distinction of Augustine’s must not be understood to hold for the moment at which blessedness is posited as being lost (because the result, namely that he is not then blessed, would not be unacceptable); but it must be understood for the ‘now’, or the time, for which he is blessed. For if he then does not want to lose blest life and yet does lose it, he does not have whatever he wants. Whether, then, he wants to lose it, or he does not care about it, he does not love that life for the future, even while he has it; therefore he is not blessed.

318. Nor is it reasonable to object that he may lose it but that he does not, while he is blessed, consider the fact, and so he is neutral as regard his will - not indeed by not caring about the apprehended good’s being possessed forever, but by not understanding anything about that ‘being possessed forever’. This, I say, is unreasonable, because how is it he would never consider the perpetuity of the life that he supremely loves if that life is blessed life? Or if he does consider it and believes the life to be perpetual, then he is deceived. But nothing is more unacceptable than that someone be blessed by a false opinion, according to Augustine City of God XI.4.

319. And with this also agrees the authority of the Philosopher On Generation 2.10336b27-29, “We say that in all things nature desires what is better; but it is better always to be than not to be,” at least in the way in which it is possible ‘to be always’; but it is possible for a perpetual nature to be ultimately perpetually perfect; therefore it naturally desires this. And so, in the case of beatitude, where natural desire is completed so as not to be vain, this condition will be obtained.